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5Foreword
Illicit drugs are big business and drug markets continue to be one of the most profitable 
areas for organised crime groups operating in the European Union. Each year Europeans 
spend at least EUR 24 billion on illicit drugs. If the sums of money spent on illicit drugs are 
considerable, then the costs for our communities and citizens are even bigger. The analysis 
presented here explores these costs in detail. They extend beyond simply the harm to 
which those who use drugs are exposed; the collateral damage to society resulting from 
drug market activities is manifest in unsafe communities, damage to legitimate commercial 
activities, the corruption of officials, violent crime and even the destruction of the 
environment. This wider impact is why this topic is so important and why I am pleased that 
two agencies for which I am responsible, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, 
Europol, and our drugs agency, the EMCDDA, have once again joined forces to produce a 
new state-of-the-art analysis of the European drug market and its impact. This information 
is invaluable for policy-makers and governments to be able to make informed choices and 
better policies for the benefit and protection of our citizens and societies overall. 
We live in an increasingly joined-up and fast-moving world in which Europe faces social, 
economic and security challenges on several fronts. Globalisation and technological 
changes are impacting on all aspects of modern life and the drugs market is quick to exploit 
these new opportunities as they arise — as is illustrated by the rapid growth of the open 
trade and sale of new psychoactive substances. In this report it has been necessary to 
address the growing implications of new technology and the internet, the growth in global 
trade and the existence of a commercial infrastructure that enables goods to be moved 
rapidly across international borders. The report shows us why a better understanding of the 
operations of organised crime and the changing business models used by groups active in 
drug trafficking and production can help us better target the vulnerabilities of these groups. 
Importantly, it also explores links to and associations with other criminal activities, such as 
human trafficking and other illicit trade, and how the income generated from the drug trade 
can undermine international development efforts, support insurgency and even finance 
terrorism.
Finally, this report shows clearly that any measures to reduce drug supply will be ineffective 
unless equal vigour is devoted to addressing the demand for illicit drugs and factors that 
foster involvement in the drug trade. The EU Drug Markets Report 2016 demonstrates the 
importance and the growing complexity of the problems we face in this area. I am also 
convinced, however, that the points for action it contains will make a valuable contribution 
to both European and national strategies to disrupt the drug market and reduce the harm 
it causes. 
Dimitris Avramopoulos 
European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship
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In 2013, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and 
Europol published the EU drug markets report: a strategic analysis, which was the first 
report of its kind, bringing together our knowledge and understanding of the operation and 
structure of the drug market within the broader context of the illicit drugs phenomenon. 
In this report, we build upon the groundwork carried out during that first joint analysis, 
developing the themes and applying new ideas and concepts that give us an improved 
insight into this dynamic policy-relevant field. The coupling of Europol’s expertise and 
knowledge of criminal networks with the EMCDDA’s holistic overview of the drug situation 
helps to separate important signals from the ever-present noise. This provides a unique 
insight that will inform policy development and facilitate action at European Union (EU) 
and national level.
In this report we present cross-cutting themes that help us understand the illicit drug 
market. For this we first need to explain what exactly we mean by ‘drug market’. Here we 
use the term to describe the entire chain of events from the production of the drug in the 
source country to acquisition of the drug by the user in the destination country. We can 
think of this in terms of the processes, the actors and the impacts/harms. The process 
includes, but is not limited to, the farming of drug crops; the procurement of precursor 
chemicals and specialist equipment; the production of the drug itself; trafficking activities 
and routes; concealment methods; the adulteration steps; and the distribution from 
wholesale all the way down to the retail level and, finally, consumption. The actors involved 
are farmers or synthetic drug ‘cooks’, members of organised criminal groups, facilitators, 
corrupt officials, middlemen, professionals, whether complicit or not, specialists providing 
criminal services, dealers and consumers. In addition, the report considers the broader 
harms associated with drug markets and their impact on society.
Reflecting upon the conclusions and recommendations of the first edition, we find that 
many are still relevant today, while some new themes are emerging. For example, the 
adaptable and opportunistic nature of organised crime remains a key challenge for law 
enforcement, often hampered by the refocusing of national priorities or the need to 
work with diminishing resources. Criminal elements respond to innovations and take 
advantage of their ready access to large amounts of cash to buy specialist services, such 
as the hacking of computer systems, or the latest communication equipment with secure 
encryption technologies. The internet continues to change how we live, and the recent 
developments of anonymising software and crypto-currencies such as ‘bitcoin’ offer new 
opportunities for online drug supply. Traditional trafficking routes persist, but diversification 
continues, and the routes appear to be less commodity specific than before, whilst 
legitimate transport and logistic infrastructures continue to be exploited, with maritime 
containers representing a convenient channel for large consignments of drugs coming to 
Europe.
There has been progress on many of the recommendations, and the report was influential 
in informing EU policy initiatives in this area. Examples of the wide range of initiatives 
being undertaken both within the EU and internationally are included in the report, and 
considerable work has been undertaken to improve our knowledge of organised crime 
operations and to focus on the individuals and groups who are most harmful, but there still 
remains more to be done. In some areas there has been less progress and, as a result, work 
on these recommendations needs to continue; however, new challenges are also emerging.
Our understanding of how criminal actors and activities in the drug market permeate our 
society has evolved to the point at which we can begin to describe it in some detail. Our 
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analysis shows how drug markets are related to other criminal activities, and that they 
create a strain on government institutions and have a serious impact on legal business 
and the wider economy, not to mention negative effects on neighbourhoods, families 
and individuals. We report how the drugs business and the organised crime groups that 
control it have an impact upon many aspects of society, from the exploitation of vulnerable 
migrants as a workforce for cannabis cultivation to the corruption of officials in public office.
The report also considers the critical success factors for criminal organisations operating 
within the drugs market and the conditions that influence their operations. Building on 
previous research projects, we present for the first time estimates of the retail market size, 
in terms of quantity and value, for the main drugs. These have been constructed as far as 
possible from the data routinely submitted by Member States to the EMCDDA, and we 
have been guided in doing so by an advisory group of leading experts in these methods. In 
making these estimates we have made some very bold assumptions, and the figures we 
have derived must be seen as indicative only. However, we believe that this is the right time 
to start undertaking this work, and that the estimation process itself will highlight important 
gaps in our knowledge which, if filled, will lead to improvements in the estimates in the 
future as the methodology is refined.
At the same time, we must not forget the on-going instability in some neighbouring regions 
that could have potentially profound effects on the drug situation in Europe. It is clear that 
illicit drug markets remain one of the key threats to the security of the European Union. 
Efforts to understand them and the key actors involved are essential if we are to make 
sound policy decisions that will have any lasting impact. This report aims to improve that 
understanding and provide a platform for debate in the coming years. After all, drug markets 
are essentially driven by two simple motives: profit and power. The ability to undermine 
these motives is critical if we are to have any impact on drug-related crime and reduce the 
wider impacts on society.
Alexis Goosdeel    Rob Wainwright
Director, EMCDDA   Director, Europol
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Executive summary
This report explores the concept of the illicit drug market within the broader context of 
changing patterns of drug use, cultural and social factors and links to wider criminality. 
Drug markets continue to be one of the most profitable areas for organised crime groups 
(OCGs) and it is estimated that EU citizens spend over EUR 24 billion (range EUR 21 
to 31 billion) every year on illicit drugs. The impacts that drug markets have on society 
are correspondingly large and go beyond the harms caused by drug use. They include 
involvement in other types of criminal activities and in terrorism; impacts on legal 
businesses and the wider economy; strain on and corruption of government institutions; 
and impacts on wider society.
Three overarching themes emerge from our analysis:
 n The increasing organisational and technical complexity, interconnectedness and 
specialisation of groups involved in drug markets.
 n Globalisation and technology are accelerating the rate of change in the drug market.
 n Drug market-related activities are concentrated in a number of established and emerging 
geographical locations.
These developments challenge those trying to respond to the problems created by the illicit 
drug market and the associated wider problems and suggest that:
 n A systemic analysis of drug market business models will be helpful for both operational 
and policy purposes.
 n Partnerships between national authorities and with industry are becoming ever more 
important, as is engagement with international organisations and third countries.
 n Efficient use of resources can be achieved through the identification and targeting of 
geographical locations where drug market-related activities are concentrated.
 n Continuing recognition of the value of a strategic response, informed by sound 
information used to identify new opportunities as well as challenges, is essential.
The report also looks in more detail at the markets for the main drug types and the key 
points are summarised below.
Cannabis is the most widely used drug in Europe and it is estimated that cannabis 
accounts for around 38 % of the retail market for illicit drugs and is worth more than 
EUR 9.3 billion annually (range EUR 8.4 to 12.9 billion). Some 22 million adults in the EU 
have used it in the last year and around 1 % of European adults use it on an almost daily 
basis, increasing the risk of health and social problems. OCGs are heavily involved, making 
full use of technological innovations to produce larger quantities of more potent products 
in Europe itself. While the market is dominated by herbal cannabis grown within the EU, 
the cannabis resin from Morocco has been increasing in potency and may be trafficked to 
the EU alongside other illicit goods and human beings, a trend potentially exacerbated by 
instability in North Africa and the Middle East.
The heroin market is the second largest illicit drug market in the EU. It is estimated at 
EUR 6.8 billion annually (range EUR 6.0 to 7.8 billion) and is responsible for a significant 
proportion of drug-related deaths and social costs. Following a period of decline, there are 
recent signs of increasing availability that may signal increased harms. Opium production 
remains generally high in Afghanistan. Production techniques, locations, trafficking routes 
and modi operandi are increasingly flexible and dynamic, as shown by an increase in 
very large heroin seizures, suggesting a shift to maritime container trafficking, and new 
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routes involving Africa, the Southern Caucasus, Syria and Iraq are emerging. Nevertheless, 
the Balkan route remains a key corridor for heroin entry to the EU. There are also signs 
of diversification in the market, with prescription medicines and new synthetic opioids 
increasingly being misused.
Cocaine is Europe’s most commonly used illicit stimulant, with a retail market estimated 
to be worth at least EUR 5.7 billion annually (range EUR 4.5 to 7.0 billion). Most use occurs 
in western and southern Europe and has been fairly stable over recent years, although 
there are signs of increasing availability. Coca cultivation appears to be increasing after a 
period of decline but there is uncertainty about how much cocaine is produced and where 
this occurs. Sea and air transport are used to traffic cocaine to Europe, with Colombia, 
Brazil and Venezuela being key departure points. The Caribbean and West Africa remain 
important transit areas, while Central America is emerging. Use of maritime containers 
shipped through major European ports is a continuing problem. An evolving array of 
concealment methods is used, including cocaine being incorporated into ‘carrier materials’ 
(e.g. plastics) before being chemically extracted on arrival in Europe. Colombian and Italian 
groups continue to dominate wholesale cocaine supply to Europe, in cooperation with other 
groups (e.g. Dutch, British and Spanish). West African, especially Nigerian, groups are also 
active in transporting cocaine from Africa to Europe and Balkan OCGs are emerging actors.
The market for the main synthetic stimulants, amphetamine, methamphetamine and 
MDMA, is estimated to be at least EUR 1.8 billion annually (range EUR 1.2 to 2.5 billion) 
in the case of amphetamines (including methamphetamine) and EUR 0.67 billion (range 
EUR 0.61 to 0.72 billion) for MDMA/ecstasy. Amphetamines appeal to both recreational 
and marginalised drug users and the market for them interacts with those for cocaine and 
some new psychoactive substances. Recent concerns include the availability of high-dose 
MDMA products and the increased use of methamphetamine. In the EU, the Netherlands 
and Belgium are important for MDMA and amphetamine production, while most 
methamphetamine appears to be made in the Czech Republic. Production is becoming 
more sophisticated and diverse, and the use of new precursor and pre-precursor chemicals 
may increase health risks. The dumping of toxic waste also poses health risks and causes 
environmental damage. Aggressive marketing is becoming more apparent in the ecstasy 
market suggesting competition between suppliers and more active targeting of specific 
groups of users.
A large number of new psychoactive substances (NPS) are sold openly as ‘legal’ 
replacements for illicit drugs. There are no signs of a slowdown in the development of 
these substances; 100 new substances were reported for the first time in 2015 and the EU 
Early Warning System is monitoring over 560. The market supplies both recreational and, 
increasingly, marginalised users and producers anticipate legal and regulatory controls 
by developing new substances. Globalised supply chains allow bulk quantities of NPS to 
be ordered online and transported to Europe where they are packaged and marketed on 
the open or illicit drug market. It is a low-risk, high-profit business attractive to organised 
crime and there are signs of production in Europe. Distinct but overlapping markets 
have emerged, such as ‘legal highs’, ‘research chemicals’ and ‘dietary supplements’ sold 
through ‘bricks and mortar’ and online shops. With increased availability, harms have 
increased, such as acute, sometimes fatal, poisonings and harms associated with injecting 
cathinones.
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Overview
Background and aims of the report
This report provides a contemporary, strategic and action-orientated analysis of the 
information available on Europe’s drug market. It is built on a synthesis of operational 
intelligence, research data and information available from the on-going monitoring of 
the drug situation. The extent and nature of the drug market, in all its ramifications, is an 
important topic for this sort of consideration. Significant effort and resources are dedicated 
to restricting the supply of drugs in the European Union (EU) as part of an integrated 
and evidence-based balanced approach that also recognises the parallel importance of 
reducing the demand for drugs. The justification for these investments is that activities in 
this area benefit both public health and community safety as well as contributing more 
generally to economic and social wellbeing. But sound policy and actions in an area such 
as drug control are possible only if they are grounded in an understanding of the complex 
nature of the problems they are addressing. The hidden, and criminal, nature of the 
drug market makes it a challenging issue in this respect. Moreover, these challenges are 
growing, as the drug market has become more dynamic, internally interlinked and externally 
connected to many of the other critical policy issues Europe faces today. This report helps 
address these information needs by providing a state-of-the-art review of the data currently 
available in this area, and draws from this analysis key learning and action points.
The report describes the EU drug market from a number of different perspectives. Starting 
with consideration of the overall impact of the drug market on society, the overlap with 
other criminal activities and the drivers of these, it then takes a more in-depth look at what 
is known about the markets for the main illicit drugs. The last part of the report then reviews 
the policy and operational responses to the challenges posed by these markets. Thus, the 
report is intended to provide a comprehensive overview of what is known about the European 
drug market. This is unavoidably derived from a triangulation between diverse, partial and 
often contradictory information sources. While putting these together helps provide a more 
complete picture, it remains important to acknowledge uncertainty and identify where critical 
information gaps exist. Therefore, throughout this report attention is also drawn to ‘what we 
don’t know, but need to know, about the European drug market’, an essential introspection if 
future policies and actions in this area are to deliver maximum returns.
Insights provided by an analysis of the EU drug market in 2016
A number of overarching key themes emerge from the analysis presented in this report. There 
is increasing evidence that organised crime groups continue to take advantage of weak states 
and conflict zones, a situation that appears to be worsening. Furthermore, organised criminal 
groups actively facilitate their illicit business by managing risks and avoiding detection. This 
may be accomplished by establishing front companies, using the latest encryption and other 
technologies, hiring specialists to provide ‘crime as a service’, by corrupting officials and 
professionals, and by the use or threat of violence. At the same time, globalisation and the 
internet have continued to play a key part in transforming the way in which the drug market 
operates, resulting in supply chains becoming shorter and opportunities for detection being 
reduced. These developments represent major challenges for existing policy and practice in 
this area, but a better understanding of them may present new opportunities to intervene. 
There is a need to reinforce international cooperation efforts and to ensure that the available 
legal and judicial mechanisms, tools and platforms are used effectively. Efforts to improve 
the sharing of information and intelligence on a strategic and operational basis, building 
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border control capacities where needed, and to develop closer collaboration both between 
different law enforcement agencies, and between these agencies and the private sector, are 
clear priority areas for action. The exchange of knowledge, expertise and best practice, and 
the provision of training are domains in which the collective EU experience has the ability to 
plug gaps in vulnerable areas. It is abundantly clear that there are key strategic locations for 
the drug market and therefore coordinated operational activities targeting these areas are 
likely to be particularly valuable. Beyond this, the expanding demand for drugs in countries 
neighbouring the EU and elsewhere must have consequences for the EU in the future, and 
therefore vigilance and international engagement are likely to become even more important. 
Lastly, but of considerable importance, is the recognition that the drug market concept is 
one where the supply of drugs interacts with the demand for these substances. In order to 
adequately address the negative consequences of the drug market, both for individuals and 
for society as a whole, effective drug prevention, treatment and harm reduction interventions 
are as important as interventions aimed at reducing supply.
Key themes and their implications for action
Three overarching, interconnected themes emerge from the analysis developed in this 
report:
The increasing organisational and technical complexity, interconnectedness and 
specialisation of groups involved in drug markets. It is now common for organised 
crime groups (OCGs) involved with the drug market to diversify across multiple drugs, to 
engage in other forms of criminality, and to form alliances across ethnic and geographical 
boundaries. Meanwhile there is more specialisation seen in respect of roles and the use 
and sharing of assets alongside the harnessing of specialist expertise.
Globalisation and technology are accelerating the rate of change in the drug market. The 
dramatic transformation seen in legitimate commodity markets arising from developments 
in the global economy and information technology also affect the illicit drug market. 
Criminal groups are quick to identify and exploit the opportunities provided by easier 
access to information, the internet as a social and commercial medium, and the growth 
in international trade, with large volumes of goods rapidly moving across international 
borders and through multiple transit points.
Drug market-related activities are concentrated in a number of established and emerging 
geographical locations. Innovation in synthetic drug production and changes in cannabis 
cultivation have resulted in greater opportunities for drugs to be produced nearer to 
consumer markets in the EU. Nevertheless, within Europe and elsewhere, some specific 
geographical locations or ‘hotspots’ remain particularly important for drug production or 
trafficking. Some of these areas are long established, while new zones are also emerging.
For those taking action in this area, these themes have important implications, which are 
elaborated further in the action points in the main body of this report. They are:
A systemic analysis of drug market business models will be helpful for both operational 
and policy purposes. Understanding the dependencies and potential for interaction 
between different areas of the drug market, and the rationales, roles and organisational 
models used within it, is of growing importance. This perspective can assist the disruption 
of market activities by identifying modi operandi, structural vulnerabilities and emerging 
new threats, helping to refocus operational priorities on key target areas.
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The EU Drug Markets Report — main elements
This report uses the concept of the drug market as a useful perspective for focusing on the 
illicit production, trafficking and sale of controlled substances. The rationale for this is that, 
despite being one of the priority areas for drug control policy and supply reduction activities, 
the drug market is rarely considered holistically or systemically and yet such a perspective 
is likely to be critically important to both the formulation and evaluation of activities in this 
area. Supply reduction efforts are central to Europe’s response to the drug problem, and in 
this report these are considered within the general context of a multidisciplinary approach 
which has the objective of improving public safety, with a focus on protecting public health, 
but also preventing and reducing violence and other harmful consequences associated 
with the production, distribution and use of drugs. At a strategic level, the identification, 
disruption and dismantling of serious organised crime groups involved in drug trafficking, 
money laundering and corruption are key elements of law enforcement activities in this area.
One of the key aims of this report is to highlight that drug markets, though largely hidden, 
do not operate in isolation but have widespread implications for society. Part I of the report 
explores the impacts of the drug market and the harms it causes not only to those involved 
in the trade, but also to the legal economy, government institutions and society more 
Partnerships between national authorities and with industry are becoming ever more 
important, as is engagement with international organisations and third countries. 
Organised crime groups are likely to be active in a diverse range of criminal activities, 
spanning, or deliberately exploiting the existence of, national borders and involving links 
with legitimate business sectors. This means that inter-sectoral cooperation, coordination 
and intelligence sharing, both within and between countries, are of increasing value. 
Correspondingly, poorly coordinated responses may increase the risk of displacement to 
those areas where enforcement efforts or regulatory frameworks are weakest; transnational 
crime requires a transnational response.
Efficient use of resources can be achieved through the identification and targeting of 
geographical locations where drug market-related activities are concentrated. Such 
specific locations, which include large container ports, parcel delivery hubs, specific land 
or air border points, and relatively discrete geographical areas used for drug production, 
represent priority targets for interdiction efforts. More generally, the larger but still distinct 
geographical areas identified in this report as important zones for drug production or 
trafficking activities deserve special attention, and coordinated action plans, addressing 
development and governance issues alongside drug-related programmes, will be 
necessary for an effective response.
Continuing recognition of the value of a strategic response, informed by sound information 
used to identify new opportunities, as well as challenges, is essential. This report makes 
a strong case for continuing to invest in an intelligence- and data-driven approach to the 
drug market, which is supported by concrete examples of how and why this works. Looking 
to the future, the need to anticipate and respond more rapidly to emerging threats is clearly 
growing. It is equally important to identify and exploit new opportunities, for example: 
insights derived from forensic data (so-called ‘forensic intelligence’); new technologies 
for monitoring and surveillance; increased opportunities for international engagement 
driven by the recognition of shared problems; and growing operational understanding and 
capacity to work in challenging areas, such as cyber-enabled drug markets.
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generally. The links with other serious criminality that may also be perpetrated by organised 
crime groups involved in the drug trade are also explored. This includes human trafficking 
and exploitation, and there is also some evidence of links to terrorist activities. The damage 
to the environment caused by the dumping of waste materials from drug production is 
often overlooked, but its impact can be severe and include harm to fragile ecosystems and 
surrounding populations in producing regions, or pollution to land and water systems in the 
EU. Part I also examines the current drivers of drug market evolution, such as developments 
arising from globalisation and technological developments, including the increasingly 
important role of the internet in information exchange and as a marketplace.
Another new element of this report is the inclusion of an estimate of the size of Europe’s 
drug market. Calculations in this area are extremely challenging, and the approach used 
here has been a deliberately cautious one. Based on the available data, a minimum 
estimate is provided, noting that some consumption remains unknown and cannot 
at present be included. Even a minimum estimate in this area, however, represents a 
considerable financial sum. Additionally, it is hoped that the existence of a data-based 
estimate, with identified areas for future improvement, not only provides a useful and 
technically credible baseline for informing current policy discussions, but also represents 
an important step to inform the future work necessary to improve the estimates. The 
methodology of how these estimates have been derived can be found in a supporting 
technical report.
Part II of the report provides an analysis of the market for each of the main drug types, 
discussed in order according to their market share: cannabis; heroin and other opioids; 
cocaine; and then the synthetic drugs amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA 
together. The new psychoactive substances, being slightly different from the other 
substances considered here, are dealt with separately at the end of Part II. Discussion of 
each drug follows a similar structure, commencing with the key issues in brief, followed 
by a detailed analysis, and then finishing with action points. These chapters detail the 
specificities of the market for each substance, but also illustrate the links between 
the different market areas. This is a point of critical importance to successful policy 
formation, as actions targeting any specific substance risk being ineffective, or even 
counterproductive, if they do not take into account their possible wider ramifications for 
other aspects of the drug market.
Finally, in any action-orientated analysis it is also necessary to both recognise the 
importance of, and describe, existing policies, structures and activities that are currently 
targeting the market-related aspects of Europe’s drug problem and Part III of the report 
focuses on these. Here the relevant EU policies and legal, institutional and financial 
arrangements are described, as well as the actions and initiatives undertaken by the 
relevant bodies that play a role in their implementation. Many of these reflect the priorities 
and action points identified in the first EU drug markets report: a strategic analysis, 
emphasising the value that a strategic perspective can have in this area. Many of the issues 
described in that initial analysis remain important today and are further elaborated here. 
The 2016 analysis is, however, more grounded in published evidence, and the speed of 
development in this area has been so rapid that important new elements now need to be 
considered. Concrete examples of this include the role the internet is now playing with 
respect to drug supply and the continuing problems posed by the introduction of new 
psychoactive substances. These are two examples of issues that were addressed in 2013 
but which have had to be significantly updated and revised for this report.
This report is accompanied by a Strategic Overview aimed at policymakers and covering the 
key points. This main report, in contrast, is intended as a more detailed reference document 
for professionals, practitioners and researchers working in the field of drug supply reduction. 
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The routine data that support the analysis, as well as the studies that were commissioned 
to inform the analysis provided in this report, are published separately and are available 
online. The EMCDDA and Europol would like to acknowledge all who played a part in the 
production of the report. We are indebted to our colleagues at the European Commission 
and other EU bodies and also note in particular the specialist networks of experts working 
in this area across Europe, whose insights and advice have proved invaluable in informing 
the drafting of this report.
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Key issues — Part I
Understanding the impact of drug markets and drivers of development
Drugs are big business, estimated to make up about one-fifth of global crime proceeds. 
In the EU they have been estimated to account for 0.1–0.6 % of the GDP (gross domestic 
product) of the nine Member States for which published data are available.
The EU retail drug market is estimated to be worth at least EUR 24 billion a year. The 
cannabis market is the largest, making up about 38 % of the total, followed by heroin 
(28 %) and cocaine (24 %). These estimates are based on limited data, with many gaps. 
Information about the economics of other aspects of the drug market is even more scanty.
The ramifications of the illicit drug market are wide ranging and go beyond the harms 
caused by drug use. They include:
 n involvement in other types of criminal activities and in terrorism;
 n impacts on legitimate businesses and the wider economy;
 n strain on and corruption of government institutions;
 n impacts on wider society.
Drug supply can usefully be viewed from a business perspective; consideration of 
features such as architecture, reputation and innovation, as well as risk minimisation and 
displacement, may identify new areas for law enforcement intervention.
Globalisation is a key driver for change and innovation in drug markets; organised crime 
groups (OCGs) rapidly exploit new opportunities for increasing profits and evading 
detection, while authorities often lack the commensurate flexibility to respond.
As with other consumer goods, the internet has had an important influence on the drug 
business, providing both open and hidden sales outlets, as well as opportunities to shorten 
the supply chain and for perceived anonymity for technology-savvy consumers on dark 
marketplaces, while reducing opportunities for law enforcement intervention.
Impact on the legal economy
The large amounts of cash generated by the drugs trade have to be legitimised in some 
way, and a portion needs to be sent overseas to pay suppliers.
Illegal money impacts on the legal economy as businesses and high-value assets are 
acquired to ‘launder’ cash. These ‘investments’ distort the true economy, leaving legitimate 
businesses and consumers at a competitive disadvantage.
The activities of criminals engaged in the drug market may have a direct impact on 
legitimate businesses, such as exposing companies to the risk of being associated with 
trade-based money laundering schemes, the theft of electricity or damage to rental 
properties used for drug production.
Wider criminal activity
Criminals, particularly OCGs, are adaptable, and hence there are many ways in which 
drug markets and those involved in them interact with other areas of illegal activity. These 
overlaps are not always recognised, so our knowledge of the extent of these interactions is 
limited and important intelligence and opportunities for action may be missed.
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The interactions with other criminal activities can be viewed as being of three broad types:
1.  when those involved in drug supply engage in the trade of other illicit goods, for 
example, firearms or migrant smuggling;
2.  when drug supply is used as a means to a different end, as when it provides financing 
for other criminal activities or when drugs are used to control those being exploited;
3.  when other criminal activity is integral to the drug trafficking activity, for example when 
trafficked individuals are coerced into participation in drug production or trafficking; 
when corruption is used to facilitate trafficking; when profits are laundered; when cash is 
smuggled to pay for supplies; or when violence is used to maintain market position.
Terrorism
Internationally there is evidence of some links between OCGs involved in drug trafficking 
and terrorist organisations, which use these links to fund their terrorist activities. However, 
these relationships are largely functional in nature.
In Europe, terrorist activity is increasingly fragmented, mainly carried out by either small 
cells or even a ‘lone wolf’. Some of these terrorists may finance their activities through drug 
dealing or trafficking, but other sources of funding seem to be more common.
While some Member States have already addressed this issue, the functional separation and 
specialisation of those tackling terrorism and drugs can result in some links being overlooked.
Strain on and corruption of government institutions
Drug supply reduction activities account for the largest share of drug-related expenditure in 
most countries; budgets for public order and safety from which these activities are financed 
are under increasing pressure, adding to the strain on already tight resources.
The corruption of public officials in law enforcement and the judiciary, as well as those 
operating at the political level, facilitates the operation of the illegal market and exerts a 
corrosive effect, undermining the authority of governments. The corruption of professionals 
is also a common feature of how criminals avoid anti-money laundering regulations and 
manage to operate their illegal business within the licit economy.
Development and stability are adversely affected in transitional and developing drug-
producing or transit countries, which are often targeted by criminals because of their weak 
governance structures. In such countries, where there may be few alternative options 
for legitimate income generation, drug policies need to be integrated with international 
development programmes.
Impacts on wider society
Drug dependence is particularly associated with the need to commit acquisitive crime, 
causing losses to individual victims and businesses.
Drug-related violence, including homicide, is present in some drug markets as an inherent 
component used to gain market dominance or for the resolution of disputes. As well 
as affecting individuals and families, such systemic violence contributes to feelings of 
insecurity within neighbourhoods, as does the operation of open drug markets.
Drug production generally involves the use of chemicals, many of which are harmful to the 
environment when the waste materials are dumped. This threatens both fragile ecosystems 
and the populations where laboratories are located, in the EU and in other drug-producing 
regions of the world. In addition, a range of other harms are associated with the cultivation 
of cannabis, coca and opium poppies, such as deforestation and erosion; these harms, 
although they largely affect countries outside Europe, may nevertheless have an indirect 
impact in the EU through migration, destabilisation and climate change.
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Illicit drugs are big business. The hidden nature of the illicit 
drugs business makes it difficult to estimate the amount 
of money it generates, but the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has estimated that illegal 
drugs account for about 20 % (17–25 %) of global crime 
proceeds and are equivalent to about 0.6–0.9 % of global 
gross domestic product (GDP) (UNODC, 2011a). However, 
it is important to bear in mind that such figures are not 
precise estimates but rather an indication of orders of 
magnitude. To put the size of the illicit drug market into the 
context of the wider economy in the European Union (EU), 
it has been estimated that illegal drug production and 
trafficking in the eight Member States for which data are 
available (1) represented between 0.1 % and 0.6 % of the 
national GDP in the period 2006–13 (Warmark Magnusson, 
2008; ISTAT, 2014).
In the EU, the retail market for illicit drugs is estimated to 
have been worth at least EUR 24 billion in 2013 (range 
EUR 21 billion to EUR 31 billion); the cannabis market is 
the largest, accounting for about 38 % of the total, followed 
by the heroin (28 %) and cocaine (24 %) markets (Figure 
1.1). These new estimates are based on very limited data, 
with many gaps, which has necessitated some very broad 
assumptions. Hence, these figures must be viewed as 
initial minimum estimates that will need to be revised in 
the future as the data underpinning them is improved 
(see box on page 28). The estimation process has built on 
previous work in the area (Trautmann et al., 2013) and uses 
a demand-side estimation approach described in detail 
in the accompanying technical report (EMCDDA, 2016a). 
Beyond estimates of the size of the retail market there is 
a need to develop our understanding of the economics of 
other aspects of the drug market, such as production and 
wholesale supply activities, to allow a fuller estimation of 
(1) Estimates are publicly available for the Czech Republic (2010), France 
(2013), Germany (2011), Italy (2011), the Netherlands (2010), Spain 
(2010), Sweden (2006) and the United Kingdom (2009). The combined 
GDP of these countries accounts for over 80 % of the total EU-28 GDP.
the costs and revenue generated at other stages of the 
drug market and inform broader estimates of illicit financial 
flows relating to the illicit drug market in the future.
The impact that drug markets have on societies is not 
restricted to their financial weight. As well as generating 
vast sums of money, as was highlighted in the previous 
edition of this report, drug markets are increasingly 
diversified and globalised and interact more and more 
with other licit and illicit markets and activities. Thus, 
drug production and supply, and the individuals or groups 
engaged in these activities, cannot be considered in 
isolation: they have connections and impacts throughout 
the criminal sphere, the licit economy, government 
institutions and society more generally.
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FIGURE 1.1
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These areas of interaction and overlap can be considered 
within four broad groupings, as illustrated in Figure 1.2, 
although the distinctions between these groupings are 
blurred. These broad areas, the most important of which are 
discussed in more detail below, are:
1.  interference in or involvement with legitimate 
businesses and the wider economy;
2.  involvement in other types of criminal activities, e.g. 
human trafficking and exploitation, and terrorism;
3.  strain on and corruption of government institutions;
4.  impacts on society in general.
The impact of drug markets on 
legal business and the economy
Drug trafficking interferes with legal economic activity 
in many different ways, as do other types of crime. The 
consequences stem largely from the direct and indirect 
influences of the large amounts of money generated by 
the illicit trade, which must be legitimised, but also from 
the direct impact of losses to legitimate business and 
corruption associated with the drug trade.
The extent of illicit financial flows
The drug trade generates large sums of money that then 
need to be dealt with in some way, and a range of methods 
The challenge of estimating the size of the illicit drug market
The illicit nature of drug supply means that the market 
is hidden and collecting data on the nature and extent 
of the phenomenon is very difficult; for this reason there 
are important gaps in our knowledge of key aspects. This 
hampers the estimation of the size of the market and any 
such estimates have a number of important limitations and 
often vary considerably as a result of the use of different 
data sources and the assumptions made to fill in gaps.
For this report our approach has been to use, wherever 
possible, data sources that are collected routinely 
and reported to the EMCDDA by most EU countries 
to enhance consistency and facilitate on-going 
development. Methods of imputation for missing data 
and all assumptions made, together with the limitations 
of the current estimates, have been documented in 
detail in the technical report (EMCDDA, 2016a).
The estimation process essentially involves taking 
estimates of the number of people who use each drug 
in a year for each country in the EU and then multiplies 
these by an estimate of the average amount used in a year 
and the average retail price in each country. The national 
estimates are then summed to provide a European total.
Key limitations to be borne in mind when considering the 
estimates presented here are:
 n Undercoverage. General population surveys of adults 
(aged 15–64 years) have formed the basis of most of 
the estimates of numbers of users, but it is known that 
some groups of users, particularly some marginalised 
groups, may be under-represented in these surveys. 
While we have attempted to use estimates of problem 
users and treatment data to identify use by some of 
these groups, there are still likely to be gaps in coverage.
 n Under-reporting of use. Estimates of numbers of 
users, as well as of frequency of use and amounts 
consumed, are based on self-reports and it is known 
that, particularly with respect to stigmatised behaviours, 
people will often underestimate or under-report use. 
We have not made any adjustment for this because, at 
present, we have no robust data on which to base any 
adjustment and the extent of under-reporting is likely to 
vary considerably between countries.
 n Knowledge gaps. There are significant gaps in the 
availability of the basic information that we need to 
estimate market size. In particular, we have very little 
information about the amounts of drugs used by 
different groups of users (such as occasional versus 
frequent users), the relative use of different forms 
of drugs (e.g. cannabis resin versus herb or ecstasy 
powder versus tablets) or quantities consumed in 
different countries, although we do know that there 
are large differences between countries. Similarly, 
information on the prices paid is limited. In such areas, 
we have had to make assumptions and use the best 
data available.
In the light of the above limitations and others described 
in the accompanying technical report, it is clear that the 
estimates presented in this report must be interpreted 
with caution and must be seen as minimum estimates. 
There is a need to develop a programme of work to 
improve the basic data on which such estimates are 
based to improve future estimates.
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are used by those engaged in the market to integrate these 
financial flows into the licit economy to legitimise income 
and establish power and influence. Obtaining estimates of 
the extent and sources of illicit financial flows is challenging 
but, as indicated above, drug trafficking is a major 
contributor to these, estimated to account for about one-fifth 
of all crime proceeds and about half of all transnational 
organised crime proceeds in 2009 (UNODC, 2011a). The 
important contribution of the drug trade to illicit financial 
flows was also highlighted in a recent report looking at illicit 
trade in the EU (Savona and Riccardi, 2015). This estimated 
that illicit drug markets in the EU (heroin, cocaine, cannabis, 
amphetamines and ecstasy) accounted for one-quarter of 
the proceeds from all illicit retail markets.
An analysis of the cocaine trade carried out as part of the 
UNODC study yielded an estimated global value equivalent 
to EUR 61 billion (2) (USD 85 billion) in 2009, of which 
EUR 60 billion (USD 84 billion) was considered to be gross 
profit (3). The analysis sought to take account of what is 
(2) US dollar amounts have been converted to euros using 2009 exchange rates.
(3) Although, strictly speaking, this is not gross profit as no expenses were de-
ducted. It should be noted that the methodology used in these estimates 
was different from that used in our estimates of the retail market, e.g. 
including wholesale activities, and is therefore not directly comparable.
known about the structure of the cocaine market and the 
impact of seizures, and the fact that many of those involved 
at the lower levels of trafficking organisations make very 
little, if any, profit, while a few at the higher echelons make 
huge sums. The cocaine market in Europe was estimated to 
be worth EUR 19.4 billion (USD 27.5 billion) overall in 2009, 
with 44 % of retail profits and 90 % of wholesale profits 
(or 55 % of total profits) being available for laundering, 
equivalent to EUR 10.8 billion (USD 15.1 billion). Not all 
of this would be laundered within Europe; the analysis 
suggested that about half would be laundered in the country 
in which it was generated and that some would flow out 
of the region (e.g. to the Caribbean or South America), 
but almost equivalent amounts would flow in (e.g. South 
American organised crime groups (OCGs) investing in 
property in Spain), so that net outflows from the region 
would be small (UNODC, 2011a).
If we assume that the figure of 44 % of retail profits being 
available for laundering holds for other European drug 
markets and apply it to our estimate of retail market size of 
about EUR 24 billion, this would suggest that something 
in the region of EUR 11 billion arising from the retail drug 
trade in the EU might be laundered annually. However, this 
is a crude estimate and needs to be treated with caution.
FIGURE 1.2
The widespread ramifications of illicit drug markets on society
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Money laundering
The profits from the drugs trade generally need to be 
‘laundered’ to make them appear legal before they can be 
used further. Money laundering schemes are often complex, 
involving the placement of the ‘dirty’ money into the financial 
system, transferring it internationally to increase the distance 
from the initial transaction in an attempt to obscure the audit 
trail and hamper detection efforts, and then returning the 
‘clean’ money to the hands of the criminal in a manner that 
does not arouse suspicion. In many EU countries, prosecution 
for money laundering depends on linking the money to the 
predicate offence, i.e. the underlying criminality that generated 
the profits in the first place. Proving a link between suspicious 
funds and a specific predicate offence remains a key challenge 
for law enforcement. Drug offences account for 21 % of all 
predicate offences in the EU, the highest proportion of all 
crimes according to a survey of the Member States conducted 
by Europol — ahead of corruption/bribery (14 %), fraud and 
swindling/scams (11 %), and human trafficking/smuggling 
of migrants (10 %) (Europol, 2015a). A limited number of 
Member States have provisions for ‘unexplained wealth’, 
whereby the authorities can pursue civil forfeiture if they can 
prove that wealth has not been derived from a legitimate 
source. Indications of criminality, however, are normally 
required in order to achieve forfeiture. Such investigations 
require significant investment in order to be successful: a 
combination of specially trained officers and prosecutors, 
international cooperation and a degree of persistence. They 
can last several years in complex cases. The investigation of 
money laundering offences is a key priority in the EU Policy 
Cycle on Organised Crime; however, the efforts of investigators 
in this field are frustrated by a combination of the creativity of 
criminals, slow or inadequate international cooperation, and 
limited domestic legislation in this area.
A number of characteristics have been identified that 
make certain legitimate business sectors particularly 
attractive to money launderers. They tend to be cash 
intensive, territorially specific (as this facilitates control 
over the territory in which drug dealing may occur), 
low-tech and labour intensive. In addition, they often 
involve public administration or public subsidies (which 
provides opportunities for infiltration and corruption), 
small firms useful for their illicit activities, or activities 
subject to weak regulation. Thus, the legal business 
sectors most targeted for criminal investment are bars and 
restaurants (as illustrated in Case study 1), construction, 
wholesale and retail trade, especially of food and clothing, 
transportation, real estate activities and hotels (Savona and 
Riccardi, 2015).
Gambling in casinos, on fixed odds betting machines, or on 
horse racing, and lotteries are also ways used to legitimise 
funds. For example, small-denomination notes obtained 
from drug dealing can be fed into betting terminals and 
the winnings are returned with a ticket showing that cash 
has been received from gambling. Although a proportion 
of the original stake is lost, the remainder now has a 
legitimate provenance. In the case of lotteries, the money 
launderer buys winning tickets for more than the prize value 
and obtains a ‘clean’ bank cheque when the tickets are 
redeemed (Europol, 2015a). Insurance policies purchased 
with ‘dirty’ cash and then redeemed early, even if this incurs 
a penalty, are even harder to detect.
Purchases of high-value assets may be used for money 
laundering but also have other uses. For example, real estate 
properties may be purchased for money laundering purposes, 
providing a high return on investment or income, or used to 
facilitate the trade, providing sites for drug production or sales. 
Similarly, boats and cars may be useful for trafficking and as 
status symbols. The purchase of securities, such as bonds or 
stocks, may provide cover and an apparently legitimate reason 
for transfers, as well as ownership of legitimate businesses 
that may be used for money laundering or to facilitate drug 
trafficking (Schneider, 2012).
Trade-based money laundering, which involves using 
trade transactions to disguise the source of funds or move 
money around and which is particularly difficult to detect, 
is another vehicle for integrating illicit funds into the legal 
economy. Practices such as over- or under-invoicing for 
goods or services, or falsely describing them, are used 
to misrepresent the price, quantity and quality of goods 
traded, and transfer value from one party to another. 
Case study 1: The use of legitimate 
businesses for money laundering
Fourteen businesses, including restaurants, nightclubs 
and bars, worth EUR 15 million were seized by Italian 
authorities investigating the money laundering activities 
of a mafia clan involved in a portfolio of crime including 
drug crime and extortion. The choice of businesses, 
which were all owned and managed at arm’s length 
from the criminals, further facilitated the criminality by 
providing locations for drug dealing. Drug dealers were 
paid for their criminal activities through ‘legitimate’ 
wages paid to family members employed as service 
staff that in fact came out of criminal funds. The 
scheme was discovered because the profits from the 
businesses declared to the tax authorities seemed 
unreasonable relative to the actual running costs.
Source: Europol (2015a). 
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Trade-based money laundering is thought to account for 
as much as 80 % of illicit financial flows from developing 
economies (FATF, 2006; PwC, 2015).
Successful money laundering often requires the 
involvement of professional enablers working in the 
financial and legal sectors, although the degree to which 
they are criminally complicit may vary; some will be fully 
aware of the illegal source of the money involved, whereas 
some will be indifferent and others simply negligent or 
incompetent in applying anti-money laundering measures. 
Activities that fall into this category include the services 
provided by individual professionals, for example the 
use of a solicitor to purchase property or other assets, 
but professional involvement may also take place at 
the corporate level. For example, major international 
banking organisations have been found negligent in their 
application of financial controls; in 2012, HSBC was fined 
for allowing drug cartels in Mexico and Colombia to launder 
large sums of money through their accounts (Mollenkamp, 
2012; US Senate, 2012). The importance of continued 
vigilance by financial regulators is illustrated by other 
recent cases involving other banking groups that have 
failed to apply proper controls, leaving the banking system 
vulnerable to exploitation by drug trafficking groups (e.g. 
Young, 2014; Slater and Jones, 2015).
The need for money transfer and the 
importance of cash
The transfer of money overseas, whether to pay for drugs 
or trafficking services or for investment or concealment, is 
achieved in a variety of ways. Examples using legal financial 
institutions include electronic transfers or depositing small 
amounts of cash (‘smurfing’), but informal money or value 
transfer systems (see Case study 2), such as the hawala, also 
known as hundi, system, are also used; and sometimes money 
is simply moved as hard cash. As controls in the regulated 
financial sector are tightened worldwide, the use of informal 
value transfer systems and cash smuggling for money 
laundering may become increasingly attractive (FATF, 2013).
Cash, and its transfer between countries, plays an 
important role in drug markets for two main reasons. First, 
drug sales themselves generate large amounts of cash, 
generally in low-denomination notes. Large sums in this 
form are bulky so before such money can be spent by 
dealers it needs to be laundered such that it can be used 
without arousing suspicion. Hence, it is unsurprising that, 
in the EU, drug trafficking is the offence most commonly 
linked to the use of cash in money laundering schemes. 
Secondly, cash is useful within the laundering process 
because it is a bearer negotiable instrument, which means 
that it belongs to whoever has it and, unlike electronic 
transfers, it is hard to ascertain its source and impossible 
to know the intended beneficiary. Institutions subject to 
regulation may still be involved at some stage and cash 
is still the main trigger of suspicious transaction reports, 
making up a third of all reports (Europol, 2015a).
Cash may be physically smuggled between countries, often 
using methods similar to those used to transport drugs 
themselves, and cash smuggling is a specialist service. In 
return for a proportion of the amount to be smuggled (4), 
(4) For example, in a study of smuggling between the Netherlands and 
Colombia this proportion has been estimated to be between 10 and 17 % 
(Soudijn and Reuter, 2015).
Case study 2: Transforming cash
A recent investigation by French authorities into a drug 
trafficking network led to several arrests relating to the 
laundering of the group’s profits.
Money from the sale of cannabis was collected 
in France. The laundering process began with the 
transport of cash from Paris to Belgium, where it was 
used to buy gold. Thereafter, couriers (often Belgian 
students) acted as mules, transporting the gold to 
Dubai. In Dubai the gold was then made into jewellery, 
which was then sent to India to be sold on the gold 
market. The profits were finally shared between the 
OCGs and money launderers with the assistance of 
bankers with access to the financial system.
A key organiser admitted having laundered EUR 36 
million since 2010 and sending 200 kg of gold 
from Belgium to India. The network collected about 
EUR 170 million per year.
Furthermore, the case revealed a connection between 
tax evasion and drug trafficking in a scheme designed 
to balance two illegal flows of cash. Cash coming 
directly from cannabis dealing in Paris was exchanged 
for sums secreted in Swiss bank accounts which tax 
evaders sought to access or repatriate. The cash profits 
from drug sales were handed over in plastic bags full 
of small dirty notes to individuals with hidden Swiss 
accounts. Equivalent amounts were debited from their 
secret Swiss accounts and further transferred through 
a complex network of shell companies which integrated 
funds through the purchase of high-value assets. In this 
way, the need to smuggle the proceeds of drugs across 
the French border was eliminated.
Source: Europol.
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the smuggler guarantees the transfer and then uses various 
trafficking means to deliver the money to the required 
destination. Because of their smaller volume, high-value 
notes are important here and traffickers are prepared to 
spend significant proportions of their revenue to make the 
conversion. For instance, EUR 1 million in EUR 500 notes 
equates to just 2 000 notes weighing 2.2 kg, and would fit 
inside a small laptop bag. In comparison, the same amount 
of money in EUR 50 notes would weigh over 22 kg and 
occupy the space of a small suitcase (Soudijn and Reuter, 
2015). This suggests that it is important to tighten controls 
on outgoing traffic to identify cash smugglers as well as 
incoming traffic for drugs and to review the continued 
issuing and controls on access to EUR 500 notes.
In some countries, informal value transfer schemes such 
as hawala (also known as hundi) may be of particular 
importance. For example, a recent report on the financial 
flows associated with the trade in Afghan opiates highlights 
the importance of these systems in this context, with an 
estimated 50–90 % of transactions in Afghanistan taking 
place through such systems (FATF, 2014). It is believed that 
in most cases payments from consumer countries are first 
transferred through the banking system to intermediate 
countries, such as Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, 
from where the money is transmitted to Afghanistan via 
value transfer schemes.
Impact on businesses and the economy
The drug trade has both direct and indirect impacts on 
businesses, many of which are easy to overlook. For 
example, open or street drug markets can negatively affect 
local businesses by reducing the attractiveness of the area 
to customers and the general public and lowering property 
values. A more specific example is the large amounts of 
electricity required for indoor cannabis plantations, which 
may be illegally diverted from electricity suppliers, reducing 
revenues and tax payments, and potentially increasing 
costs to legitimate customers (Ofgem, 2013). The illicit drug 
market also absorbs resources from the legal economy. 
Money spent on illicit drugs is denied to governments in 
taxes and to producers of other consumer goods.
The large proportion of illegal proceeds from the drug trade 
that is not reinvested in illegal activities but channelled back 
into the legal economy can also have a negative impact 
(Unger, 2007). For example, the market for products or 
services can be distorted when business and investment 
decisions are made not on a commercial basis but to reduce 
the risk of detection or facilitate drug-related activities, thus 
FIGURE 1.3
Examples of cash smuggling attempts detected 
at European airports
Photo © Dutch Schiphol teams (Customs/FIOD/Marechaussee) 
Photo © German Customs, via Europol
Case study 3: Corruption and manipulation 
of public sector procurement
The threats posed by modern OCGs are increasingly 
diverse. Some activities of OCGs are obviously 
criminal but others less so, such as the use of criminal 
acts to achieve unfair advantage in other areas. Some 
EU Member States have reported cases of criminals 
bribing public officials to allow them to win tenders for 
public contracts that provide opportunities for money 
laundering.
Another example of corrupt practice is provided by the 
tender process for a contract to provide transportation 
services for patients travelling to and from hospitals 
in a region of Scotland. A total of seven tenders were 
submitted from two separate companies that were 
associated with OCGs engaged in drug supply by 
both reputation and criminal intelligence reports. The 
two companies colluded in the process to provide 
the appearance of open competition and, for some 
unknown reason, there were no other applications 
from any competitors. In the absence of any serious 
alternative bidders, the contract was awarded, despite 
the efforts of law enforcement to intervene and 
prevent public money flowing into the hands of one of 
the criminally associated firms.
Sources: CSD (2010) and Murray (2016).
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undercutting legitimate businesses operating in the same 
field and effectively pricing them out of the market. Moreover, 
those involved in the drug trade may bring their criminal 
tactics into the legal businesses area, for example by rigging 
tendering processes (see Case study 3), or by using violence 
to obtain competitive advantage or discourage competition. 
There can also be an increase in corruption, especially when 
OCGs seek to use legitimate business to facilitate their 
activities, for example to get access to containers for drug 
shipments, and this has a knock-on effect on legitimate 
business as well as undermining the credibility of legal 
institutions (UNODC, 2011a).
The application of controls on illicit drugs that also have 
pharmaceutical uses and on precursor chemicals also poses 
a financial burden on legitimate businesses as well as the 
state. The diversion and thefts of these substances is another 
source of financial loss while counterfeiting and the illegal 
production of substances that are then sold on the black 
market may lead to reputational damage for legal producers.
Drug markets and the link to 
wider criminal activity and 
terrorism
This section examines some of the links that exist between 
drug markets and other forms of criminal activity, including 
terrorism. There are numerous reasons why drug-related 
and non-drug-related crime may coexist. For example, 
those primarily engaged in other forms of criminal activity 
or terrorism may simply be attracted to the drug trade as a 
convenient source of funds. Alternatively, the large profits 
generated by drug trafficking organisations may encourage 
diversification into other illicit activities, while the networks 
and logistical infrastructure established for this purpose 
may also be utilised to traffic other commodities. In 
addition, areas where drugs are produced and/or through 
which they transit are often home to other illegal activity 
and may be attractive to OCGs more generally because of 
their fragile legal and political systems.
Terrorism
Terrorist activities need to be funded and drug trafficking 
provides substantial profits. These facts are the basis of a 
potential direct link between these two types of activity, and 
internationally there have been examples of terrorist groups 
directly engaging in the drug trade to finance their activities 
(Makarenko, 2012). Historically, this direct involvement is 
probably best documented in areas where drug production 
takes place, such as parts of Latin America, and such 
geographical links arise at least partly because both drug 
trafficking groups and terrorist organisations are attracted 
to countries where judicial and political systems are 
weak. However, there are obviously a variety of potential 
sources of finance for terrorist organisations, with direct 
contributions from supporters generally thought to be 
among the most important overall (Tupman, 2014). 
Moreover, terrorist organisations appear adept at seeking 
out new revenue sources, as illustrated by recent reports 
that Da’esh has generated significant income through 
illicit oil sales. Nevertheless, the proximity of conflict zones, 
where terrorist groups are active, to established routes 
for drug trafficking and drug production areas, close to 
EU borders, means that the monitoring of developments 
in this area must be regarded as both strategically and 
operationally important.
Conceptually, links between organised crime and terrorism 
can be thought of as being either links between entities 
or links between activities. Such links range from simply 
operational ones, with one type of group making use of the 
tactics or expertise of the other, through closer organisational 
ties, to links that could be described as evolutionary, when 
a terrorist group transforms over time into an OCG, or 
vice versa. So far, it appears that, in Europe, there are no 
systematic links between crime and terrorism, linkages 
being largely of the more limited operational type, with 
either temporary or more long-term alliances of convenience 
existing between OCGs and terrorist organisations.
Where they exist, the rationale for operational alliances 
is that they often provide access to specific expertise or 
support, linked to the need for terrorist groups to finance their 
operations. For example, it has been reported that in southern 
Colombia both the FARC guerrilla group and the paramilitary 
organisations fighting them imposed ‘taxes’ on all the actors 
involved in the cocaine chain including the cartels operating 
cocaine labs in the regions under their control (Jansson, 
2006; Labrousse, 2004). Likewise, in Afghanistan, the Taliban 
reportedly taxed the actors of the heroin chain including the 
criminal organisations operating heroin laboratories (Felbab-
Brown, 2010). In 2012, Irish Republican groups were reported 
to be laundering money on behalf of the ‘Ndrangheta OCG, 
which is heavily involved in drug trafficking to Europe, and it 
has been reported that the Basque separatist group ETA had 
links with Italian mafia organisations involving exchanges 
of drugs for arms. Of the 27 operational alliances between 
OCGs and terrorist organisations active in Europe identified 
between 2000 and 2010, 18 involved drug-related activities, 
mostly drug trafficking. In more than half of the cases 
reviewed, the networks had links to countries outside Europe, 
including in the Balkan region and the former Soviet Union 
(Makarenko, 2012).
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An additional area of concern in Europe is the potential 
for radicalisation of second- or third-generation diaspora 
youth whose families originated in areas historically 
affected by Islamist or nationalist conflicts. Disaffected 
young people with a history of criminality, which may 
include involvement with the drug market, may use 
their criminal networks in support of terrorist activities. 
An example of this kind of relationship is the case of 
Mohamed Merah, who used his criminal contacts for 
financial and material support of the terror attacks in the 
south-west of France in March 2012.
A study of jihadi terrorist cells in western Europe found 
that the majority of the activities did not require significant 
funds, and there was a trend towards single-actor plots 
(Oftedahl, 2015). However, given the adaptability of such 
organisations, this may change once again. In this study drug 
trafficking was only rarely a source of finance. Nevertheless, 
the increasingly fragmented nature of terrorist activity in 
Europe gives rise to concerns that groups or individuals with 
a dual criminal/terrorist profile may be harder to detect, 
as their activities may not register as important with either 
those concerned with organised crime or those investigating 
terrorism. There is therefore a need for continued monitoring 
and analysis of potential linkages in this area, to determine 
where they occur and who are likely to be involved, in 
addition to greater communication between the different 
agencies involved in tackling these threats.
A further, but poorly documented, area of potential linkage 
is the use of illicit drugs by terrorists or insurgents while 
undertaking their terrorist activities or in battle, for example 
the use of illicit opiate-based painkillers to treat wounded 
combatants or of stimulants to keep fighters going through 
long engagements. It has been reported that captagon 
tablets, which generally contain amphetamine or other 
stimulants, are commonly used by fighters in Syria, for 
example, and media reports have linked the use of this drug 
to recent terrorist atrocities in the EU. Although it may be 
overly simplistic to assume such direct links, this remains 
an area that needs to be monitored.
Human trafficking and exploitation
The relationship between drug and human trafficking 
is multifaceted, but the hidden nature of both of these 
phenomena makes this area difficult to study. Although 
statistics on human trafficking are collected and efforts are 
being made to improve the information available, at present 
recorded data are likely to underestimate the true figures, 
and published statistics do not currently record whether 
or not human trafficking offences are associated with drug 
markets (Eurostat, 2015).
One way in which the activities can be linked is if both 
activities are conducted by the same OCGs. For example, 
Turkish and Balkan groups are reported to smuggle both 
drugs and migrants into and within Europe. One of the 
reasons why drug trafficking groups may also be attracted 
to human trafficking activities is that there is some overlap 
between the routes used and there are advantages to be 
gained by sharing established logistical infrastructure, 
which includes transportation and storage facilities. 
The risks associated with people trafficking are also low 
compared with drug trafficking as rates of prosecution 
are lower and penalties are generally less, making it a 
potentially more attractive business opportunity (Shelley, 
2012). However, differences between these areas can also 
be observed. For example, human trafficking organisations 
tend to be smaller than some of the large criminal 
organisations engaged in drug trafficking.
Drugs may also play a part in the human trafficking process, 
facilitating and maintaining the exploitation of the victims. 
The United Kingdom National Crime Agency’s Strategic 
assessment of the nature and scale of human trafficking 
highlights that the grooming of women and children by 
older males, involving the use of drugs and alcohol, is an 
important method of recruitment for sexual exploitation 
(NCA, 2014). Substance misuse may also be a pre-existing 
risk factor for exploitation, with vulnerability arising from 
either personal or parental substance misuse (Beckett et 
al., 2013; Klatt et al., 2014). Victims may be given drugs 
to make them comply with sexual exploitation without 
resistance, but may also become drug dependent and 
continue to participate in order to maintain their access 
to drugs or to pay off drug debts. In addition, the use of 
stimulants to allow victims to work harder and for longer 
has been noted (Shelley, 2012; McCarthy, 2014).
The victims of human trafficking may also be made to play 
a more active role in the drug trade, and there is evidence 
of this from a number of European countries. For example, 
vulnerable individuals are lured from their home country by 
false promises of well-paid work, and after their arrival in 
the destination country may be coerced into working in the 
drugs or sex industry, often in order to repay debts accrued 
to the trafficking organisation or because of threats to 
family members at home (Anti-Slavery International, 2014; 
NCA, 2014).
In Europe the use of trafficked individuals, mainly 
Vietnamese, to act as ‘gardeners’ maintaining indoor 
cannabis plantations is well documented, and can involve 
both adults and children (see Case study 4). In the United 
Kingdom, for example, 29 of the 54 individuals identified 
as potential victims of human trafficking for cannabis 
cultivation in 2013 were children (NCA, 2014).
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In addition to cannabis production, victims of 
human trafficking have been coerced into working in 
methamphetamine production sites, as drug couriers 
and as dealers in street drug markets. In addition to being 
exposed to the physical hazards of working in these 
environments, they risk prosecution and the coercive 
nature of their involvement with the offence may not 
always be taken into account (Hales and Gelsthorpe, 
2012). Exploitation for the purpose of criminal activities 
such as drug trafficking within the domain of the criminal 
offence of trafficking in human beings is addressed in EU 
Directive 2011/36, on preventing and combating trafficking 
of human beings, which came into force in 2013, and may 
improve the way these cases are dealt with in the future.
Human trafficking and exploitation is not just a 
transregional or transnational phenomenon but also 
occurs within European countries; one recent estimate 
suggests that around one-third of trafficking cases are 
domestic (UNODC, 2014a). For example, recent reports 
from the United Kingdom have highlighted the issue of the 
exploitation of vulnerable young people who go missing 
from home and are recruited as runners for drug dealers 
or are ‘groomed’ for sexual exploitation using drugs and 
alcohol. Vulnerable and drug-dependent people may also 
be coerced into allowing their accommodation to be used 
for drug dealing or drug production (NCA, 2015a; Sturrock 
and Holmes, 2015).
Trade in other illicit goods
It is likely that interaction and links between the drug trade 
and the trade in other illicit goods also exist, given the 
similarities of criminal ‘business models’ and supporting 
expertise and infrastructures in these areas. However, this 
is currently an under-investigated area.
Falsified, counterfeit, substandard and 
unauthorised medicines
Globally, the sale of falsified, counterfeit, substandard 
and unauthorised medicines is big business and a 
serious and growing public health problem. Over the 
past decade this market has seen high growth, fuelled 
by globalisation. As discussed below, the combination of 
modern transport networks, the internet, low labour costs, 
Trafficking for cannabis farming
A is from a small village in rural Vietnam. After a poor 
harvest his family were struggling for food. His parents 
took out a loan and he was then coerced into working 
abroad until the debt was repaid. A was transported from 
Vietnam to the Czech Republic, where he was locked 
in a warehouse with other Vietnamese boys and men. 
When he questioned the traffickers or asked to go home, 
he was subjected to beatings and verbal abuse. He was 
then smuggled by lorry to a house in Birmingham in the 
United Kingdom. The windows were boarded up and the 
house was used for cultivation of cannabis. A was taught 
how to look after the crop, made to sleep in the kitchen 
and told that if he left the premises his family would be 
hurt.
When A was discovered by the police who raided the 
house, he was disorientated and frightened, and unable 
to ask for help because he could not speak English. 
He was arrested and charged. At his interview A was 
assigned a Vietnamese interpreter who could not 
understand his regional accent. As he had no identity 
documents and no registered address, A was detained 
in custody. A was 16 years old when he arrived in the 
United Kingdom but it was assumed that he was over 18 
and he was tried in an adult court. He was advised by his 
lawyer to plead guilty to charges of cultivating an illegal 
drug. He was sentenced to 21 months in prison to be 
followed by immediate deportation.
Trafficking for drug smuggling
B, a Nigerian woman, was trafficked to Denmark and 
forced to transport cocaine in a body belt on her 
person. She was caught by the authorities and arrested. 
She was visited in prison by someone from HopeNow, 
a Danish non-governmental organisation (NGO), 
who identified her as a victim of human trafficking. A 
HopeNow representative testified at her trial, stating 
that she was indeed a victim of trafficking and that 
her exploiters had threatened to kill her child, who had 
since been moved elsewhere in Nigeria for safety. B’s 
claim to have been a trafficking victim was dismissed 
by the court because of lack of evidence and she was 
sentenced to 3 years in prison for drug smuggling.
Source: Anti-Slavery International (2014).
Case study 4: Human trafficking for the drug trade
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and the rapid growth of the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries, particularly in China and India, has facilitated 
the development of this large market. The potential for huge 
profits has also led to the involvement of OCGs, although 
the relationship between these groups and the drug market 
remains poorly understood. It has been suggested that 
some illicitly produced opium may now even be used to 
produce counterfeit medicines.
Alongside the risks to health posed by using such 
medicines, consumers also face the risk of being victims 
of fraud by buying from this market. This risk may be 
compounded by the poor security of many online shops, 
which could lead to consumers having their personal 
and financial information stolen or exposed. However, 
information on the extent of these problems is limited.
Another problem reported in the EU is the diversion of 
psychoactive medicines for misuse. Here more information 
is available, although most illicit drug monitoring systems 
were not designed to identify signals of such misuse so 
the data are patchy. Nevertheless, data are available from 
the EU Early Warning System and recent developments 
to EMCDDA annual data collections mean that some 
substances are now included. Therefore the information 
available is improving and, while still limited, raises 
concerns that misuse of psychoactive medicines may 
be a growing problem. Data from both individual studies 
and routine monitoring suggest that the main types of 
medicines misused in Europe are opioid analgesics, 
benzodiazepines and ‘Z-drugs’ (hypnotic drugs such as 
zolpidem and zopiclone). In particular, the diversion of 
methadone and buprenorphine from opioid substitution 
treatment is reported to be a significant problem in some 
countries, accounting for a non-trivial proportion of overall 
drug-related morbidity.
FIGURE 1.4
Illicit medicinal products
Fake diazepam tablet containing diclazepam seized in  
Inverclyde, Scotland, October 2013.
Photo © Police Scotland
Medicines that are traded illicitly may reach the drug 
market in different ways: they may be diverted from licit 
use, as is the case when people who are prescribed opioids 
or benzodiazepines sell a proportion of their prescription; 
they may be stolen from the legitimate supply chain, 
including from manufacturers, wholesalers, pharmacies 
or prescribers; they may be obtained fraudulently through 
forged prescriptions; they may be purchased from online 
pharmacies that do not insist on a prescription; or they 
may be produced specifically for the illicit market. Different 
approaches are needed to tackle these diverse phenomena. 
For example, there is a need to focus on prescribing 
practices as the implementation of good practice in this 
area may reduce diversion by patients. In some settings, 
real-time prescription drug monitoring programmes have 
been found to be successful in reducing inappropriate 
prescribing (Clark et al., 2012).
Similarly, good practice in medical waste disposal can 
reduce the risk of the diversion of used fentanyl patches. 
Partnerships with industry, the development of regulatory 
controls, as well as customs and policing activity are all 
likely to be appropriate responses to the involvement of 
OCGs, which are more likely to divert larger quantities of 
medicines by infiltration of the supply chain or through 
the importation of falsified, counterfeit and unauthorised 
medicines from outside the EU.
The EMCDDA and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
routinely exchange information on the misuse of medicines 
through EU legislation: the Council Decision covering 
new psychoactive substances (5) and the medicinal 
products legislation related to pharmacovigilance (6). 
The EMCDDA also collects information on psychoactive 
medicines through its on-going drug monitoring activities. 
Nonetheless, the limitations of current monitoring systems 
mean that some potentially important developments in 
this area are difficult to observe; for example, the misuse 
of tramadol, gabapentin and pregabalin appears to be 
increasing, but this currently is difficult to detect in the 
routine data sources available (Griffiths et al., 2014).
Alcohol and tobacco 
The revenues from the illicit trade in alcohol and tobacco 
products also have the potential to generate substantial 
profits for OCGs; however, to date there is little evidence 
(5) Council Decision No 2005/387/JHA of 10 May 2005 on the information 
exchange, risk-assessment and control of new psychoactive substances, 
OJEU L127, 25.05.2005, p. 32.
(6) Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and 
establishing a European Medicines Agency, OJEU L 136, 30/04/2004, p.1.
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concerning links between the markets. The profits from 
illicit tobacco sales within the EU, for example, have been 
estimated to be similar to those derived from the cocaine 
or heroin market (Savona and Riccardi, 2015). As in the 
case of the illicit medicines market, the trade in these 
products appears to be evolving, and is characterised by 
the presence on the market of smuggled genuine products 
(where tax is not paid in either source or destination 
country, or both) and illicitly manufactured products 
(including counterfeit products). As the penalties are less 
severe than those available for drug trafficking activities, 
this makes them high-profit, low-risk activities and would 
suggest that alcohol and tobacco smuggling are likely 
to be an attractive area for OCGs. The expertise and 
infrastructure are likely to be to some extent common for 
both drugs trafficking and tobacco and alcohol trafficking 
although the market outlets may differ.
Firearms
Firearms are sometimes used by those involved in the 
drug market and, unsurprisingly, there are reports of drugs 
and firearms being smuggled together. For example, a 
lorry driver from the Netherlands was jailed in 2014 for 
attempting to smuggle drugs and firearms into the United 
Kingdom. Along with two guns and ammunition, more than 
600 kg of cannabis resin/cannabis, 60 kg of amphetamine, 
50 litres of amphetamine in liquid form, 6 kg of cocaine and 
1 kg of MDMA were intercepted (NCA, 2015b). However, 
the best and most consistent documented link between 
the supply of arms and drugs concerns outlaw motorcycle 
gangs (OMCGs). These groups are noted as having a long 
history of involvement in the supply of both drugs (see 
individual drug chapters in Part II) and weapons. There are 
also concerns about the growth in numbers of such gangs 
and about the potential impact on the EU of OMCGs based 
in neighbouring countries. OMCGs are particularly active in 
trafficking drugs, weapons and humans from the western 
Balkans to western and northern European countries. 
Efforts are currently being made to develop a strategic 
response to this problem and it remains a potentially fruitful 
area for cross-border intelligence sharing and coordinated 
operations (Council of the European Union, 2015a).
Strain on and corruption of 
government institutions
Government expenditure
A large amount of government spending that would 
otherwise be available for other purposes is used in 
tackling drug markets or responding to the problems 
associated with it. The amount of public expenditure 
invested in the supply reduction area is difficult to estimate 
with any precision simply because of the wide range of 
public sectors involved and the fact that many activities are 
undertaken as part of general policing or customs activity. 
This expenditure forms part of the broader expenditure 
category of public order and safety but will not be identified 
(or ‘labelled’) as drug related.
Despite these difficulties, just over half of EU Member 
States have in the last decade attempted to estimate 
overall drug-related expenditure, including both those 
expenditures labelled as drug related and those related to 
day-to-day activities. Overall, these data indicate that drug 
supply reduction initiatives account for the largest share 
of drug-related expenditure in most countries. There is, 
however, considerable variation between countries in the 
proportion of overall expenditure on public order and safety 
that is estimated to be drug related, which ranges between 
1 % and 20 % of the total (EMCDDA, 2014a).
Recently, economic conditions have resulted in European 
countries reviewing and seeking savings in many areas 
of public finance. Drug-related budgets have come under 
scrutiny and, while there is no clear pattern to be seen, 
some reductions have been observed. More generally, 
overall public expenditure on public order and safety, the 
source of finance for most supply reduction activities, 
appears to have declined markedly in real terms since 
2008, especially in 2011.
Early findings from a repeat survey of the availability 
and activity of drug squads across Europe show a mixed 
picture, with some countries reporting reductions in staffing 
— through reductions in either total posts or posts filled — 
but others suggesting no decrease. Several respondents 
reported reorganisation or re-prioritisation of work on drugs, 
in the latter case most commonly suggesting a possible 
downgrading of the priority being given to drug markets 
in the face of other threats such as terrorism and border 
security.
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Corruption of officials
Countering corruption is generally a solely national 
competence; however, as it is identified as a key threat at 
EU level, concerted efforts are being made to monitor and 
improve the situation. Such efforts include the adoption 
of the ‘Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU’ 
(European Commission, 2011) and the establishment of 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report.
Corruption of public officials, from low-level law enforcement 
officers at one end of the spectrum through to high-level 
members of the judiciary and politicians at the other, is a 
systemic feature of all illicit markets. That said, some countries 
are more affected than others as a result of historic and 
social factors as well as cultural specifics; in some countries, 
corruption is present in all levels of public administrations 
while in others cases are sporadic. Drug markets have been 
identified to be one of the two most corruptive influences 
in the EU (prostitution being the other), with OCGs 
most commonly targeting low-ranking police and public 
administration employees, with tax authorities and financial 
regulators targeted to a much lesser degree (CSD, 2010).
The aim of police corruption by OCGs is usually to 
obtain information on investigations or operations, or to 
protect on-going illegal activities. Pressure from corrupt 
magistrates or prosecutors may, for example, obstruct 
police investigations of influential individuals who are 
members of criminal networks. In relation to drugs, the goal 
of corruption of customs officers is usually to facilitate the 
free passage of smuggled goods and avoid investigations. 
This is most apparent in small town border areas in the 
eastern EU; in the large western European ports, rather 
than attempting to corrupt officials, smugglers prefer 
to rely on the fact that the risk of detection is relatively 
low because of the huge numbers of containers passing 
through. 
In most countries the judiciary appears to be much less 
targeted than police officers or politicians. When it occurs, 
the most frequent reasons are to avoid pre-trial detention, 
to delay court action or to influence trial outcomes. 
Staff working in public prosecutors’ offices may also be 
bribed to leak information about on-going cases. Political 
corruption at the level of elected representatives or heads 
of agencies/departments appears to be rare. However, 
political corruption at local level is more common, as 
evidenced by the fact that in many EU Member States, but 
especially those along the EU’s eastern land border, mayors 
or city councillors have been convicted of associating with 
organised or ‘white-collar’ criminals. These officials may 
be accessed via social, political, professional and family 
networks, and in some countries elite social networks allow 
criminals direct access to the upper echelons of public 
office.
Most Member States have legislation to address corruption 
in the private sector (sometimes called ‘white-collar’ 
corruption) following the adoption of EU regulations (7); 
however, data are not routinely collected by governments. 
The term ‘collusion’ may also be used to describe the 
behaviour of professionals such as lawyers, accountants 
and real estate brokers who provide services to organised 
(7) Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in 
the public sector.
European cooperation against corruption
The European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC) and 
the European Contact-point Network against corruption 
(EACN) are high-level European networks of anti-
corruption practitioners operating since 2004 and 2008 
respectively, composed of more than 70 organisations, 
including the EU’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF. In November 
2015, OLAF, together with 52 other European anti-
corruption and police oversight bodies, adopted the 
Paris Declaration, which calls on European decision-
makers to strengthen the fight against corruption.
The Declaration calls for:
n  deterrent punishment of crimes of corruption through 
both custodial and financial punishments and 
effective systems of recovery of assets;
n  the introduction of a cross-border automatic exchange 
of financial information for the investigations of 
crimes of corruption by the law enforcement agencies;
n  the establishment of an appropriate tool at both 
national and transnational level for the protection of 
threatened key witnesses and disclosers of crimes of 
corruption;
n  further intensified cooperation and information 
sharing between anti-corruption authorities and 
police oversight bodies in Europe through the newly 
launched EPAC/EACN communication tool within 
the Europol Platform for Experts.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/index_en.htm
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crime. Examples of practices for which corruption may 
be used include diversion of chemicals to illegal markets, 
the facilitation of drug trafficking by workers in the 
transportation industry, and the distribution of illicit goods, 
as, for example, when nightclub door staff distribute drugs. 
However, it is money laundering, as discussed above, 
that is the key reason for corruption within the private 
sector, with the most common issue being bribery to avoid 
suspicious financial activity being reported to authorities 
(CSD, 2010).
Some observers draw a distinction between offences based 
on the official’s motivation (Carter, cited in Stinson, 2015). 
Thus, offences undertaken for personal gain, such as taking 
bribes, can be distinguished from those that are committed 
by officials because they are perceived to be legitimate 
ways of achieving their organisational objectives, such as in 
the case of perjury, violations of criminal procedure or the 
planting of evidence. What is clear is that, whatever form 
it takes, corruption exerts a corrosive effect, undermining 
the authority of governments, and facilitates the work of 
organised crime.
Drug markets and development
The global nature of drug supply means that the impact 
of drug markets on other countries can have serious 
repercussions for the EU. The impact of drug production 
and supply on development and stability within developing 
and transitional countries that are producer or transit 
countries are wide ranging and complex. The associated 
corruption and violence can undermine both social and 
economic development. As noted already, trafficking groups 
are attracted to areas of the world where governance 
and judicial structures are weak. The dominance of the 
illicit economy also encourages other forms of criminality, 
decreasing tax revenues and reducing respect for the law 
and state institutions in a vicious circle that increases 
vulnerability to further exploitation and destabilisation.
It also needs to be recognised that, in some communities, 
involvement in the drug trade may represent one of the 
few opportunities available for income generation. This 
has been acknowledged in the focus given to alternative 
development support alongside crop eradication efforts in 
producer countries, articulated in the 1998 UN Action Plan 
on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit 
Drug Crops and on Alternative Development, reaffirmed 
in 2009 and again in the 2013 United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Alternative Development (UNODC, 2015a). 
That said, there has been criticism that current investments 
are more focused on eradication and interdiction activities 
(Buxton, 2015), and that the alternative development 
programmes lack a strong evidence base on which to judge 
their effectiveness.
This has led to an increasing recognition in the international 
policy debate in this area of the importance of integrating 
drug policies with international development policies 
and programmes if either is to be successful. There have 
been calls for a paradigm shift to a more holistic approach 
that addresses a broader set of issues: sustainable 
development addressing issues such as land distribution 
as well as income opportunities, strengthening state 
governance, resilience building and human rights 
(Gutierrez, 2015; UNDP, 2015). The EU and Member States 
make significant investment in both drug control measures 
and development support to drug producer and transit 
countries in Asia, Africa and the Americas, so ensuring 
coherence and seeking synergies between these areas is 
important.
Other impacts on society
Illicit drug markets have a range of impacts on 
neighbourhoods and society in general. The illegal nature 
of the drug market means that those who use drugs 
expose themselves to more harms than would be the case 
in a legitimately regulated market. However, the harms 
extend beyond drug users, in that violence, corruption 
and fear of visible drug markets also affect non-users 
(Wilson and Stevens, 2008). The drug market can also 
result in environmental degradation, high crime rates, 
decreases in property values and loss of amenities because 
areas associated with drug use become ‘no-go areas’ and 
lead to business closures. If the police are seen as 
ineffective at dealing with drug markets, there may be a 
knock-on loss of confidence in policing and a reluctance to 
report drug-related or other offences. In some deprived 
areas or among marginalised communities, involvement in 
the drug market may be perceived as providing one of the 
few available opportunities for income generation and 
therefore attract vulnerable young people into involvement 
with criminal behaviour. This can have long-term negative 
consequences for both those involved and the wider 
community (Bibard et al., 2013; Connolly and Donovan, 
2014).
Drug-related economic-compulsive 
crimes
The extent to which drug use is associated with offending 
(other than drug law offences) is dependent on a variety 
of factors, including the type and pattern of drug use, 
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socio-economic situation and lifestyle factors. Drug 
dependence, with the resulting need to finance drug habits, 
can lead users to engage in acquisitive crime, such as 
shoplifting, robbery or burglary, as well as drug dealing. 
Offending is often reduced following engagement with 
drug treatment services. In the EU, the association with 
acquisitive offending is most noted in relation to dependent 
opioid use and some chronic patterns of stimulant use. 
Drug-related crimes can have a major impact on society, 
causing significant losses to individual victims and 
businesses. One study in England and Wales estimated 
that, on average, heroin users commit 160–230 acquisitive 
offences a year, around 70 % of which are shop theft, and 
that this generates ‘an income’ of about EUR 4 700–7 900 
(GBP 4 000–6 700) a year. The overall costs imposed 
on society by an average heroin user’s drug-related 
crime, although highly uncertain, are placed in the range 
EUR 71 000–118 000 (GBP 60 000–100 000) (8) (Bryan 
et al., 2013). The overall cost to society of drug-related 
acquisitive crime in England and Wales in 2010/11 
has been estimated to be EUR 6 200 –7 650 million (9) 
(GBP 5 318–6 566 million) (Mills et al., 2013).
Drug market-related violence
Drug market violence is often framed as resulting from 
the effects of drugs on individual users (e.g. violence 
stemming from drug-induced psychosis) or as a by-product 
of involvement in some acquisitive crime, such as robbery, 
as mentioned above. However, the illicit production and 
trafficking of drugs has an additional element that links 
violence, including homicidal violence, with drugs. This 
(8) Pounds sterling have been converted to euros using 2013 exchange rates.
(9) Pounds sterling have been converted to euros using 2010 exchange rates.
‘systemic’ violence is an inherent component of the illicit 
drug market, used to gain or maintain market share or 
resolve disputes (Goldstein, 1985; Goldstein et al., 1989). 
However, such systemic violence, at least in the European 
context, appears most often directed towards other groups 
or individuals participating in the marketplace, rather than 
consumers. Inter-gang rivalries and struggles over territory 
are a concern in many countries and have international 
reach (see Case study 5).
Internationally, both the production and the transit phases 
of transnational drug trafficking generate a significant 
amount of crime and violence, as homicides are frequently 
associated with organisations involved in the movement of 
drugs (UNODC, 2013a). In a variety of settings, cartels that 
derive their primary financing from illicit drugs production 
have been implicated in a substantial proportion of 
homicides (Castle, 2009; Agren, 2010; Mejia and Restrepo, 
2013). With regard to retail markets for illicit drugs, as 
well as to trafficking, there is evidence that the extent of 
violence varies and some drug markets are less violent than 
others (Coomber, 2015).
Representing the most serious form of drug market violent 
crime, homicides linked to the drug trade have been 
proposed as a potential indicator of systemic violence 
(Ouimet, 2012). However, although some information 
on the frequency of homicides in different countries is 
available, these figures currently do not provide contextual 
information, such as the relationship to illegal drug trade, 
consistently across Europe. This information is either 
unavailable or limited in comparability because of legal 
and definitional differences. Although the methodological 
FIGURE 1.5
Dump sites of chemical waste from synthetic drug production
A stolen van loaded with waste product from MDMA  
manufacturing that was set on fire in the Netherlands.
Photo © Dutch National Police/LFO
Waste product from synthetic drug production dumped  
in a rural area in the Netherlands.
Photo © Dutch National Police/LFO via Europol
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issues in this area are not trivial, it is worth exploring, for 
future monitoring purposes, if information on drug-related 
homicides can be improved at the European level. In 
addition to lessons from the European Homicide Monitor 
(Liem et al., 2013), some work conducted in Canada 
provides one potential model that could inform European 
discussions on this topic (Homicide Survey, Statistics 
Canada (10)).
Environmental impacts
The illicit production of plant-based and synthetic drugs 
entails a range of environmental harms where it takes 
place and the dumping of waste products from synthetic 
drug production in parts of Europe is a growing problem 
(Figure 1.5), which is addressed in more detail in the 
individual drug chapters. Many of the chemicals used in the 
production of drugs are toxic. The hazardous waste products 
are often simply dumped on the ground or in streams and 
rivers in the areas where drug labs are located, which may 
often be in populous areas or host to fragile ecosystems.
(10) See http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvInstru-
ment&SurvId=1723&InstaId=201339
Although precise estimates are not available, it is probable 
that millions of tonnes of hazardous waste from drug 
production are released into the environment each year 
(UNODC 2006a, 2015a). The impact and harms will vary 
depending on where this takes place. Deforestation is a 
particular concern and can impact on biodiversity and 
climate change and increases the risk of erosion. This is a 
particular concern in areas with heavy rainfall, and when 
the land under cultivation is on a slope, which is the case 
of much of the area of coca and poppy cultivation in South 
America and South-East Asia, as well as areas under 
cannabis cultivation in the Moroccan Rif area. In addition, 
the excessive use of chemical fertilisers, herbicides 
and pesticides in order to increase production can also 
cause environmental problems. Moreover, in regions with 
limited water resources, drug production needs compete 
with other water needs (Chouvy, 2003; Afsahi and 
Chouvy, 2015).
Homicide can be categorised according to the 
relationship between the offender and victim and the 
context in which it takes place. Dutch researchers have 
noted that in the Netherlands most homicides that take 
place in the criminal environment are drug related. They 
include the murder by drug users of dealers or other 
drug users, and the murder of dealers by other dealers, 
so-called ‘liquidations’. Of all homicides, approximately 
11 % fall into this category. The following case compiled 
from media reports — one of the potential key sources 
for monitoring drug-related homicide — illustrates the 
impact of such activity on public order and security.
In December 2014, Vedat Şahin, the Rotterdam-based 
brother of a top Turkish gangster, was murdered in Istanbul 
on the same day as his associate, a Dutch-Turkish criminal 
named Ali Akgün. Şahin was shot whilst walking in the 
street with his two bodyguards, one of whom also died later 
in hospital. Akgün was shot dead in his car while it was 
stopped at traffic lights. According to the public prosecutor, 
Akgün had been linked to a series of liquidations in the 
Netherlands, where he was connected with the upper 
echelons of Dutch organised crime.
One of the people arrested during the police 
investigation was Atilla Önder, alleged to be connected 
to the drug trade and to several liquidations, and 
who narrowly avoided being murdered himself in the 
Netherlands. In April 2015, Atilla Önder’s son, Baris 
Önder, was murdered in Amsterdam when his car came 
under fire. Baris Önder’s close criminal associate of 
Turkish origin, Murat Garki, who was being tried in a 
major case of alleged extortion of a drug trafficker, had 
been murdered in Amsterdam in December 2014. Önder 
and Garki were suspected to be involved in heroin and 
synthetic drug distribution and had been arrested earlier 
in 2014 during an investigation into the murder of Aytas 
Göraler, who had once owned an Amsterdam nightclub 
called ‘The Sand’, in which Atilla Önder had invested at 
one time. The Sand nightclub was shut in September 
2014 by order of the mayor after a fatal shooting on the 
premises.
Sources:
Research project European HOMICIDE Monitor (http://law.leiden.edu/
organisation/criminology/research/homicide/characteristicshomicide.html), 
Liem et al. (2013) and press reports.
Case study 5: Systemic violence associated with drug markets — international and long-lasting
2
43
As highlighted in the previous EU drug markets report, the 
drug market is highly adaptable and innovative. The drug 
market is becoming increasingly diversified and the overlap 
with other types of criminal activity and the legal economy 
also appears to be expanding, although this may be due 
in part to an increased recognition of the potential for it to 
occur. Consideration of the factors that influence or drive 
these changes can help the design of new interventions to 
tackle these issues.
OCGs are increasingly flexible, engaging in multiple forms 
of criminality. Criminals capitalise on new opportunities in 
order to generate profit, especially when they are able to 
use existing infrastructures, personnel and contacts. This 
is particularly true for groups involved in the transportation 
and distribution of illicit commodities. For example, a group 
trafficking cannabis resin from Morocco to the Iberian 
Peninsula can easily use the same people, routes and 
means of transport to also traffic cocaine transiting West 
Africa. OCGs will also expand their enterprises into other 
supporting or associated activities. ‘Crime as a service’ 
approaches are developing. For instance, some OCGs 
specialise in maritime smuggling or in money laundering, 
others in disposing of the waste from synthetic drugs 
manufacturing, while some groups are providers of security 
services for major drug deals.
Poly-drug trafficking is a common approach chosen by 
OCGs active in the EU. OCGs involved in the distribution 
of drugs in the EU typically traffic various types of drugs 
depending on their price, demand and availability. In 
addition, OCGs are becoming increasingly multinational in 
their membership. Some are dominated by one nationality, 
others by two or more. Some large criminal networks 
have members of more than 60 nationalities. Whilst 
acknowledging this, the description of OCGs in this report 
points out certain nationalities that are dominant players 
within the networks.
Drug supply as a business
A number of studies that have considered organised crime 
have suggested that illicit markets, such as drug markets, 
and the groups engaged in them can be viewed as part of 
a ‘continuum of business’ or a spectrum of legality (Savona 
and Riccardi, 2015; Murray, 2016). For OCGs, involvement 
in the legal economy is linked to the fact that legitimacy is 
important for achieving, and enjoying, wealth, power and 
influence. While they are to some extent similar to legitimate 
businesses, they also differ in some important ways. Most 
obviously they carry forward their criminal methods ‘use of 
force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of 
public officials’ into the licit business world, as in the case 
of an OCG in Scotland that rigged a contract tendering 
process for provision of hospital transport (see Case study 3 
on page 32). Also, the risks they face and their goals in 
investment in the legal economy differ from those legal 
businesses (CSD, 2015), as discussed earlier in the section 
on the impact of drug markets on the legal economy.
It is also important to recognise that, as is the case in the 
legal business world, the size of organisations or entities 
involved in illicit drug supply is highly diverse, ranging from 
lone individuals or small-scale enterprises to large criminal 
organisations. For example, at one end there are young 
people engaged in what is known as ‘social supply’, who 
purchase drugs, such as ecstasy, on behalf of friends and 
may sometimes sell them for a small profit. At the other 
end are the large organised crime gangs, such as Italian 
mafia groups, engaged in trafficking large amounts of 
drugs transnationally. This same diversity can be seen in 
the different groups engaged in growing cannabis, from 
individuals growing for personal use to OCGs growing 
thousands of plants.
A potentially fruitful area for development would be the 
elaboration of a conceptual framework for understanding 
the business drivers and contextual factors that influence 
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those involved in supplying the drug markets. The evidence 
suggests that key concerns for most people involved at all 
levels of the drug market are making a profit, sustainability 
and maintaining a competitive advantage, while minimising 
risk, for example by outsourcing or transferring it, as is the 
case for licit businesses. Therefore, viewing drug markets 
from a business perspective may provide valuable insights 
into their operations, including factors that may either enable 
or inhibit both expansion and diversification. Knowledge 
of such factors may in turn allow the development of more 
effective strategies for tackling drug supply and limiting the 
harms arising from it. Such an approach would require the 
collection of different kinds of information and intelligence 
as well as a different analytical focus. While it is still 
experimental, it is an approach that merits testing and builds 
on developments already under way in Europe.
As Murray (2016) describes in a working paper prepared 
as background for this report, factors that are likely to be 
important include the following:
 n Architecture — contacts, logistical infrastructure, the 
availability of large cash resources, etc., may drive 
involvement in wider areas, such as illegal immigration, 
arms dealing or terrorism.
 n Reputation, and the need to maintain it, may drive, for 
example, the establishment of legitimacy through legal 
business; the need to maintain a monopoly position and 
reputation may lead to diversification, both geographical 
and substance related, and potentially to violent crime to 
maintain position.
 n Innovation/entrepreneurship — the need for adaptability 
to remain successful is illustrated by the use of the 
internet and cybercrime, dealing in new substances 
or moves into production. This is driven by a need to 
respond to wider contextual changes: globalisation, 
technological developments, changes in the regulatory 
environment and enforcement activity.
Consideration of these broad drivers can help identify 
potential areas for cross-involvement in different criminal 
and legitimate activities, mechanisms for quantifying 
the extent of these overlaps and also areas of possible 
weakness that might be targeted. This also suggests that 
responses should target the processes rather than the 
groups or individuals involved, looking at what is done and 
how, rather than who is doing it. 
An OCG in Scotland regularly received cocaine from a 
Liverpool-based group, supplied on credit with payment 
due in 1 week. A network of retail-level dealers was used to 
distribute the drug to customers, each receiving a batch of 
cocaine to sell over a period of 1 to 2 weeks. Each dealer 
kept GBP 200 of the takings as wages, and the remainder 
of the proceeds was collected by the local wholesaler. 
After the Liverpool group were paid, the remaining 
substantial profits had to be laundered quickly and three 
legitimate businesses were used for this purpose.
The first scheme involved using dirty cash to buy stock 
for a bar controlled by the OCG: excess profits were 
hidden by raising false invoices or paying wages to 
fictitious staff. The second scheme involved setting up 
a legitimate company to supply home improvements 
for ‘Green Deal’, a government environmental 
initiative designed to let members of the public and 
businesses make energy-efficiency improvements to 
their properties. Once the company was established, 
subcontractors were paid in dirty money; meanwhile the 
clean government subsidy money was ‘stored’ on the 
balance sheet. The third mechanism involved acquiring 
properties using mortgages arranged by a corrupt 
financial adviser using false income declarations. The 
dirty money was used to make the mortgage payments 
through small bank deposits under the suspicious 
transaction reporting limit (‘smurfing’).
By taking a business analytical approach, it is possible 
to identify targets for law enforcement intervention; 
for example, the key relationships in the business 
architecture, the Liverpool cocaine supplier, the retail 
dealers, legitimate traders supplying goods to the 
bar, the subcontracted insulation installers and the 
corrupt financial advisor, all represent opportunities 
for disruption. The reputation of the group retailing the 
drugs is important, as it allows it to receive drugs on 
credit and the dealers know they will be paid on time; 
the exploitation of the Green Deal initiative shows 
innovation. Understanding these factors leads to 
opportunities to disrupt the activities of the group by 
damaging its reputation and inhibiting its access to the 
legal economy, for example by reporting the misuse 
of ‘Green Deal’, which may also serve to prevent other 
OCGs from attempting such schemes.
Source: Murray (2016).
Case study 6: Analysing a cocaine supply business
45
CHAPTER 2 I Drivers of drug market developments
For example, having certain types of key partners will be 
essential to enable OCGs involved in drug markets to 
access the profits they make and to deal with the vast sums 
of cash associated with this activity (see the section on 
money laundering in Chapter 1). Recognising this leads 
on to consideration of how many of such groups, that 
is, lawyers, bankers, accountants, etc., may be involved 
with drug trafficking organisations and the extent of this 
involvement. Appreciating that indoor cannabis farms 
require properties to house them leads on to consideration 
of how many estate agents and landlords wittingly or 
unwittingly are allowing their premises to be used for 
cannabis production and how they become involved. Case 
study 6 illustrates this sort of business analysis and also 
demonstrates many of the issues discussed in the previous 
chapter, including money laundering approaches and 
corruption. The importance of this approach is reflected in 
the SOCTA (Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment) 
OCG indicators ‘Expertise’ and ‘Human Resources’ 
(Europol 2015b). Similarly, considering key activities would 
lead to the identification of the types of activities that are 
being undertaken by the drug trafficking organisations in 
both the criminal and licit spheres.
The influence of globalisation
Globalisation and the growing use of the internet are 
factors that have had a big impact on illicit drug markets 
and their wider ramifications. Globalisation simultaneously 
facilitates drug supply, by generally improving its efficiency 
and multiplying opportunities, while hampering drug supply 
reduction activities, by making it more difficult to stop 
larger and more numerous drug flows. In fact, it is probably 
the most challenging development faced by international 
drug control at present. Globalisation has created 
efficiency gains in trafficking activities. Lower transport, 
communication and information costs have increased 
the efficiency of illicit business operations. In addition, by 
opening up borders, globalisation has also made it possible 
to easily transfer scientific and technological know-how 
which can be exploited by illicit, as well as legitimate, 
businesses. If not offset by improved supply containment 
policies, the reduced costs of bridging the gap between 
suppliers and producers of illicit products may lead to lower 
retail prices if passed onto consumers, with the potential 
for stimulating consumption. Alternatively, or in addition, 
globalisation increases the potential profits for producers, 
which might increase production (Costa Storti and De 
Grauwe, 2009).
One of the main ways in which globalisation impacts on 
European drug markets is by increasing the diversity and 
intensity of flows of people and goods in and out of Europe. 
Many of the plant-based drugs and precursor chemicals 
supplied to European markets are produced outside Europe 
and must be smuggled into the region, while some drugs 
and precursor chemicals are produced in the EU and 
supplied to other regions of the world. Each passenger, 
car, bus, lorry, aircraft, sea vessel and container entering or 
leaving the region (to say nothing of intra-European traffic) 
is effectively an opportunity to smuggle illicit goods, so the 
spectacular growth in global transport, trade and logistics 
over the past 25 years has multiplied such opportunities. The 
boom in container traffic entering and leaving Rotterdam by 
sea in the last 25 years or so is a telling example. The port of 
Rotterdam receives 30 000 sea vessels and 110 000 inland 
vessels every year and is Europe’s largest, and the world’s 
eighth largest, container port. Container traffic in Rotterdam 
increased threefold between 1990 and 2014, when 
7.4 million containers went through the port (see Figure 2.1), 
on average a little more than 20 000 containers a day. 
During the same period the net weight of load transported 
by the containers processed through the port increased 
fourfold, to reach 127.6 million tonnes in 2014, or roughly 
350 000 tonnes a day (11). This spectacular increase goes a 
long way to explaining why increasing numbers of middling 
to large consignments of heroin and cocaine intended for 
distribution within Europe are seized from containers in 
the port of Rotterdam every year. Indeed, it takes about 
3 minutes for traffickers to illegally open a container and 
retrieve a consignment of, for example, 100 kg of cocaine 
distributed in four or five duffel bags. Container traffic in 
almost all other large European ports, such as Hamburg, 
Antwerp, Algeciras, Felixstowe, Piraeus, Gioia Tauro and Le 
(11) Source: https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/the-port/facts-figures-
about-the-port
FIGURE 2.1
Container traffic in the port of Rotterdam, 
1990–2014
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Havre, to name just a few of those processing thousands of 
containers a year, is also growing.
Air passenger traffic has also increased in most major 
European airports and, owing to the development of 
low-cost air connections, in many smaller, regional airports 
as well. Thus, for instance, the number of passengers 
using Spanish airports increased from about 166 million 
in 2004 to about 196 million in 2014 (Aena, 2004, 2014). 
Land connections are also growing. Thus, for instance, lorry 
traffic at Kapitan Andreevo, a key border crossing point 
between Bulgaria and Turkey (Greece is also quite close), 
was already increasing even before Bulgaria joined the EU, 
from about 193 000 lorries in 2001 to more than 300 000 
in 2003 (CSD, 2004).
Another perspective on globalisation’s impact on drug 
markets can be obtained by looking at changes in the 
chemical industry in the last 20 years or so. The precursors 
used in the manufacture of most traditional illicit drugs 
are generally produced legally by legitimate firms and then 
diverted to illicit ends, while new psychoactive substances 
and their precursors are predominantly made in Asia, 
particularly China and to a lesser extent India. Four main 
recent trends have made it simultaneously easier for drug 
market actors to source chemicals and more complicated 
for authorities to tackle them. Firstly, the global chemical 
industry has experienced unprecedented expansion and 
growth during the last 20 years and continues to grow. 
Chemicals are now manufactured in most countries of 
the world and global output of the chemicals industry 
almost doubled between 1990 and 2010, meaning that 
it grew faster than global GDP. Secondly, international 
trade in chemicals has grown even more strongly than 
their manufacturing, with exports of chemicals increasing 
3.5-fold between 1990 and 2012. Thirdly, a significant 
proportion of international trade in chemicals is made up 
of re-exports, highlighting the increasing role played by 
brokers and other intermediaries. In practice, this means 
that more chemicals are traded between more countries 
through more intermediaries than ever before, seriously 
complicating the task of those in charge of targeting 
illicit shipments. Finally, Asia has become the largest 
chemical manufacturing region in the world, supplying 
44 % of global output in 2010, with China alone supplying 
27 % of global output. And a key characteristic of the 
Asian chemical sector, including China and India, is that 
it is made up of a large number of comparatively small 
companies, as opposed to a limited number of large firms. 
This makes the implementation of in-country controls 
more difficult because of the large number of sources 
of chemicals and potential opportunities for diversion 
(UNODC, 2014b). 
Finally, at a general level, demographic shifts worldwide, 
such as rapid population growth and urbanisation in Africa 
and Asia, alongside economic developments, will have 
major implications for global drug markets and will impact 
on Europe’s role in the world drug scene. Implications are 
difficult to predict, in part because, except in a few western 
countries, drug monitoring systems are poorly developed 
or non-existent. Nevertheless, it seems clear that socio-
economic development is leading to the emergence of 
large drug markets in eastern Europe (Russia), the Middle 
East (e.g. Turkey, Iran), Africa (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria, South 
Africa), the Americas (Brazil, Mexico, etc.) and Asia (China, 
India, etc.). This suggests that in future Europe is likely 
to be even more of a transit point for drug flows starting 
and ending elsewhere. Early-warning signs are already 
discernible, for example in the transit through European 
airports of drug couriers (some of whom are nationals 
of the EU) carrying methamphetamine made in West 
Africa or Iran and destined for Japan or the Philippines. 
Globalisation also makes it probable that more drugs will 
be produced in Europe for export on foreign markets, as 
is already the case with MDMA, and that more European 
criminal organisations will become significant players 
outside Europe.
The expanding influence of the 
internet
An important contributor to globalisation that has impacted 
on the drug market in a number of different ways is the 
internet, providing not only new ways to access customers 
and suppliers but also opportunities to enhance the 
efficiency and security of off-line criminal activities. The 
internet encompasses what is known as the surface or 
clear web, that part of the internet that can be found by 
link-crawling techniques used by a typical search engine 
such as Google or Bing, and the deep web, which is not 
accessible to these search engines (see Figure 2.2). The 
deep web comprises a wide variety of different types 
of content, including dynamic web pages, private sites, 
blocked sites and limited access networks. These are 
generally accessible only by conducting a search of a 
particular website; for example, much of the information 
contained in government databases and libraries lies in 
the deep web. However, a small proportion of the content 
on the deep web, known as the dark web or dark net, has 
been intentionally hidden and is accessible only using 
special web browsers. This is the portion of the internet 
most associated with illicit activities because of the relative 
anonymity associated with this network. However, while 
much attention has been given to the online marketplaces 
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found on the deep web, the surface web also plays an 
important role, particularly with respect to sales of new 
psychoactive substances.
The internet as a facilitator of drug 
trafficking processes
The internet facilitates drug trafficking in many ways, along 
all stages of the chain, but a key benefit of internet use for 
drug supply is the reduction of risk by allowing different 
stages of the trafficking process to be managed without 
the need for physical interaction with people, for example 
through the use of online booking and parcel tracking 
systems. Similarly, internet phone services, such as Skype, 
are used to avoid detection through the interception of 
communications (Lavorgna, 2016).
The deep web also provides opportunities for criminals 
to network through underground forums and, in addition 
to providing new opportunities for profit (through online 
sales), it provides new ways for money laundering and 
buying access to technical skills (see Case study 7). 
The dark net markets also open up the possibility of 
the establishment of new networks of drug producers/
manufacturers, wholesalers, brokers and drug-using 
customers, on a scale and with a degree of freedom 
that significantly exceeds what was possible through 
conventional, interpersonal criminal networks (Martin, 
2014). Previously, trafficking required a chain of on-the-
ground connections and relationships of trust with drug 
dealers at different levels and/or producers and importers 
(McCarthy and Hagan, 2001; Morselli, 2001). With 
the advent of the dark net market, almost anyone with 
sufficient technological skills can access stock and, using 
postal delivery, serve a (potentially) worldwide market of 
unknown customers they encounter only in the virtual 
sphere (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014).
In this rapidly developing marketplace, it is not yet clear 
to what extent dark net markets, by directly linking drug-
using customers and producers/manufacturers, cut out 
some of the middle level in the drug supply chain (Martin, 
2013) or whether most are ‘business-to-business’ sales 
that represent the middle level of a drug market (Aldridge 
and Décary-Hétu, 2014). While a very limited number of 
cases of connections to more sophisticated drug trafficking 
operations on Silk Road 2.0 suggest that some vendors 
may have ties to sources above the retail level (Dolliver, 
2015), emerging analysis of sales on a range of dark 
net marketplaces suggests that most are smaller-scale 
operations. Many vendors operate on the market for only a 
short period of time, and the majority (70 %) sell products 
worth no more than EUR 900 (12) (USD 1 000) in total, 
with only about 2 % of vendors managing to sell product 
totalling more than EUR 90 000 (USD 100 000) (Soska and 
Christin, 2015). A search of available data did not reveal 
any traditional OCGs selling and distributing drugs online, 
but it is not clear if this is because of a failure of detection 
as a result of the emergence of a new type of ‘tech-savvy’ 
(12) Converted using 2015 exchange rate.
FIGURE 2.2
Understanding the web: the iceberg analogy
Also known as the 'Visible web', 
this part of the internet can be 
found by link-crawling techniques 
used by a typical search engine
such as Google or Bing
Surface web  4 %
Deep web    96 %
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'Invisible web'. 
Content here is not 
accessible to search 
engines and includes
types including dynamic 
web pages, private sites,
blocked sites and limited
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Dark net
Part of the deep web, 
also known as the 'Dark web'. 
Content is intentionally hidden 
and is accessible using only special web  
browsers such as the Onion Router (Tor)
Case study 7: Accessing skills through 
the internet
In June 2013, police in Belgium and the Netherlands 
dismantled a Netherlands-based drug smuggling ring. 
The gang had hired hackers to infiltrate the systems 
controlling the movement and location of shipping 
containers at a large container port. This allowed the 
gang to manipulate the data to allow their own drivers 
to remove drug-loaded shipping containers before the 
legitimate haulier could collect them.
Source: Europol (2014a).
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OCG — a ‘generational shift’. At present, there also appears 
to be little overlap between drug and non-drug trade 
activities and networks, with vendors generally selling 
either drugs or non-drug items (i.e. weapons, hacking, 
credit cards, etc.) but not usually both (Compton, 2015). 
However, continued monitoring is necessary to determine 
whether this market divide will continue, or whether 
criminal diversity will increase.
Technologies that provide some anonymity to internet 
users are particularly important as the perceived anonymity 
associated with the deep web can make people feel more 
comfortable engaging in illegal activities including, but 
not limited to, the drug trade (Ciancaglini et al., 2015). 
The operators on the dark net use a variety of systems 
to conceal their identity. Anonymisation tools, such as 
the Onion Router (Tor), are commonly used to hide the 
identity of participants and transactions, and these are 
complemented by crypto-currencies, the best known of 
which is bitcoin, although others continue to evolve.
Internet drug marketplaces
The surface web provides access to pharmaceuticals and 
new psychoactive substances through online pharmacies 
and specialist vendors. Not all of the substances on offer 
will be legal but, because of the many ‘grey areas’ with 
respect to these substances, vendors are able to operate 
on the surface web with relative impunity (Lavorgna, 2016). 
Like online retailers of other products, they usually provide 
customer testimonials or reviews and may claim to provide 
ethically sourced products.
Dark net markets also allow customers to search and 
compare products and vendors, in the manner of clear 
net marketplaces (e.g. eBay and Amazon); a vendor’s 
ratings, and consequently their reputation, is one of the 
most important factors in creating trust and launching 
transactions. Following the Silk Road blueprint, in excess 
of 50 online anonymous markets were created between 
2011 and July 2015 (Gwern Archives). At the time of 
writing, the Gwern Archives list 21 active and operational 
marketplaces, while 28 active marketplaces appeared on 
the Darknet Stats list at approximately the same time point 
(May–July 2015) (DarkNet Stats). These marketplaces are 
generally short-lived; the majority of those currently active 
appear to have been launched in the second half of 2014 
or in early 2015. Market closures are generally the result 
of hacking, raids, exit scams (in which the site operators 
close the site down suddenly, taking the money from sales 
without fulfilling the orders) or voluntary exit and it is not 
clear what this market instability will mean for buyer safety 
or the popularity of dark net marketplaces in the future.
Although a number of successful law enforcement 
operations have been undertaken, including the take-down 
of Silk Road and Operation Onymous, these markets have 
proven to be very adaptable, and it appears that the effects 
of such interventions on the online anonymous ecosystem 
are short term (Soska and Christin, 2015) and those 
operating such sites develop new ways to evade detection, 
for example by improving encryption and anonymisation. 
It is suggested that a likely future development will be 
completely decentralised marketplaces that exploit 
aspects of game theory to side-step current weaknesses 
(Ciancaglini et al., 2015) — perhaps a ‘dark cloud’ on the 
horizon.
The drugs that feature most on dark net marketplaces 
are ‘traditional’ drugs, although there appears to be 
some variation in the pattern on different sites. For 
example, data from Silk Road showed that MDMA, 
cannabis and LSD were the three most common drugs 
bought in the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Australia (Barratt et al., 2014), whereas stimulants (e.g. 
cocaine, methamphetamine) and hallucinogens (e.g. 
LSD, PCP) made up over half the drug items on the Silk 
Road 2.0 market (Dolliver, 2015) and a study of 16 dark 
net marketplaces carried out between July 2013 and 
January 2015 found that cannabis, MDMA and stimulants 
accounted for over two-thirds of market share (Soska and 
Christin, 2015). When drug users in a global survey were 
asked about drugs bought through the dark net, MDMA, 
cannabis, LSD and cocaine were the most commonly 
reported (Winstock, 2015).
The United Kingdom (10 %) and the Netherlands (6.5 %) 
were among the top countries of origin for all items (the 
majority being drug related) listed on Silk Road; the EU 
represented 6 % of shipping destinations listed (Christin, 
2012). On Silk Road 2.0, Germany (14 %) was the second 
most popular country of origin for drug items listed on the 
site, after the United States and closely followed by the 
United Kingdom (13.8 %); the EU represented 9.2 % of 
shipping destinations offered for drug items on Silk Road 
2.0 (Dolliver, 2015). Although it is not clear how complete 
and representative such data are, the findings suggest that 
Europe may be a significant player in global online drug 
marketplaces.
The internet as a potential tool for 
reducing drug market harms
The surface web is also being used increasingly to host 
online tools to help people use drugs more safely or to 
give up using illicit drugs altogether as well as signposting 
people to traditional harm reduction and treatment 
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services. So there may be opportunities for benefit 
alongside the threat of wider drug supply.
Although dark net markets have been estimated to 
account, in revenue terms (13), for a very small proportion 
of the global drug trade, it has been argued that they are 
growing, serving an increasing customer base. There are a 
number of ways in which the use of the internet can reduce 
harms for both users and dealers. Research shows that 
customers value the quality and range of products offered 
by these markets, as well as the higher level of security 
than that afforded by street drug markets (Barratt et al., 
2014; Winstock, 2015). From the drug sellers’ perspective, 
the principal advantages are distance from street dealing 
and the associated risk of law enforcement detection and 
intervention, as well as access to a much larger potential 
market of purchasers (Van Hout and Bingham, 2014; 
Buxton and Bingham, 2015).
(13) Silk Road revenue generation before its closure was estimated at 
around EUR 13 million (USD 16.7 million) in 2012 and EUR 67.6 million 
(USD 89.7 million) in 2013 (Christin, 2012; Albridge and Décary-Hétu, 
2014); for comparison, the global cocaine market was recently estimated 
to be worth between EUR 54.7 and 68.3 billion (USD 80 and 100 billion) 
in 2008 (UNODC, 2010a).
In addition, both the surface web and the deep web host 
a range of forums and chatrooms in which drug users are 
able to exchange information about particular drugs and 
vendors. The discussions on drugs include information on 
effects arising from use, modes of use and appropriate 
dosage, which may help promote safer use. The information 
on vendors made available on discussion forums can 
alert people to vendors who supply substandard products 
or simply fail to deliver. In addition, most dark net 
marketplaces now incorporate customer feedback and 
ratings into their systems along with escrow systems to 
reduce the risk from scams (Van Hout and Bingham, 2013).
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Action points
Improve our understanding of the widespread ramifications of the drug 
market
1.  The collection of more detailed data on drug use, such as on the amounts and 
frequency of use among different groups of users, is needed to increase the accuracy 
of market size estimates and to monitor trends in the value of individual drug markets 
in the EU. These data will also assist in the development of drug policies and the 
assessment of their impact and effectiveness.
2.  Research is required to better understand the crossovers between drug trafficking 
and the trafficking of human beings, as well as the role of drugs in the exploitation of 
vulnerable people. In addition, the relationship between the drugs trade and the alcohol, 
tobacco and firearms trades should be critically reviewed for intervention opportunities 
and, if needed, systematic monitoring.
3.  There is a need for continued monitoring and analysis of potential linkages between 
organised criminals involved in the drugs trade and those engaged in terrorist activity. 
This will require greater cooperation between the different agencies tackling those 
threats as well as engaging with key partners.
4.  There is a need to more effectively monitor the nexus between drugs and violence, in 
particular systemic violence, by developing methodologies for data collection with a 
focus on measuring the number of such criminal acts related to the conduct of the 
drugs trade, and potentially their cost burden.
Increase knowledge sharing and cooperation to improve responses and 
ensure coherence between policy areas
5.  There is a need to share knowledge, expertise and best practice for tackling corruption, 
for example the use of internal corruption investigation departments, and to develop 
programmes to assist countries most affected. Continued support and commitment 
is needed for important initiatives, such as the Paris Declaration, and systematic 
monitoring should also be developed to enable benchmarking to be undertaken and 
to identify priority areas.
6.  Steps must be taken to ensure coherence, maximise synergies and reduce duplication 
between drug control policies and international development and assistance 
programmes in important production and transit regions.
7.  Greater dialogue, leading to positive engagement with drug-producing and transit 
countries bordering the EU and further afield, is required to safeguard the security of 
the EU. Focusing attention on financial centres, particularly the United Arab Emirates, is 
equally important.
Develop responses to drug markets by targeting drivers and interlinkages
8.  A methodology and framework to describe illicit enterprises from a business 
perspective should be elaborated by studying case-level data on the phenomenon. By 
understanding the processes involved, this may highlight immediate, cost-effective and 
innovative opportunities for intervention.
9.  The intelligence from operations targeting drug trafficking on the surface web and 
the dark net, as well as any best practice identified, should be shared with Europol. 
Though not exclusively related to internet trade, partnerships must be fostered with 
the payment card industry and money transfer companies, as well as parcel delivery 
services, while monitoring the developments with anonymous delivery technologies.
51
CHAPTER 2 I Drivers of drug market developments
10.  Work should be initiated to explore and develop strategies for engaging with young 
people in custodial environments for drug law offences and who may be vulnerable to 
radicalisation.
11.  A comprehensive suite of best practice interventions targeting criminal finances and 
money flows should be developed. This would include methodologies for improving 
cooperation with financial institutions, conducting successful parallel financial 
investigations, and exploiting and sharing financial intelligence.
12.  An assessment should be made of the key EU departure points of outgoing cash 
smugglers, and controls should be tightened in these areas to complement efforts to 
interdict incoming drugs.
13.  Improvements in the systematic monitoring of national expenditures in the EU on drug 
supply reduction are needed in order to assess the cost-effectiveness of interventions 
and the subsequent avoidance of activities of low value. This may, however, be 
challenging, as many supply reduction activities are a result of general public order and 
safety, or revenue and customs law enforcement.
14.  Awareness must be raised about the environmental damage caused by the dumping of 
waste from synthetic drug production sites in Europe. The data collection on this must 
be systematically implemented in the Member States and the knowledge, expertise 
and best practice developed in countries with the longest experience of tackling such 
environmental consequences could be more effectively shared with other Member 
States.
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Key issues
The importance of the cannabis market in Europe
With an estimated retail value of more than EUR 9 billion per year (range EUR 8 to 
13 billion) and over 22 million annual users, the illicit market for cannabis is the largest drug 
market in the EU. It represents an important source of revenue for OCGs and is associated 
with violence and other forms of crime that have a range of impacts on communities.
Market dominated by domestic herbal product
Cannabis is commonly available in Europe in two forms, herbal cannabis and cannabis 
resin. However, increased production in the EU in the last 10 years has led to a shift in 
the market, with domestically produced herb becoming more important and displacing 
imported resin in many countries. This has led to greater levels of intra-EU trafficking. In 
addition, Turkey reported seizing more cannabis herb in 2014 than any other European 
country.
Rapid innovation
There is evidence of product innovation with respect to edible products, oils and cannabis 
preparations intended for use in vaporisers. The adoption of these has the potential to affect 
patterns of use and harms, but information in this area is currently sparse.
Potency increases
Most of the herbal cannabis produced in Europe is cultivated indoors and appears to be of 
high potency. Furthermore, in Morocco, the main source of resin for Europe, there has been 
a switch to cultivation of higher-potency plants and the production of stronger resin. The 
average potency of both herbal and resin products available in Europe has almost doubled 
in the last decade, with prices only increasing slightly.
Health concerns
Trends in prevalence of use vary among countries, with some high-consuming countries 
showing marked declines in prevalence but other countries showing increases. There is also 
variability in demand for treatment related to cannabis use but, overall, this has increased. 
Public health concerns are greatest for daily users, estimated at 3 million, and those initiating 
use at an early age. High-potency forms of the drug may be more harmful.
CHAPTER 3
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Organised crime plays a key role
Dutch and ethnic Vietnamese OCGs, in particular, are well established and are expanding 
cannabis herb production in several EU Member States. They also provide know-how and 
equipment to other criminal groups that want to start cannabis production. Intensive domestic 
production sites have not only been linked to violent inter-group crime and to electricity 
theft but are also associated with human trafficking activities. Moroccan OCGs, working in 
partnership with European groups, have an established role in the importation and sale of 
cannabis resin in the EU, with the Netherlands and Spain acting as key distribution points. 
However, both countries may also be important herbal cannabis producers, since a recent 
increase in seizures in Spain suggests growth in production. Albanian-speaking groups play a 
variety of roles as producers of cannabis herb in both the EU and Albania and as distributors of 
Afghan resin, which is making inroads in some EU countries.
Moroccan resin moving east
The interception of large consignments of Moroccan cannabis resin moving eastwards 
along the North African coast raises the possibility of a new smuggling route into Europe or 
the opening of new markets in an unstable region.
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Introduction
Today the market for cannabis products is the largest drug 
market in Europe, since cannabis is the most commonly 
used illicit drug. Although for many people cannabis use is 
experimental and short-lived, for a minority use can become 
problematic and have serious long-term mental health 
consequences. Europe has seen an increasing number of 
people seeking treatment for cannabis-related problems.
Cannabis can be cultivated outdoors in most parts of the 
world and anywhere indoors, making it the most widely 
produced illicit drug in the world. The illicit cultivation of 
cannabis usually produces two distinct cannabis products: 
herbal cannabis (marijuana) and cannabis resin (hashish). 
Herbal cannabis is produced by drying the flowering tops 
of the plants, and resin is the product of processed plant 
secretions that are normally compressed into blocks.
Globally, it appears that herbal cannabis tends be produced 
for sale on domestic markets and in neighbouring regions 
rather than for export outside the region. As a result, herbal 
cannabis is less likely to be intercepted by authorities 
in relation to trafficking. In contrast, it seems that so far 
cannabis resin has been produced largely for export. In 
the majority of EU countries cannabis consumption is 
dominated by herbal products, which can be of high potency.
Improved cultivation methods, including indoor techniques 
and selective plant breeding, have resulted in cannabis 
plants that grow faster, produce more flowering tops and 
contain higher concentrations of the main psychoactive 
constituent, tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC). These factors 
are likely to have played a role in increased levels of 
domestic production in Europe, and a concomitant reduced 
demand for imports, and to have contributed to a shift in 
the consumer market. They have also probably contributed 
to a change in cannabis resin production in Morocco, 
Europe’s main source of this drug.
The importance of THC and CBD levels in 
cannabis products
The two main psychoactive constituents of cannabis 
are tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and cannabidiol 
(CBD). The amount of these and other cannabinoids 
in cannabis plants varies widely depending on 
factors such as genetic strain, growing environments, 
cultivation techniques, processing methods, 
packaging, transportation, storage and freshness. 
Intensive indoor cultivation has become widespread 
in Europe and elsewhere in recent years. This is based 
on seed varieties specially selected to give increased 
yields of flowering tops and THC as well as procedures 
such as artificial heating and lighting, hydroponic 
cultivation in nutrient solutions and propagation of 
cuttings of unfertilised female plants (sinsemilla). 
This leads to a high production of flowering material. 
Herbal cannabis produced by such intensive indoor 
methods may have a THC content two or three times 
greater than that of naturally grown imported herbal 
cannabis, but contains very low levels of CBD.
CBD is known for its antipsychotic properties. 
Therefore, any reduction in CBD in illicit cannabis 
may have implications for the overall negative health 
consequences associated with consumption. Data 
on drug treatment demand and some studies have 
shown links between cannabis use and an increased 
risk of developing psychotic illness, anxiety disorder or 
depression, although only a small proportion of users 
are affected. The absence of the protective effects 
of CBD in varieties of herbal cannabis with high THC 
and low levels of CBD may be a significant factor and, 
given these concerns, the levels of these chemicals in 
cannabis products should be carefully monitored as 
the cannabis market develops.
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TABLE 3.1
Consumption (1) 
Table 3.1 
Age group
(years)
Lifetime
Last year
Last month
All admissions
Number (% of admissions for all drugs)
Cannabis resin Herbal cannabis
EUR/gram EUR/gram
First admissions
possession for use 
EU  
EU plus Norway and Turkey
EU
EU plus Norway and Turkey
15–64
15–34
15–24
83.2
42.5
17.5
24.8 (4.3–40.9)
  33.9 (7.1–53.0)
29.9 (5.1–46.7)
15–64
15–34
15–24
22.1
16.6
9.6
6.6 (0.9–11.4)
  13.3 (3.2–23.9)
16.4 (3.4–27.1)
15–64
15–34
15–24
12.0
8.8
4.9
3.6   (0.4–6.6)
  7.0 (1.4–13.5)
8.3 (1.2–16.0)
139 000 (31 %)
75 000 (46 %)
606
139
229 000  453 000  
Estimated number
of users (million)
% of EU population 
(range between countries)
Drug treatment (2) 
(2014)
Seizures (3) 
Quantity 
Number
(2014)
(2014)
Range 
(IQR) (4)
3–22
(9–12)
Mean retail price
(2014) 
Range 
(IQR) (4)
7–29
(12–18)
Mean potency
(2014)  
Best estimate (low–high)
Value (billion EUR)
  9.3 (8.4–12.9)
Estimated market
size (2013)
Quantity (metric tonnes)
1 289 (1 154–1 790)
574
232
243 000  501 000  
5–23
(7–11)
% in EU % in EU
3–15
(8–12)
675 000 (76 %)
Number
Trends
Trends
Quantity Trends Trends
(tonnes) (tonnes)
CANNABIS IN EUROPE AT A GLANCE
813 000 (71 %)
136 000 (58 %)
Notes: 
(1)  EU estimates are computed from national estimates weighted by the population of the relevant age group in each country. They are based on surveys conducted 
between 2004 and 2014/15 and therefore do not refer to a single year.
(2)  Drug users entering treatment for cannabis problems. Units coverage may vary across countries.
(3)  The 2014 figures should be considered as estimates; where not available, most recent data were used in place of 2014 data, except for the number of seizures 
for the Netherlands, France and Poland where no recent data is available so they are not included. An additional 3.4 million cannabis plants and 1.9 tonnes of 
cannabis plants were seized (33 000 seizures) in Europe, including Norway and Turkey, in 2014.
(4)  IQR: interquartile range, or range of the middle half of the reported data.
Data presented are for the EU unless stated otherwise. All trend lines shown in this table cover a 5-year period, 2010–14. All trends reflect absolute numbers except 
for trends on price and on potency which reflect averages of mean values. In the case of treatment, price and purity, trends are based only on data from those EU 
countries that have consistently submitted data since 2010.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.
59
CHAPTER 3 I Cannabis
Global overview
Cannabis is produced and consumed in virtually all 
countries of the world. Because illicit cannabis cultivation is 
so widespread and carried out both indoors and outdoors, 
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to estimate how much 
cannabis is produced worldwide annually.
Europe continues to be one of the world’s largest consumer 
markets for cannabis resin (hashish), the majority of which 
is sourced from Morocco. The Middle East, North Africa 
and South-West Asia also have large consumer markets 
for resin, and significant production occurs in these 
regions (UNODC, 2015a). The world’s two largest producer 
and exporter countries of cannabis resin appear to be 
Afghanistan and Morocco, although resin is also produced 
in and exported from, but probably to a lesser extent, India, 
Lebanon, Nepal and Pakistan. Afghanistan is becoming 
more important in global resin production, with the UNODC 
suggesting that it has overtaken Morocco in terms of 
quantities of resin produced. Despite this, Afghan resin 
does not currently seem to be widely available in most of 
Europe (Chouvy, 2016).
In 2013, some 1 416 tonnes of cannabis resin was seized 
worldwide, confirming an increasing trend since 2011. 
After peaking at 7 060 tonnes in 2010, worldwide herbal 
cannabis seizures declined to reach 5 764 tonnes in 2013 
(UNODC, 2015a).
Cannabis herb
Turkey 58 %
Italy 9 %
Greece 7 %
UK 6 %
Spain 5 %
Cannabis resin
Spain 57 %
Turkey 17 %
France 13 %
Italy 7 %
Portugal 2 %
Cannabis herb
USA 29 %
Mexico 17 %
8 %Paraguay 
7 %
Nicaragua 4 %
Cannabis resin
Spain 23 %
Pakistan 22 %
Algeria 15 %
Morocco 8 %
Turkey 7 %
GLOBAL OVERVIEW – CANNABIS
Main seizing countries Cannabis herb Cannabis resin
Quantities seized
(tonnes) Proportion of 
European seizures 
2013
Proportion of 
global seizures 
2013
Estimated users
Global
 181 m
EU
22.1 m
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Past year,
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Global Overview Cannabis.pdf   1   02/03/16   10:38
 
 
 
Cannabis herb Cannabis resin
6 667 6 265
5 494
5 764
 1 281 1 060 1 060
1 269 1 416
Europe
Global
Europe
Global
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
7 060
Colombia 
Note: The estimates for seizures presented are for 2013; more recent EU figures are available but have not been used for the purposes of comparability. For the 
most up-to-date European data, please refer to Table 3.1.
Source: UNODC, World Drug Reports. EMCDDA, 2015a.
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Consumer market for cannabis in 
Europe
The cannabis market is now more diverse than ever before, 
with the potency of available products generally higher than 
in the past. These changes suggest a less benign image 
of the drug and a far more professionalised, commercial 
supply than the popular characterisation of cannabis in the 
1960s and 1970s. However, it is not clear if these changes 
are driven by consumer preference or the changes in the 
production and supply. This is an area that merits further 
investigation to inform the current debates around the 
liberalisation of cannabis control.
In almost all countries the prevalence of cannabis use 
far exceeds that of the other major drug groups. Almost 
a quarter of 15- to 64-year-olds in the EU, approximately 
83.2 million adults, are estimated to have tried the drug 
at least once in their lifetime. Use is higher among young 
adults, with almost one in eight young adults (aged 15–34 
years), or 16.6 million individuals, using cannabis in the last 
year. However, cross-European estimates mask between-
country variations not only in the extent of use (estimates 
of last-year prevalence of use among young adults range 
from less than 1 % to over 20 %), but also in trends in use. 
For example, surveys in Germany, Spain and the United 
Kingdom have shown decreasing or stable trends in 
reported use while, in contrast, increasing prevalence can 
be observed in Bulgaria, France and three of the Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) (EMCDDA, 
2015a).
Other developments in cannabis consumption give rise 
to some concerns. In some countries where use has been 
declining or stable, there are some signs of a change in 
this trend among younger people. Cannabis is now the 
drug most frequently reported as the principal reason for 
treatment entry by clients entering treatment for the first 
time in the EU. When all treatment entrants are considered, 
it is the second most frequently mentioned drug. It is 
important to note, however, that treatment data reflect not 
only need but availability of cannabis treatment or referral 
practices. However, the change in the potency and the 
balance between THC and CBD in the cannabis on the 
market (see box on page 57) as well as age at first use of 
cannabis may also play a role.
Information on the frequency of cannabis use is becoming 
increasingly available from national surveys. It is estimated 
that 1 % of those aged 15–64 years in the EU, or about 
3 million individuals, smoke cannabis on a daily or 
near-daily basis, but with considerable variability between 
countries (EMCDDA, 2015a).
The size of the market for cannabis
The estimated value of the retail market for cannabis in 
the EU is over EUR 9.3 billion in 2013, with a likely range of 
EUR 8.4–12.9 billion. This represents just under two-fifths 
of the total illicit market in drugs. Our estimates of amounts 
used suggest that in 2013 about 647 tonnes of herbal 
cannabis (range 581–903 tonnes) and 641 tonnes of resin 
(range 573–887 tonnes) were consumed.
In reaching these estimates, we have used information 
on numbers of users from the general population surveys 
conducted in most countries but, recognising that some 
groups of drug users are unlikely to be represented in these 
surveys, we have supplemented these with estimates of 
cannabis use by problem users of other types of drugs. 
Separate estimates for consumption of herbal cannabis and 
resin were also calculated but, since information on the type 
of cannabis use was not collected in the surveys used, these 
estimates are based on the proportion of the seizures (in terms 
of numbers) that are herbal cannabis, and this may not be a 
very good proxy for use. There are a number of other limitations 
to these estimates (see box on page 28) and further details 
of the estimation methods are given in the background paper 
published alongside this report (EMCDDA, 2016a).
Diversification of cannabis products
Apart from herbal cannabis and resin, which are by far 
the most common products, other products may be made 
from the cannabis plant. Probably the best known of 
these is cannabis oil, a product made by purifying either 
the herbal substance or the resin, to produce an extract 
that has a higher concentration of THC. Traditionally, little 
cannabis oil was seized in Europe. In 2014, however, fairly 
large amounts were seized. Indeed, 11 countries reported 
seizing a total of 119 kg of cannabis oil, with Spain alone 
confiscating 103 kg. This may be an indicator of on-going 
market diversification in Europe.
The liberalisation of cannabis use in North America and 
elsewhere may be driving a renaissance in innovative 
methods to prepare cannabis products, which could lead 
to an expansion of the range of cannabis products on offer 
in Europe. For example, there are reports that cannabis 
oil prepared using butane gas has become more popular 
in North America, although the process of making this 
is inherently dangerous due to the flammable gas used. 
The product, called BHO (butane hash/honey oil, ‘wax’ or 
‘shatter’), is reported to have a high concentration of THC. 
A recent study concluded that hospital emergencies due to 
burns associated with the production of BHO have increased 
since the liberalisation of cannabis policy in Colorado (Bell et 
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al., 2015). The situation in the United States has also led to 
the emergence of other products containing cannabis, most 
notably edible ones, such as cookies or ‘brownies’.
For consumers interested in making their own cannabis 
resin, methods for domestic production are available. One 
such method combines a sieving technique with a cold 
water extraction process to produce a potent resin product 
that is then smoked. Kits and equipment to perform this 
procedure are commercially available in the EU and readily 
available in grow shops.
The use of electronic cigarettes or vaporisers to consume 
cannabis would also appear to be gaining in popularity, 
with many online shops offering advice and equipment 
for this purpose. In the absence of a better source of 
information, Google trends suggests that interest in ‘vaping 
cannabis’ has been increasing since September 2013, 
and to a lesser extent ‘vaping cannabis oil’ since early 
2015. This may have positive implications for public health, 
particularly given the high levels of the co-use of tobacco 
and cannabis in European countries.
Finally, an important and more negative factor in the 
diversification of cannabis products is the appearance of 
synthetic cannabinoid products on the market (see also 
Chapter 7). These products are not in any way derived from 
the cannabis plant although they are aimed at cannabis 
users. They are mainly herbal products; resins and liquids 
containing the chemicals are also available, but to a much 
lesser extent. The motivations to take such products 
are numerous but poor access to real cannabis and the 
possibility of being drug tested are cited as key factors. 
Attempting to circumvent use-related prosecution or, in 
some countries, to avoid a cannabis-positive roadside 
drug test are other reasons cited (Fattore and Fratta, 2011; 
van Amsterdam et al., 2015). For example, the problem of 
synthetic cannabinoid use in prisons in England and Wales, 
where a random mandatory drug testing programme in is 
force, may be in part driven by the desire to avoid positive 
tests since these substances are not currently detected by 
such tests (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2015).
Cannabis production 
Production processes
Key factors in the cultivation of cannabis, whether indoors 
or out, include exposure to light (natural or artificial), 
access to good-quality seeds or cuttings, the cultivation 
method used, plant density, water supply (irrigated or 
rain-fed crops) and soil acidity or alkalinity, which affects 
the availability of nutrients. Outdoor cannabis crops may be 
planted as a single crop or hidden within other crops such 
as maize, and yields depend upon natural daylight cycles 
and climate. Outdoor cultivation may be large or small scale 
and usually produces one or two harvests per year (Clarke, 
1998; UNODC, 2006b; EMCDDA, 2012).
Indoor cultivation ranges from small-scale home growing 
to professional operations run by criminal networks in 
industrial warehouses. The control that can be exercised 
over growing conditions (e.g. light, heat, water, plant 
density, pest control, etc.) allows for continuous cultivation 
throughout the year and can result in four to six full 
harvests per year (Vanhove et al., 2012). The benefits 
of indoor cultivation include lower risk of detection and 
generally higher yields of higher-potency strains. Most 
indoor cultivation in Europe uses soil, rather than the  
once-popular hydroponic method.
Cannabis is harvested by cutting the plant at the base 
and then drying it in warm, low-humidity, low-light 
conditions, either by hanging or by placing it upon drying 
shelves, although nowadays special drying equipment is 
commercially available. To prepare herbal cannabis for 
smoking, once the plant is dry the flowers are ‘manicured’ 
(either manually or with a machine) to remove the leaves 
and stems, leaving the inflorescence (bud), which is the 
material usually sold on the market.
FIGURE 3.1
Associating electronic cigarettes with cannabis 
symbols
Shop window in Glasgow, United Kingdom, December 2015.
Photo © Andrew Cunningham
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Grow shops
One potential indicator of the spread in domestic 
production in Europe, in particular indoor production, is 
the apparent rise in the number of ‘grow shops’. A grow 
shop is a shop selling products specifically — although 
not always explicitly, given legal considerations — for the 
cultivation of cannabis plants, and in 2009, 15 European 
countries reported the existence of such shops. Grow 
shops have increased in popularity since the 1990s 
in Europe. Some grow shops sell not only cultivation 
equipment but information, literature and smoking 
paraphernalia, suggesting that they can be regarded as 
‘centres of learning’ about domestic cultivation. In a few 
countries (Belgium, France, the Netherlands) it has also 
been suggested that some grow shop operators sell 
seeds, buy their customers’ harvests and dispose of their 
waste products (EMCDDA, 2012).
The recognition of the involvement of criminal actors 
in the grow shop business has led some EU countries 
to counter the activity, notably by a crackdown or 
a specific legislative act. In the Czech Republic, 
following a Supreme Court ruling that grow shops were 
unlawful, 50 shops were raided in a police crackdown 
in November 2013, leading to seven arrests. In March 
2015, the Dutch implemented an Article in the Opium 
Act of the Netherlands (Article 11a), which ‘prohibits 
the preparation or facilitation of professional cannabis 
cultivation or other criminal activities related to trafficking 
of large quantities of cannabis’. As a result of police 
enforcement activity linked to this Act, it is expected 
that Dutch grow shops will close and that facilitators 
of cannabis production, such as corrupt electricians 
and real estate agents, will be more effectively targeted 
and their assets seized. However, there remains the 
possibility of displacement to the virtual domain.
The production of cannabis resin, or hashish, entails 
dislodging the glandular trichomes that form mostly on 
flowers (buds). The result is a fine powder that is high in 
THC, which is then compressed to form hashish. Two main 
methods have been used in the main producing regions: 
hand-rubbing and sieving. Sieving is reported to produce 
much more resin much more rapidly than hand-rubbing, 
although in both cases several ‘grades’ of resin may be 
produced. However, even resins produced by the same 
methods can appear to be substantially different products 
(Clarke, 1998; UNODC, 2006b, 2010a).
As noted above, some cannabis resin (and cannabis oil) 
is also produced in Europe by extraction methods based 
on chilled water, or the use of electric tumbler/sieving 
machines. The resins and oils produced by these ‘modern’ 
methods using high-THC cannabis plants are likely to be 
quite potent (see below).
Producing for European markets
The herbal cannabis and resin available on consumer 
markets in Europe come from a range of both domestic and 
external sources. Currently, systematic data on cannabis 
production sites or the origin of cannabis products seized 
in the EU are not available, but, despite this limitation, the 
overall situation can be described in general terms.
Cannabis resin
Historically, Europe has relied heavily upon production 
sources of cannabis resin outside the region, predominantly 
Morocco. However, Afghanistan may be re-emerging as a 
supplier of European resin markets (UNODC, 2013b). In 
both Morocco and Afghanistan, hashish is produced by the 
sieving method. Although recent qualitative information 
suggests that Afghan resin is rare in Europe, and mostly 
of low quality (Chouvy, 2016), British authorities recently 
reported to Europol that approximately 50 % of the hashish 
entering the United Kingdom originates in Afghanistan. In 
this respect it is notable that 3 tonnes of cannabis resin 
shipped from Pakistan was intercepted in Belgium in 2013 
(Belgium: Reitox, 2014).
Evidence has emerged of a change in cannabis resin 
production in Morocco that is likely to be having an impact 
on the European market. The kif plants traditionally grown 
in the Rif mountains are being replaced by cannabis 
hybrids of various origins that allow for much higher resin 
yields and THC contents (Chouvy and Afsahi, 2014). This 
has led to the emergence of a new, more potent, type of 
Moroccan hashish, which may in part explain why the 
potency of the cannabis resins seized in many European 
countries has increased in recent years.
Another potential, but as yet more speculative, explanation 
for the potency increase of seized resins is hashish 
production in Europe itself, from domestically grown 
cannabis plants. Indeed, there is already evidence 
suggesting that some cannabis resin is produced in Europe 
using the ‘modern’ methods described above. So far this 
seems to be restricted to individuals producing small 
amounts of home-made resin from their own plants and 
for their own use. However, there is a distinct possibility 
that large-scale, commercial, production of cannabis resin 
may develop in Europe in the coming years (Chouvy, 2016; 
Denmark: Reitox, 2016).
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Cannabis herb
In Europe, herbal cannabis tends be produced for sale on 
domestic markets and in neighbouring countries rather 
than for export outside the region. Although some cannabis 
herb is imported from outside the EU, it is probable that 
most of what is available on European markets is produced 
in Europe itself. A data collection tool on the number and 
scale of the cannabis cultivation sites dismantled by law 
enforcement in Europe has recently been developed by 
the EMCDDA and Europol. The implementation of such a 
data collection will systematise information on this topic, 
allowing a more reliable analysis of the situation.
Major herbal cannabis-producing countries in the Balkan 
region, including Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria and, to some 
extent, Kosovo (14), supply the markets of central-eastern 
and south-eastern Europe. Albania appears to have been 
an important outdoor producer; however, this situation 
may have changed recently as a result of intensive 
eradication efforts in the summer of 2014. Cannabis 
plants were found growing on several hundred hectares in 
the southern municipality of Lazarat, in a mountain region 
near the Greek border, although commercial cannabis 
production probably also occurs elsewhere in Albania. 
Greece, where cannabis herb is also produced, is a major 
entry point into the EU for Albanian cannabis herb, which 
is distributed in several EU Member States, including 
Italy, Croatia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria. In 
addition, some Albanian herb may also be sold in western 
Europe, for instance in France and Germany. Furthermore, 
Europol indicates that low-potency cannabis herb 
produced in Albania is trafficked to the Netherlands and 
(14) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line 
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Internation-
al Court of Justice opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
used to adulterate higher-potency cannabis, the mixture 
being destined for the UK market. Some Member States, 
such as Belgium and the United Kingdom, report that 
some cannabis herb is imported from sub-Saharan Africa 
and the Caribbean. Finally, the Ukraine has emerged as 
an apparently large producer of cannabis in recent years; 
however, as yet it has not been reported as a significant 
source of cannabis for European markets.
In Europe, cannabis production occurs indoors in 
most countries, with fewer countries reporting outdoor 
cultivation. Seizures of whole cannabis plants are 
generally thought to be an indicator of domestic cannabis 
cultivation in the country where they occur. The number 
of seizures of cannabis plants in the EU has been 
increasing for some time to over 30 000 seizures in 2014, 
compared with a little over 11 000 in 2006. Countries 
report the quantity seized either as an estimate of the 
number of plants seized or, in a few cases, by weight. 
The total number of plants seized in the EU remained 
stable at about 2.5 million annually in 2005–09, and then 
increased gradually to a peak of nearly 7 million in 2012 
before falling to around 3.4 million in 2014 (15). The EU 
Member States that between them generally seize most 
of this total are the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and the 
United Kingdom.
Historically, the Netherlands has been an important source 
of herbal cannabis supply within Europe, and thousands 
of cannabis production sites are dismantled by law 
enforcement there every year. Many of the innovations in 
growing techniques and equipment that have fostered 
the gradual professionalisation of cannabis production 
(15) Data for the Netherlands for the years 2008–13 were obtained from the 
UNODC (2015a). Data for the UK were not available for 2014 so 2013 
data have been used.
FIGURE 3.2
Professional cannabis cultivation
Underground cannabis plantation dismantled in Zeist, the Netherlands, in March 2013: cultivation area (left) and electrical set-up (right).
Photos © Dutch National Police, Central Intelligence Division
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in Europe over the last 20 years, as well as many high-
potency strains of cannabis, have been developed in the 
Netherlands. More recently, the internet has been identified 
as a key facilitator of the cultivation of cannabis, providing 
access to expertise and online shops selling growing 
equipment and seeds (Europol, 2015c).
Organised crime plays a major role in cannabis production 
in Europe. A significant development in this respect has 
occurred in recent years, a type of ‘delocalisation’ of 
production whereby some OCGs run cannabis plantations 
outside their place of origin and/or supply production 
equipment and know-how to other OCGs producing 
cannabis within EU borders for sale on EU consumer 
markets. Drivers for this include law enforcement actions 
against cannabis cultivation and social intolerance 
towards it, both of which are likely to be stronger in 
countries with a long history of cannabis production 
(e.g. the Netherlands). Other important factors include 
producing near the consumer markets in order to avoid 
smuggling drugs across borders, including internal EU 
borders, easier availability of premises in which to set up 
plantations, cheaper labour, lower law enforcement and 
social awareness of commercial cannabis cultivation. In 
this respect, Dutch and Vietnamese OCGs appear to play a 
significant role. For example, Dutch OCGs are increasingly 
active in other countries, setting up plantations, as 
illustrated by a recent case in France (see Case study 8). 
Dutch OCGs also provide ‘crime as a service’ expertise to 
other criminal groups in Europe, notably through ownership 
of grow shops (see box on page 62) but also, for example, 
through the use of corrupt real estate brokers who help 
select premises for the setting-up of plantations. Other 
criminal services available include electricians specialising 
in electricity theft, a crucial requirement for modern indoor 
plantations.
Environmental effects of cannabis production
The single-cropping of cannabis plants over large surface 
areas has negative environmental effects, such as erosion 
and underground water pollution and depletion, although 
these are often overlooked. As is the case with other drugs, 
environmental harm caused by cannabis production is 
poorly documented, although some information is available 
for Morocco.
An indoor plantation of 600 cannabis plants was 
dismantled by the gendarmerie on a farm belonging 
to a 52-year-old Dutch national in a remote rural 
area of central France in January 2015. According 
to the press, he offered his property as a cultivation 
site to criminal contacts in Rotterdam in order to 
alleviate financial problems. The plantation was set 
up by members of a Dutch OCG who travelled from 
the Netherlands and supplied all the equipment and 
cannabis cuttings. After the first harvest in 2014, 
the OCG had collected the cannabis herb from the 
farm and transported it first to the Netherlands and 
eventually to the United Kingdom, where it was sold. 
The prosecutor stated that the cannabis plants were of 
a high-yield variety and that they could be harvested 
four times a year. The defendant said that he expected 
to make a profit of about EUR 7 000 from the harvest 
of the 600 plants although its total retail value was 
estimated at about EUR 145 000. He also told the 
court that there were many other operations like his in 
France, where cannabis herb is produced for export to 
the Netherlands. The court in Moulins sentenced him to 
5 years in prison, a EUR 5 000 fine and the confiscation 
of his farm.
Source: Larcher, 2015.
Case study 8: Dutch OCG producing cannabis herb in France
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Cannabis production and the environment in 
Morocco
Cannabis is cultivated as a cash crop over an 
estimated 47 000 ha of land in the Rif mountains 
of northern Morocco, a relatively densely populated 
region located close to Europe (UNODC, 2015a). 
Illicit crops have taken a heavy toll on the forests 
of the Rif. An estimated 17 000 ha of forests was 
lost in the Chefchaouen province alone during the 
1980s, largely in order to make way for cannabis 
crops (Grovel, 1996). Deforestation makes the soil 
much more vulnerable to erosion, which leads to soil 
depletion. Soil depletion is particularly acute when 
the affected land is on slopes, as is the case in the Rif 
mountains. Depleted soil and the need to maximise 
yields often lead to the use of agricultural chemicals, 
in many cases with little regard to dosage, further 
polluting already degraded soils and spreading to 
rivers and underground water deposits (Chouvy, 
2003; Afsahi, 2009). The large-scale cultivation of 
imported hybrid cannabis plants is likely to bring 
additional environmental harm to a region already 
seriously affected by the effects of large-scale 
cannabis cropping. Indeed, in addition to more 
soil depletion and pollution caused by the large 
quantities of agricultural chemicals required by the 
new plants, widespread cultivation of water-hungry 
cannabis hybrids risks further depleting the Rif’s water 
resources because of the frequent drilling of deep 
wells tapping underground water deposits (Afsahi and 
Chouvy, 2015).
Trafficking of cannabis in Europe
Supplementing domestic production within Member 
States, cannabis is imported from other EU Member 
States and from outside the EU, and cannabis is the most 
commonly seized drug in Europe, accounting for more than 
75 % of the total number of seizures of all drugs made in 
the region in 2014. This reflects the widespread availability 
of the drug, which is the most consumed in Europe, among 
other factors. Although much larger quantities of cannabis 
resin continue to be seized in Europe, seizures of cannabis 
herb outnumbered those of resin for the first time in 2009, 
and the gap has widened since (see Figure 3.3). Thus, 
in 2014, 243 000 seizures allowed the confiscation of 
some 606 tonnes of resin in the EU, Norway and Turkey, 
while 501 000 seizures of herb resulted in the capture of 
232 tonnes of cannabis herb.
Spain, a major entry point for hashish produced in 
Morocco, has traditionally been the country seizing the 
largest quantities of cannabis resin in Europe, seizing 
nearly two-thirds of the European total in 2014. However, 
Spain, together with Greece and Italy, has also reported 
large increases in seizures of cannabis herb in recent 
years, although Turkey is now the country reporting the 
largest quantities of herbal cannabis seized in Europe, 
more than 90 tonnes in 2014. In 2013, Turkey also 
reported seizing more than 180 tonnes of cannabis herb, 
which is more than all other European countries combined 
(EMCDDA, 2015a).
Cannabis herb is also imported from outside the EU. 
For example, several large seizures made in the port of 
Antwerp in 2013 originated from Senegal (7.6 tonnes), 
Ghana (4.1 tonnes) and Honduras (1.7 tonnes) (Belgium: 
Reitox, 2014).
Organised crime: a threatening player on 
the European cannabis market
A recent Europol survey has mapped out the intra-
European trafficking flows of EU-produced cannabis herb 
and imported cannabis resin associated with major crime 
groups active in Europe. The survey outlines a geography 
of strategic locations for organised crime activities linked 
to cannabis products (see Figure 3.4). Belgium, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom are reported to 
be important locations for producing cannabis herb for 
export because of their well-established industrialised 
structures linked to organised crime. Production of high-
potency herbal material for export also appears to be 
significant in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Spain 
Case study 9: Operation SAUCO — 
cannabis resin trafficking
In February 2014, almost 1 tonne of cannabis resin 
was discovered by Spanish police concealed in the 
false bottom of a sailing boat that had arrived in 
Spain from Morocco. Investigations revealed that 
the OCG behind the shipment comprised Moroccan, 
Spanish and German criminals who had set up false 
companies in Spain and Germany to launder their 
proceeds. Despite the seizure, the group continued to 
operate until it was eventually dismantled in October 
2014, when 20 people were arrested in a joint day of 
action during which 44 vehicles, 21 properties, one 
yacht and EUR 27 500 cash were also seized.
Source: Guardia Civil (2014).
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and Slovakia. Spain is a key importation point for cannabis 
resin produced in Morocco (see Case study 9 on page 65), 
with Belgium, and even more so the Netherlands, acting as 
major distribution hubs for wholesale quantities. Albania 
and the Netherlands appear to be the main distribution 
hubs for Afghan cannabis resin (Europol, 2015d).
Violence, such as kidnapping, torture and murder, seems to 
be a salient feature of the sector of the European cannabis 
market controlled by OCGs, despite the fact that the 
groups also often collaborate with each other. This violence 
often occurs during or as a result of raids by rival gangs 
on cannabis plantations. Indeed, some OCGs, especially 
Moroccan groups, are reported to specialise in raiding other 
groups’ cultivation sites in order to save the time, effort 
and money required to obtain cannabis harvests. Belgium, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as well as 
Switzerland, have all reported incidents of extreme violence 
linked to cannabis cultivation over the last 3 years.
The herb produced in the Netherlands, as well as that 
grown by Dutch OCGs in, for instance, Belgium, Spain, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, is trafficked 
practically everywhere in Europe. Major consumer markets 
for the cannabis herb produced by Dutch groups include 
relatively large and wealthy countries such as Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, as well as Russia.
Dutch and ethnic Vietnamese OCGs: key 
players for cannabis herb
The important role played by Dutch OCGs in cannabis 
production has been described above, and Dutch OCGs 
are known to collaborate with Albanian-speaking and 
Moroccan criminal gangs involved in the cannabis trade. 
It should also be noted that some OMCGs are involved 
in cannabis cultivation in the Netherlands, and in the 
FIGURE 3.3
Seizures of cannabis reported in Europe, 2006–14
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trafficking of cannabis products to countries in northern 
(e.g. Denmark, Finland), north-western (United Kingdom, 
Belgium) and central Europe (Germany, Austria). The 
Netherlands is also an important distribution centre for 
cannabis resin, especially from Morocco, trafficked via 
Spain, and from there to the Netherlands via France and 
Belgium.
Ethnic Vietnamese OCGs based in Europe are comparative 
newcomers on the cannabis scene, but they are now firmly 
established as important suppliers for consumer markets 
in many countries. In particular, their activities have been 
linked with recent increases in the number of professional 
cultivation sites dismantled in central and eastern Europe, 
especially the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. However, Vietnamese OCGs have been active for 
some time in a number of Member States, including the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden and Hungary. Vietnamese 
OCGs run their own plantations but also sell technical 
expertise in setting up plantations to other groups, and are 
involved in other forms of crime such as methamphetamine 
production and trafficking of humans. Vietnamese 
OCGs are known for coercing illegal immigrants to work 
as gardeners in cannabis plantations, often in harsh 
conditions. Many of the immigrants used in this way are 
bonded by debt and work in cannabis production sites 
as a way to pay for their passage to Europe (MRCI, 2014) 
(see the section ‘Human trafficking and exploitation’ in 
Chapter 1).
Cannabis resin: Moroccan trafficking routes 
diversify while Afghan hash makes inroads
Although it has lost market share to cannabis herb in 
recent years, cannabis resin, mostly of Moroccan origin, is 
still widely consumed in Europe and its supply is largely 
in the hands of OCGs. The largest markets for cannabis 
resin are found in western and northern Europe (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), but Russia and 
Belarus also appear to be important. The Netherlands 
and, probably to a lesser extent, Belgium are traditional 
distribution hubs for cannabis resin, for instance to 
Scandinavia via Germany, or to Russia and Belarus 
via Poland and the Baltic countries. Hashish is also 
distributed from Denmark to the Nordic countries. Many 
shipments of resin destined for the French market are 
organised and depart from Spain, especially Andalusia. 
Europol also notes that members of the Italian Camorra 
mafia group organise cannabis resin shipments from 
Spain to Italy, either directly or via the Netherlands.
A recent and potentially significant development in the 
trafficking of cannabis resin to Europe from Morocco 
is the use of ships that transport the resin eastwards 
on the Mediterranean Sea to countries in the north of 
Africa, where OCGs may be exploiting unstable security 
environments (Figure 3.5). This is evidenced by several 
large seizures in the region. The Maritime Analysis and 
FIGURE 3.4
Main trafficking flows of cannabis in Europe
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Figure 3.4b Trafficking flows of cannabis resin.pdf   1   02/03/16   10:09
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Note: The trafficking flows represented are a synthesis of a number of information sources and should be considered indicative rather than accurate descriptions of 
the main trafficking flows.
Source: Europol.
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Operations Centre — Narcotics (MAOC-N) reports that in 
recent years it has been actively involved in the seizure 
of over 100 tonnes of cannabis resin off the coast of 
North Africa, at least some of which is thought to have 
been destined for European drug markets. A link has 
also been made between this maritime trafficking and 
the facilitation of illegal immigration to Europe, although 
the specifics of this are not well understood at present 
(Europol, 2015d).
Moroccan criminal groups are major players in the supply 
of cannabis resin to Europe, sometimes in partnership 
with European OCGs, for instance Dutch and Albanian-
speaking OCGs. Some Moroccan OCGs are able to control 
the whole chain of trafficking, from production in the Rif 
mountains to retail sales in, for instance, Marseille, France. 
In addition, their control over wholesale imports and sales 
allow them to exert significant influence on most markets 
in Europe. These groups are reported to cooperate with 
each other through Moroccan communities living in 
Europe, especially France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
the Nordic countries. Albanian OCGs are reported to be 
involved in the trade of Afghan cannabis resin, mostly 
to eastern and central Europe and, via the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom. However, it seems that the United 
Kingdom also receives Afghan hashish directly from 
South-West Asia.
The retail market for cannabis
Cannabis is the most frequently used illicit drug in Europe, 
so it is unsurprising that it is also the one considered 
most easily accessible, with the number of young people 
reporting that they could easily obtain some within 
24 hours being more than double the number claiming 
ready access to any other illicit substance (TNS Political 
& Social, 2014). However, not all cannabis consumed is 
purchased, as people may grow it for themselves, and 
not all cannabis purchased is for own-use, as it is often 
shared among groups of friends. For example, in a survey 
FIGURE 3.5
Large maritime shipments of cannabis resin
A seizure of 20 tonnes of cannabis resin from the Jupiter cargo ship in Cagliari, Italy, in September 2015. One of several large seizures of Moroccan 
cannabis resin from ships traveling eastwards on the Mediterranean Sea. The cannabis resin was stored in a compartment hidden underneath  
a shipment of huge granite blocks. 
Photos © Europol
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of cannabis users in seven European countries (van Laar 
et al., 2013), nearly two-thirds of respondents said that 
they mainly bought the cannabis they used, but over 
one-quarter said that the cannabis they used was given to 
them for free, 7 % reported growing it and 3 % obtained it in 
some other way. There was considerable variation between 
countries, however.
Only limited information is available on how the retail 
market operates, although local studies show that 
different types of market are associated with different 
levels of risk to purchasers and dealers. There is 
considerable variation between countries in how the 
retail cannabis markets function, which may be a result 
of legislative differences, for example in the Netherlands 
coffee shops are allowed to sell cannabis and in other 
countries cannabis clubs are permitted, or of cultural 
differences or the maturity of the market. This is 
illustrated by the study mentioned above, which found 
that the vast majority of users in the Netherlands (87 %) 
usually purchase their cannabis from a coffee shop, a 
possibility not available in other countries. In Bulgaria, 
most people (58 %) reported buying their cannabis on the 
street or in a park, whereas purchasing at the seller’s or 
someone else’s home was the most common response 
among respondents in the remaining five countries where 
the survey was administered (the Czech Republic, Italy, 
Sweden, England and Wales, and Portugal), suggesting 
more closed markets in these countries. The data from 
the study also suggest that the market for cannabis at the 
retail level in most of the countries in the study is quite 
specialised, as in five of the seven countries the number 
of respondents who said that other drugs were available 
where they usually bought cannabis was less than one-
third. This separation of the markets was greatest in the 
Netherlands, where most people buy their cannabis from 
coffee shops, indicating that the policy was achieving one 
of its key aims. The highest levels of market overlap were 
seen in Sweden (52 %) and Bulgaria (49 %).
Technological developments, such as the internet and the 
spread of mobile phones, also play a part in the cannabis 
market. As discussed in Chapter 2, the internet is an area 
of growing concern with respect to drug markets generally, 
although most surveys find that internet purchase of 
cannabis is not commonly reported. Nevertheless, in 
the Global Drug Survey (Winstock, 2015), cannabis was 
mentioned as one of the substances purchased through 
dark net markets, and a recent study of dark net drug 
markets found that cannabis accounted for a significant 
proportion of drug sales volumes, probably about a 
quarter (Soska and Christin, 2015). The use of mobile 
phones to arrange drug deals appears to be of increasing 
significance in many countries, facilitating either home 
deliveries or constantly changing meeting places for the 
exchange of drugs. This reduces the risk of detection by law 
enforcement.
The reported prices of cannabis resin and herb, where 
available, are quite similar and have been essentially stable 
in recent years. In 2014, the interquartile range (IQR) of 
the price of cannabis resin was EUR 9–12 per gram, while 
that of herb was EUR 7–11 per gram (Table 3.1). However, 
prices need to be considered in terms of the potency of 
the substances purchased as well as the quantity typically 
used at any one time. The price of both types of cannabis 
has increased in recent years, but not to the same extent as 
potency appears to have increased (Figure 3.6). Reported 
average potency (measured in terms of the percentage of 
THC) in 2014 tended to be slightly higher for resin than for 
herb. The IQR of the potency of resin was 12–18 % while 
that of herb was 8–12 % (Table 3.1). The potency of both 
types has roughly doubled since 2006 (EMCDDA, 2015b).
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FIGURE 3.6
Trends in cannabis potency and retail price in the EU, 2010–14
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Action points
Rising to the challenge of serious organised crime in the cannabis market
1.  As the cannabis market is the largest drug market and the involvement of organised 
crime in cannabis production and trade poses a significant threat, it is important that it 
remains a priority for action within the EU.
2.  It is important to continue to target and strengthen interdiction efforts in key 
geographical areas for cannabis production and trafficking, which include, but are not 
limited to, the Iberian Peninsula, the Netherlands and Belgium.
3.  The sharing of good practices, technical innovations and effective policing strategies for 
combating domestic cannabis production needs to be strengthened and extended.
4.  There is a need to engage with local communities to develop proactive responses to 
reduce the negative impact on areas affected by cannabis production, street markets 
and related criminality. Strategies to prevent vulnerable young people from becoming 
involved with the cannabis market should be developed.
Monitoring and adapting responses to the diversification of products and 
production methods
5.  Improvements in the monitoring of potency and different forms of cannabis available 
on the European market, including new products and technologies, are needed to 
understand and communicate their implications for public health in Europe. This 
is particularly important in the light of licit cannabis product developments in the 
Americas.
6.  Prevention, treatment and harm reduction interventions need to address contemporary 
developments in the cannabis market including potency and product innovations.
7.  Monitoring cannabis production in the EU should be further improved by making more 
use of existing tools, such as European Reporting on Illicit Cannabis Production (ERICP) 
sites, to build our understanding of scope, methods and trends at both national and 
European levels to enhance operational responses.
Addressing the key threats in production areas and along trafficking 
routes
8.  Engage with international partners to address the social, environmental and economic 
problems underlying cannabis production in the Moroccan Rif — a region close to 
Europe that poses risks in terms of OCGs’ activities, illegal immigration and possible 
links to terrorism.
9.  As large consignments of Moroccan cannabis resin are trafficked towards the eastern 
Mediterranean, there is a need to build on existing EU measures and increase 
engagement with non-EU partners of the eastern Mediterranean (North Africa and the 
Middle East) to develop a greater strategic understanding of flows, new routes and 
financial links, especially to terrorist organisations, human trafficking and the trafficking 
of other drugs.
10.  There is a need for active monitoring to identify potential threats related to production 
and trafficking activities in some areas, such as Afghanistan and Albania.
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Key issues
The European heroin problem
Although indicators suggest a long-term decline, the heroin market is still large, estimated 
as at least EUR 6.8 billion per year (range EUR 6 to 7.8 billion), and the drug remains 
responsible for a significant proportion of Europe’s drug-related health and social costs. 
Worryingly, some signals suggest an increase in availability that may pose greater risks to 
current users and the potential for new heroin users.
Heroin and the market for opioid drugs
The opioid market, in which heroin still predominates, appears to be more dynamic and 
complex than in the past, with more substances available to consumers. Transitions 
between heroin and other opioids, such as fentanyl and substitution medicines, have been 
observed. Prescription medicines and new synthetic opioids, which can be purchased 
online, are likely to be of increasing importance for both public health and law enforcement.
Understanding production
Understanding heroin production is important in order to analyse market dynamics and 
estimate size. Opium production estimates for Afghanistan, the main source of heroin 
in the EU, fluctuate but remain high, even though methodological uncertainties exist. 
Moreover, increased opium production has recently been noted again in South-East Asia. 
Morphine seizures outside Afghanistan may signal displacement of heroin production 
to new countries, including Europe. Monitoring of the diversion and trafficking of acetic 
anhydride is not only an essential element for a robust control framework but can also 
signal changes in opiate production.
Implications of large seizures
The recent increase in seizures of very large heroin consignments has important 
ramifications. Shipments of this size imply that relatively few consignments could 
have a significant impact on availability. The implications of this change need to be 
better understood as it may be important for understanding the relative importance of 
different trafficking routes, particularly those exploiting maritime and container trafficking 
opportunities.
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Organised crime and changing business models
Production techniques, locations, trafficking routes and associated modi operandi appear 
increasingly flexible and dynamic and quick to adapt to successful law enforcement 
activities. Turkish, Albanian-speaking and Pakistani OCGs are key players for heroin 
trafficking into Europe. Cooperation between groups, and with local OCGs, exists and may 
be increasing. The use of decentralised business models facilitates the sharing of assets 
and logistics, and results in risk displacement. OCGs are involved in trafficking of multiple 
drugs, precursors, weapons, other illicit commodities and, sometimes, migrants.
The importance of the Balkan route
The Balkan route remains a key corridor for heroin entry into the EU. This area therefore 
remains a natural focus for law enforcement efforts. Important recent developments 
include the emergence of two new off-shoots to the Balkan route involving the Southern 
Caucasus and Syria and Iraq. Turkey, in terms of both organised crime activities and anti-
trafficking measures, remains of central importance, especially given its proximity to areas 
of instability in the Middle East. Potential connections between flows of heroin and other 
drugs and terrorist groups in this region are a major concern, and Turkey is a key partner to 
help counter these threats.
The wider impact of trafficking routes
Significant domestic demand already exists along all trafficking routes and may be growing, 
with drug trafficking acting as an additional destabilising factor in countries often faced 
with other serious political, social, health and economic problems. Developments on the 
Southern route, in particular, are worrying owing to the potentially larger role of this route 
in the supply of heroin and other drugs to Europe and its negative impact on African 
countries.
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Introduction
Opioid use, and in particular heroin use, continues to be 
a major part of the drug problem in Europe, and has been 
for over 40 years. Heroin is the second largest contributor 
to the overall illicit drug market after cannabis, and the 
trafficking of heroin remains a significant source of revenue 
for OCGs. Although there has been a stabilisation or decline 
in the extent of opioid use in many countries in recent 
years, the illicit use of opioids remains responsible for a 
disproportionately large proportion of the health problems 
and mortality associated with drug use in Europe. High 
levels of dependence and associated, largely acquisitive, 
crime are common features of heroin use. Primary heroin 
users still represent one-third of all drug users entering 
specialised treatment, and in a number of countries there 
are signs of increasing use of a range of other opioids, 
mainly methadone, buprenorphine and fentanyl. Opioids, in 
particular heroin, are also still implicated in the majority of 
reported overdose deaths in Europe, and injecting heroin is 
associated with high levels of blood-borne virus infections 
and other health harms. There remain a significant number 
of problem opioid users in Europe with long-term polydrug 
use histories who are now aged in their 40s and 50s. The 
cumulative effects of this polydrug use, overdose and 
infections over many years accelerate physical ageing 
among these users, with growing implications for health 
and social support services, and the cost of treating opiate 
users will remain a significant burden on health budgets for 
many years to come.
Criminal justice costs associated with drug-related 
offending by opioid users and dealers also remain 
important. In spite of some law enforcement success 
in recent years, there are signs of recovery in the heroin 
market in the EU. Exceptionally large heroin seizures 
are now frequent in the EU, and seizures in Turkey are 
increasing. There are also signs of an increase in the 
purity of heroin on the streets of Europe. Since increased 
production in Afghanistan and elsewhere is also reported 
and the trafficking routes to Europe are diversifying, it is 
important that vigilance is maintained and the situation 
is carefully monitored, as there is a risk that greater 
availability will result in increased risks to users and the 
potential for new heroin outbreaks.
Opiates, opioids and heroin
Opiates are drugs that originate from naturally 
occurring alkaloids found in poppies. Opiates include 
opium, heroin, morphine and codeine. The term opioid 
generally refers to any substance that binds to the 
body’s opioid receptors and therefore also includes 
synthetic drugs that produce opiate-like effects, such 
as fentanyl and oxycodone.
Heroin is another name for diamorphine. It is a 
semisynthetic product obtained by acetylation of 
morphine, which occurs as a natural product in 
opium, the dried latex of certain poppy species, 
especially Papaver somniferum. Although opium has 
been smoked for centuries, diamorphine was first 
synthesised in the late 19th century. Diamorphine is 
a narcotic analgesic used in the treatment of severe 
pain and usually comes as tablets or an injectable 
liquid. Illicit heroin is usually an off-white or brown 
powder that may be smoked, snorted or solubilised 
with a weak acid and injected.
Heroin purity has been classified into four grades. 
No 4 is the purest form — the purified hydrochloride 
salt, which is a white powder that can be easily 
dissolved and injected. No 3 is the purified base, 
‘brown sugar’, used for smoking (base). No 1 and No 2 
are unprocessed raw heroin (salt or base).
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TABLE 4.1
HEROIN IN EUROPE AT A GLANCE
possession for use
(2014) 
31 000 (3 %)
18 000 (8 %)
49 000 (4 %)
Trends
All admissions
Number (% of admissions for all drugs)
First admissions
150 000 (33 %)
24 000 (14 %)
Drug treatment (2) 
(2014)
Trends
Problem opioid use (1)  
Age group
(years)
Last year 15–64 1.3
Estimated number 
of users (million)
Best estimate (low–high)
Value (billion EUR)
6.8 (6.0–7.8)
Estimated market
size (2013)
Quantity (metric tonnes)
138 (121–162)
EUR/gram
Range (IQR) (4) 
Mean retail price
(2014) 
25–140
(35–59)
Heroin base
Range (IQR) (4) 
Mean purity
(2014)  
% in EU
7–52
(15–29)
EU  
EU plus Norway and Turkey
EU  
EU plus Norway and Turkey
   8.9
Seizures (3) 
(2014)
21.7
40 000
32 000
Number
Quantity 
(tonnes)
Trends
Notes:
(1) Estimate of the extent of problem opioid (mainly heroin) use within the EU.
(2) Drug users entering treatment for heroin. Units coverage may vary across countries.
(3)  The 2014 figures should be considered as estimates; where not available, most recent data were used in place of 2014 data, except for the number of seizures 
for the Netherlands, France and Poland where no recent data is available so they are not included. An additional 0.9 tonnes and 353 000 tablets of other opioids 
were seized (7 000 seizures) in Europe, including Norway and Turkey, in 2014.
(4)  IQR: interquartile range, or range of the middle half of the reported data.
Data presented are for the EU unless stated otherwise. All trend lines shown in this table cover a 5-year period, 2010–14. All trends reflect absolute numbers except for 
trends on price and on potency which reflect averages of mean values. In the case of treatment, price and purity, trends are based only on data from those EU countries 
that have consistently submitted data since 2010.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.
77
CHAPTER 4 I Heroin and other opioids
Global overview
Opium poppies are grown illicitly in three main regions:
 n South-West Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan and India);
 n South-East Asia (Myanmar and Laos); 
 n the Americas (especially Colombia, Mexico and 
Guatemala).
There are emerging reports of poppy cultivation and heroin 
production in the Middle East, but there are no estimates 
of the scope of this phenomenon (EMCDDA–Europol, 
2013; Council of the European Union, 2015b). The majority 
of the global detected illicit opium output still comes from 
Afghanistan (85 % of the total of more than 7 500 tonnes in 
2014), although recent data indicate that the Afghan opium 
crop decreased by almost 50 %, to 3 300 tonnes, in 2015 
(UNODC, 2015a,b).
Global quantities of opium seized increased to 634 tonnes 
in 2013, approaching the peak level of 668 tonnes recorded 
in 2009 (UNODC, 2015a). Iran seized 69 % of the total in 
2013 and, although not a significant producer of opium, 
has traditionally been the country reporting the largest 
quantities of opium seized in the world (UNODC, 2011b, 
2015a).
Global illicit production of heroin was estimated at 
526 tonnes in 2014. It is too early to assess the impact that 
the drop in Afghan opium production in 2015 will have on 
heroin production estimates.
GLOBAL OVERVIEW – HEROIN
103
383
467
377
555
526
95
154
124
116
Europe
Global
Quantities seized
(tonnes)
Estimated potential production 
(tonnes)
Estimated poppy cultivation
(hectares)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010 2014
Estimated users
Global
 32.4 m
EU 1.3 m
190 662
310 891
Main production and exporting regions Production areas Exporting areas
Past year,
aged 15–64
Note: The estimates presented are up to 2013; more recent EU figures are available but have not been used for the purposes of comparability. For the most  
up-to-date European data, please refer to Table 4.1.
Source: UNODC, World Drug Reports. EMCDDA, 2015a.
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In 2013 (16), quantities of heroin and morphine seized 
worldwide decreased, to 116 tonnes. Large quantities of 
heroin and morphine were seized on the historical Balkan 
route, along which opiates have traditionally been trafficked 
from Afghanistan to western Europe (UNODC, 2015a).
It is estimated that, in 2013, there were about 32 million 
users of opioids worldwide, most of whom, it is thought, 
live in North America, Oceania, South-West Asia, eastern 
Europe, including Russia, and South-East Europe. About 
half are thought to be using opiates, mainly heroin (UNODC, 
2014b). Although some western heroin consumer markets, 
such as the EU, now appear to be shrinking, the level of 
illicit opium production in Asia in 2014 was amongst the 
highest ever recorded. If most of the opium harvested in 
Asia does not end up as heroin on western markets, where 
does it go? This issue will be considered further below.
Consumer market for opioids in 
Europe
The extent and nature of use
The main opioid sold on the illicit market in Europe is 
heroin. Most individuals using heroin are dependent 
users, often living on the margins of society and highly 
stigmatised. In contrast to most other drugs, there appear 
to be very few occasional users of heroin (Trautmann and 
McSweeney, 2013). This makes estimation of the size of 
the heroin-using population difficult, as heroin users are 
unlikely to be included in surveys of the general population. 
Nevertheless, national estimates obtained by a variety of 
indirect estimation techniques based on administrative 
data sources are available in many countries. These 
suggest an average annual prevalence rate for high-risk 
opioid use among adults aged 15–64 of 0.4 % (4 per 1 000 
population), the equivalent of 1.3 million problem opioid 
users in Europe (EMCDDA, 2015a).
A third of people entering drug treatment in 2014 in 
Europe (150 000 clients) said that heroin was their primary 
problem drug. However, less than one-sixth (14 %) of those 
entering treatment for the first time (24 000 clients) cited 
heroin as their principal drug, less than half the number 
doing so in 2007, suggesting that recruitment into heroin 
use is declining.
Heroin comes in different forms (see box on page 75) and 
may be smoked, snorted or injected. There is no consistent 
(16) The last year for which global seizure data are currently available.
data collection on patterns of use within EU countries, but it 
is clear from both treatment data and research studies that 
the preferred mode of use varies from country to country. 
For example, among first-time treatment entrants reporting 
heroin as their primary drug in 2013, the proportion 
reporting injecting as their main route of administration 
ranged from 8 % in the Netherlands to 100 % in Lithuania 
(EMCDDA, 2015a). Similarly, a three-country research 
study found that injecting was the main mode of use in 
Italy, while smoking was the main mode of use for the vast 
majority of participants in the Netherlands and just over 
half of those in England. Snorting heroin was less common 
(Trautmann and Frijns, 2013).
The same study also found variation between countries in 
the locations where heroin is most often consumed, which 
has implications for the level of harm associated with use. 
Consumption in the user’s own home or in someone else’s 
home were the locations most commonly mentioned, but 
in Italy two-thirds of participants mentioned using in the 
street or park (67 %), while in the Netherlands a significant 
proportion mentioned using a drug consumption room 
(40 %) (Trautmann and Frijns, 2013). These differences 
may be associated with differences in services (e.g. the 
availability of drug consumption rooms), but also factors 
associated with the markets and enforcement activity that 
might affect whether or not an open drug scene exists.
The size of the market for heroin
It is estimated that the quantity of heroin used in the EU 
in 2013 was at least 138 tonnes (121–162 tonnes) with a 
total value of approximately EUR 6.8 billion (EUR 6.0–7.8 
billion). This makes it the second largest retail drug market 
in the EU.
These estimates have been calculated from national 
estimates of the number of problem opiate users, adjusted 
on the basis of treatment data to take account of the 
proportion likely to be users of opioids other than heroin. 
These estimates have also taken account of the fact that 
quite a large proportion of heroin users are in receipt of 
drug treatment, particularly opiate substitution treatment, 
and that when retained in treatment their drug use 
diminishes substantially.
A number of limitations affect the accuracy of these 
estimates (see box on page 28), and further details of 
the estimation methods are given in the technical paper 
published alongside this report (EMCDDA, 2016a). It is 
particularly difficult to estimate the number of users of 
heroin, which is fundamental to any estimate of market 
size, and hence the above figures must be viewed as 
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preliminary estimates that will be improved in the future 
by the incorporation of new sources of data. Even less 
information is available about the use of other opioids, 
and so estimation of the value of the markets for these 
substances has not been attempted here.
Diversification of opioids being used
While the incidence of heroin use in Europe appears to 
be declining, the data on those presenting for treatment 
suggest an increasingly diversified market in opioids. 
Although the majority of those entering treatment for opioid 
use problems still cite heroin as their primary problem 
drug, in 2013 one in 12 (8 %) clients entering treatment 
cited other opioids. The most commonly reported other 
opioids are methadone (which accounted for 60 % of 
those entering treatment for use of other opioids in 2013), 
buprenorphine (30 % of new presentations) and fentanyl. 
In just over one-third of European countries (11), more 
than 10 % of all opioid clients entering specialised services 
in 2013 were treated for problems primarily related to 
opioids other than heroin. In some countries, other opioids 
represent the most common form of problem opioid use. 
In Estonia, for example, the majority of treatment entrants 
reporting an opioid as their primary drug were using illicit 
fentanyl, while in Finland most opioid clients are reported 
to be primary misusers of buprenorphine (EMCDDA, 
2015a). Thus, although heroin still predominates, the opioid 
market appears to be more dynamic and complex than in 
the past, with more substances available to consumers. 
Transitions between heroin and other opioids, such as 
fentanyl and substitution medicines, have been observed. 
Prescription medicines and new synthetic opioids, which 
can be purchased online, are also appearing and are likely 
to have increasing importance for both public health and 
law enforcement, with the potential for a growing problem 
of use of opioid-based medicines, as has been seen in the 
United States and Australia (see also Chapter 7).
Production and precursors
The process by which opiates are produced from the opium 
harvested from poppies is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
FIGURE 4.1
The heroin production process
CULTIVATION
Most of the heroin available in Europe comes from opium poppy 
cultivation in Afghanistan.
Papaver somniferum
OPIUM LATEX HARVEST
Poppy capsules are lanced so the opium latex can ooze out. 
e opium is then collected and dried.
EXTRACTION
Morphine is extracted from the opium using calcium hydroxide and 
ammonium chloride.
Ca(OH)
2
NH
4
Cl
Morphine base 
ACETYLATION
Morphine base is acetylated resulting in diamorphine (the chemical name for 
heroin) by adding acetic anhydride and sodium carbonate.
(CH
3
CO)
2
O
Na
2
CO
3
Heroin base 
 
ADULTERATION
the resulting powder can be pressed into blocks and logos can be added.
Several ‘cutting agents’ (e.g. caeine, paracetamol) are added and then
EXPORTATION
Blocks are smuggled to consumer markets including Europe.
Paracetamol?
Opium latex
Ca
(O
H)
2NH4Cl
Na2CO3
(C
H
3CO
)2O Brown heroin 
Diamorphine
= 
= 
Note: This illustration is intended to provide an indicative schematic overview 
of selected stages of a production process. It must be noted that alternative 
methods, chemicals and procedures may be used.
Source: EMCDDA.
80
EU Drug Markets Report: In-depth Analysis
Trends in opium production
As mentioned earlier, Afghanistan is by far the world’s 
largest illicit producer of opium, the raw material for heroin, 
and Europe’s main supplier, although some heroin from 
South-East Asia may also be found in Europe. In 2014, 
global opium production was estimated to be 7 162 tonnes, 
second only to the 8 091 tonnes produced in 2007 
(UNODC, 2015a).
For the last decade, Afghanistan has been the world’s 
largest producer of opium, never accounting for less 
than three-quarters of global production, although with 
marked fluctuations. In the period 1995–2005, global 
production was fairly stable but with Afghanistan becoming 
increasingly dominant, except in 2001, when production 
decreased abruptly to less than 200 tonnes following 
the ban on poppy cultivation imposed by the Taliban, 
then controlling the country. After the fall of the Taliban 
regime, the opium harvest immediately recovered to a level 
comparable to the years prior to 2001.
Since 2005, estimated opium production in Afghanistan 
has averaged over 5 000 tonnes annually, compared with 
less than 3 000 tonnes in the previous decade, although 
in some years, such as 2010 and 2012, harvests were 
comparatively poor owing to poppy blight and unfavourable 
weather conditions (UNODC, 2014c). It is estimated that 
Afghanistan produced 6 400 tonnes of opium in 2014, a 
16 % increase compared with the already high estimate 
of 5 500 tonnes in 2013 (see Figure 4.3). The latest data 
from UNODC (2015b) suggest that the 2015 Afghan 
opium crop is likely to be around 48 % lower, at 3 300 
tonnes, continuing the pattern of yearly fluctuations. The 
reasons for this drop include a reduction in the area under 
poppy cultivation (19 % less than in 2014 after a period 
of expansion between 2003 and 2013) and, to an even 
greater extent, falling opium yields. It is estimated that in 
2015 the average yield fell by a remarkable 36 %, attributed 
largely to water supply problems and to poppy disease in 
the desert areas into which much cultivation has shifted 
(Mansfield, 2015; UNODC, 2015b). The failure of many 
poppy crops in the desert areas of southern Afghanistan, 
FIGURE 4.3
Estimated global illicit opium production and share of Afghanistan, 1995–2014
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Sources: UNODC, World Drug Reports.
FIGURE 4.2
Opium farming in Afghanistan
Children harvesting a failed poppy crop in Chaghcharan district, Ghor province, 
Afghanistan, July 2008.
Photo © David Mansfield
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and the absence of alternatives to opium production as a 
livelihood for the hundreds of thousands of settlers that live 
there, could eventually result in increasing migration out of 
the country (Mansfield, 2015).
In the second largest opiate-producing region of the world, 
South-East Asia, estimated opiate production in 2014 
decreased to 762 tonnes, from a peak of 893 tonnes in 
2013. Nevertheless, detected illicit opium production in 
South-East Asia remains at a fairly high level, especially 
when compared with the mid-2000s (UNODC, 2014d).
Heroin production
It is extremely difficult to estimate the production of heroin, 
both the agricultural raw material, opium, and, even more 
so, the finished product, and improvements in technology 
and changes in methodology can have a big impact on 
these estimates. The UNODC stresses that its figures are 
best considered rough estimates giving an indication of the 
order of magnitude, rather than as accurate measurements 
(UNODC, 2014c). There have been three changes in 
UNODC methodology vis-à-vis Afghan opiates since 2010, 
some of which have occurred since the 2013 EU markets 
report (EMCDDA–Europol, 2013). This has led to the 
revision of a number of estimates from previous years; 
hence the figures presented here may vary from those 
presented in the previous report. These methodological 
changes, taken together, have resulted in marked 
reductions in the estimates of heroin production.
The changes relate to uncertainties arising from gaps 
in information about key factors, which remain even in 
Afghanistan, the opioid producer country for which the 
most information is available. Areas about which we 
have only sketchy information include heroin laboratory 
efficiency, which may be very variable (UNODC, 2014c); 
the morphine content of poppies; and the proportion of the 
opium crop that is processed into heroin. Thus, there is a 
need to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of 
opiate production in Afghanistan, especially the proportion 
of the crop that is transformed into morphine and then 
exported out of the country as well as the fate of the opium 
exported to neighbouring countries.
In order to reflect recent methodological changes and 
remaining uncertainties, the UNODC (2014c) published 
four estimates of the amount of heroin potentially produced 
from the Afghan opium harvest of 2014 (Table 4.2).
Most of the heroin consumed in Europe is manufactured 
from Afghan opium, but relatively little information is 
available on where this manufacturing takes place. 
Historically, Afghanistan has been the main country 
reporting seizures of opiate laboratories, indicating that 
large quantities of opium are processed into heroin in 
Afghanistan (UNODC, 2011c).
However, there is evidence to suggest that opiate 
production also takes place elsewhere. In addition to 
seizures of opiate-processing laboratories, seizures of 
illicit morphine (which is an intermediary in the heroin 
production process) may be viewed as an indicator 
of opiate-processing activities. For the last 3 years, 
Afghanistan has seized the largest quantities of morphine 
in the world, more than 60 % of the global total, and 
comparatively much less heroin. In contrast, in Iran, Turkey 
and Pakistan heroin seizures dominate, although in Iran, 
and to a lesser extent Pakistan, significant quantities of 
morphine are also seized (see Figure 4.4). In the period 
2011–13 almost 132 tonnes of illicit morphine was 
seized in Afghanistan, 24 tonnes in Iran and 9 tonnes 
in Pakistan. During the same period, seizures of opium 
totalled 289 tonnes in Afghanistan, 1 198 tonnes in Iran 
FIGURE 4.4
Morphine and heroin seizures in Afghanistan, 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, 2011–13
Afghanistan
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Source: UNODC, 2015a.
TABLE 4.2
Estimated amounts of heroin potentially produced 
from opium harvested in Afghanistan in 2014
If 62 % of Afghan 
opium crop 
is processed 
(tonnes)
If total Afghan 
opium crop 
is processed 
(tonnes) 
Pure heroin base 210 350
Heroin of export 
quality (52 % purity)
410 670
Source: UNODC (2014c).
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and 87 tonnes in Pakistan. This provides confirmation that 
some of Afghanistan’s opium crop is not processed into 
heroin in the country, and that there are markets for opium 
and morphine outside Afghanistan. Although fairly large 
quantities of opium are consumed in Pakistan and, even 
more so, in Iran, the amounts seized suggest that some 
opium may also be used to manufacture opiate products in 
these countries.
A number of hypotheses as to the possible uses for the 
large amounts of opium and morphine seized in the 
region may be put forward. A proportion of the opium and 
morphine may be used to manufacture heroin in Pakistan 
and Iran, and probably in other countries further afield. 
Alternatively, or in addition, a proportion may be used to 
licitly or illicitly manufacture medicinal products, including 
injectable morphine and codeine-based cough syrups, in 
Pakistan and Iran. It is likely that large amounts of these 
products are sold in these countries. For instance, there are 
large numbers of unregulated pharmacies and stores in 
Pakistan, where controlled drugs, including morphine, can 
be bought without a prescription (UNODC, 2013c). These 
products may also be exported to neighbouring countries.
Recently, following the establishment of a new system 
for reporting information on dismantled laboratories by 
Europol and the EMCDDA, there have been a number of 
reports that the manufacture of a range of opioids from a 
variety of precursors is occurring in Europe (see box ‘Opiate 
production in Europe’). This is a new development that 
needs to be kept under review.
Precursor — acetic anhydride
Acetic anhydride is used as an acetylation agent to process 
morphine into heroin and is subject to international 
control because of its critical role in the manufacture of 
Opiate production in Europe
The normal picture of the European opioid market is one 
of large-scale production of heroin in far-away regions 
that is then smuggled into Europe by OCGs. However, 
old and new evidence suggests that this picture is too 
simplistic and markets are fluid and adaptable.
Heroin
At the end of 2013, for the first time, the Spanish 
National Police dismantled a laboratory producing 
heroin from morphine; 20 kg of heroin, 20 kg of 
morphine and 75 kg of precursors were seized. At 
the time, it was the largest ever seizure of morphine 
recorded in Spain. In early 2014, this was surpassed 
when a second production facility was found, again 
producing heroin from morphine. The quantities 
of drugs and chemicals seized indicate that the 
laboratories were operating on a reasonable scale; 
the chemist in charge of the conversion activities 
was Turkish, and in total nine persons, born in various 
countries (Turkey, Paraguay, Honduras, Spain) but 
residing locally, were arrested. Furthermore, the 
Czech Republic has recently reported the seizure of 
several laboratories producing opiates. These include 
facilities undertaking the production of morphine from 
poppy straw, the production of hydrocodone and the 
production of heroin from morphine extracted from 
tablets of Vendal retard (morphine hydrochloride), a 
pharmaceutical product available in some EU countries 
(Hrachovec et al., 2015).
Although morphine is produced from poppies grown 
in Europe, the process is strictly controlled, making 
it unlikely that European-made morphine could be 
diverted to illicit heroin manufacture. However, the 
very large quantities of opium and morphine produced 
in Asia, combined with modern transportation and 
distribution options and the existence of well-connected 
criminal organisations in Europe, may be making heroin 
production in Europe a more attractive option.
Other products
Crude opioid products have been made in Europe for 
many years, such as braun, a home-made codeine-
based preparation produced in the Czech Republic 
in the 1980s. However, the main crude preparations 
are currently made from poppies or ‘poppy straw’, 
the dried stalks, leaves and seed capsules of opium 
poppies, which contain residual opium alkaloids. The 
active chemicals may be simply extracted using water 
or other solvents and the resultant liquors can then 
be taken orally or injected, a practice found in several 
eastern European countries, such as Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia and Lithuania. A more sophisticated home brew 
is kompot, which is exclusively produced in Poland. 
Kompot is a crude preparation of heroin that emerged 
in the 1970s and which produces effects similar to, but 
generally weaker than, heroin. It is produced from poppy 
straw and several chemical reagents, and contains 
heroin, morphine, codeine and other opium alkaloids 
in variable concentrations (Wodowski, 2004). It is a 
brownish liquid and is normally injected.
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heroin (17). However, it has many licit uses, particularly in 
the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. to manufacture aspirin), 
but also in the manufacture of paints, plastics, polymers, 
cellulose (for cigarette filters) and explosives. As a result, 
the global legitimate manufacture and trade in acetic 
anhydride is large and expanding, and this, combined with 
the fact that comparatively small amounts are required in 
heroin manufacture, makes preventing diversion for illicit 
purposes a challenging task (see Figure 4.5).
Estimates of annual licit global production of acetic 
anhydride vary, but the latest estimate from the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) puts it close to 
1.5 million tonnes per year (INCB, 2014). Set against this, 
the INCB estimates that the requirement for illicit heroin 
manufacture is between 400 000 and 1.1 million litres  
(or approximately 430–1 190 tonnes, midpoint 
810 tonnes) (INCB, 2015a), i.e. less than 0.1 % of licit 
production. In 2012, global licit exports were reported to 
be 397 000 tonnes and imports 414 000 tonnes (UNODC, 
2014b). However, licit imports into South-West Asia in 
2012 were very small: none was imported into Afghanistan 
and only 14 kg into Pakistan. This suggests that the 
source of the acetic anhydride used in clandestine heroin 
production in the region is the diversion of licit supplies 
outside the area.
(17) Acetic anhydride may also be used in the illicit manufacture of amphet-
amines. It is believed that the increase in seizures in some parts of the 
world, e.g. Mexico, is largely related to its use in methamphetamine pro-
duction (INCB, 2015a, para. 180) although it may also indicate increasing 
heroin manufacture targeted at the American market.
Efforts to prevent the diversion of acetic anhydride for 
illicit drug production include the pre-export notification 
of shipments leading to stopped or suspended shipments 
in addition to seizures. In December 2013, the EU 
strengthened its precursor legislation, by implementing 
a number of measures, such as a requirement for the 
registration of end users of acetic anhydride, which seek 
to reduce diversion (see box in Chapter 8 on precursor 
control, page 163). These measures have led to large 
shipments to both Iraq and Iran being stopped. For 
example, one shipment of 2 200 litres being sent from 
Spain to Iraq was stopped in July 2014 as the importer was 
not authorised to import the substance (INCB, 2015a, para. 
183). Although the number of countries providing pre-
export notifications is increasing, there are fewer controls 
on supply within countries, and it is believed that most of 
the acetic anhydride diverted to illicit drug production is 
obtained from domestic diversion. Nevertheless, the above-
mentioned entry into force of the mandatory end-user 
registration for acetic anhydride in the EU as of 1 July 2015 
should further enhance the prevention of diversion.
The largest amounts of illicit acetic anhydride are seized 
in Afghanistan and surrounding countries, with West Asia 
accounting for about one-third or more of global seizures 
annually since 2009. Interpreting the data on trends in 
seizures is complicated by the sporadic nature of seizures. 
Nevertheless, the INCB reports that global seizures in the 
5 years after 2009 were higher than in the previous 5 years 
(INCB, 2015a). However, its most recent estimate is that 
seizures account for less than 17 % of the acetic anhydride 
diverted for illicit heroin manufacture annually (INCB, 
2015a, quoting its 2012 report).
In Europe, diversion of acetic anhydride still occurs 
despite stringent controls. Reported seizures and stopped 
shipments in the EU are sporadic, being reported by 
between two and four countries in each year between 2009 
and 2014. They are mainly small scale (less than 50 litres) 
but occasionally larger quantities are involved, such as in 
Spain in 2013, when 9 498 litres were intercepted as a 
result of seven stopped shipments and one small seizure; 
in Poland in 2012 (1 755 litres); and in Slovakia in 2011 
(6 020 litres) (INCB, 2015a). Seizures in Spain, which in 
2014 also reported intercepting 4 942 litres, including 
110 litres seized, may be linked to the recently reported 
seizures of laboratories for heroin manufacture and 
associated storage facilities (see box on page 82 ‘Opiate 
production in Europe’).
Europol has established a subproject to support Member 
States in response to the problem of acetic anhydride 
trafficking, which aims to identify the role of OCGs in the 
trafficking of acetic anhydride from the EU. The OCGs 
FIGURE 4.5
Estimating acetic anhydride requirements for 
heroin manufacture, 2013
Estimated annual world production 
of acetic anhydride
1.5 million tonnes
Estimated quantity of 
acetic anhydride required 
to manufacture 
heroin quantities 
(range 430–1190 tonnes, 
midpoint 810 tonnes shown)
810 tonnes
Amount of acetic 
anhydride seized
163 tonnes
Source: INCB, 2015a.
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involved in transporting heroin from Afghanistan into 
Europe are likely to be well placed to facilitate shipments 
of the precursor in the opposite direction. It cannot be 
excluded that acetic anhydride is diverted from the EU to 
Afghanistan along the same Balkan route used to transport 
heroin to the EU, sometimes in exchange for heroin, the 
so-called ‘reverse’ Balkan route. OCGs use their own front 
companies or infiltrate existing businesses to order acetic 
anhydride from companies registered in the EU. Although 
fluctuating over the years, Turkey has consistently reported 
significant seizures (INCB, 2015a), and, in December 2013, 
14 tonnes of acetic anhydride originating from the EU was 
seized in Turkey, providing evidence supporting the use 
of this route. As indicated above, suspect shipments to 
Iraq continue to be identified and stopped, and continued 
vigilance and cooperation is needed. Overall, there is a 
need for additional evidence to understand the significance 
of the ‘reverse’ Balkan route.
Given the record poppy crop in Afghanistan, it is probable 
that there will be increased demand for the chemical. 
Hence, attempts to smuggle acetic anhydride to 
Afghanistan from the EU are likely to continue so vigilance 
remains important. However, other sources are likely to 
be of significant importance. For example, China reported 
increased seizures in 2013 and also in that year there 
was a large seizure reported by Iran at the border with 
Afghanistan of a shipment that was traced back to China 
(INCB, 2015a).
The price of acetic anhydride on the illicit market in 
Afghanistan, although still higher than on the international 
licit market, has fallen in recent years. The price varies 
depending on perceived quality, but average prices in 
2012, 2013 and 2014 (first 10 months) were below 
about EUR 150 (USD 200) per litre, compared with over 
EUR 264 (USD 350) per litre in 2008, 2009 and 2010 (in 
2013 US dollars). This suggests that the accessibility of 
the substance has increased despite efforts to control 
diversion.
Adulterants
The production and processing of drugs may result 
in contamination with a range of sometimes harmful 
substances. However, in addition, mainly for reasons of 
profitability, intentional adulteration is common practice 
with all powdered drugs. In the case of heroin, the most 
commonly used adulterants are paracetamol and caffeine, 
and pre-mixed bags of brown paracetamol/caffeine powder 
have been seized by law enforcement. When heroin is in 
short supply, the extent of adulteration increases further 
to satisfy market demand. Adulteration (or ‘cutting’) may 
occur at all stages of the supply chain including at the 
point of production. For instance, UNODC estimates that in 
Afghanistan heroin of ‘export quality’ is 52 % pure (UNODC, 
2014c).
Environmental impact
Although not well documented in the scientific literature, 
the mono-cropping of poppies and the manufacture of 
heroin will have an environmental impact. Deforestation 
and slash-and-burn methods for poppy cultivation, leading 
to erosion and soil depletion, are likely to be an issue in 
tropical areas of South-East Asia, particularly Myanmar 
(Chouvy, 2003), but also elsewhere. Indiscriminate use of 
agricultural chemicals, such as fertilisers, herbicides and 
pesticides, in producer countries is likely to have a negative 
impact on rivers and underground water deposits. Finally, 
toxic chemicals, which include acetic anhydride, solvents 
such as ethyl ether and acetone, and hydrochloric acid, are 
needed to transform opium into heroin. The waste resulting 
from heroin production may simply be spilled on the 
ground or in streams and rivers in the areas, and, although 
scientific evidence as to the exact impact of this process 
on the environment is lacking, it is probable that thousands 
of tonnes of hazardous waste from heroin production is 
released into the environment each year (UNODC, 2006a).
Trafficking and supply
Since illicit heroin production takes place a long way from 
the main consumer markets, there is a long supply chain, 
which involves many different groups. Considerable effort is 
put into interrupting this supply, so the modes of transport 
and the routes taken may vary accordingly. While seizures 
by enforcement agencies are inevitably to some extent a 
reflection of their level of activity, they do also provide a 
useful indication of trafficking routes and methods.
Heroin trafficking to Europe
Two major developments affecting the supply of heroin 
from source countries to Europe have occurred since the 
last EU drug markets report was drafted. Firstly, there has 
been an unprecedented increase in the size of individual 
shipments sent along the heroin routes to Europe, with 
consignments of 100 kg or more, and occasional amounts 
measured in tonnes, being seized with increasing 
frequency (see Figure 4.7). As a result, record-breaking 
heroin seizures have taken place since 2013 in many EU 
countries, including Belgium (864 kg), the Czech Republic 
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(157 kg), Germany (330 kg) and the Netherlands (1.2 
tonnes), along with a major operation resulting in the 
seizure of over 2 tonnes in Greece in June 2014. In fact, 
the 6.4 tonnes confiscated in the EU in 2014 solely from 
seizures of more than 100 kg is even greater than the total 
of just under 6 tonnes of heroin seized in the EU in 2013 
(5.6 tonnes). While there are signs that the trend may be 
levelling off, large seizures have continued into 2015; five 
seizures of over 100 kg were reported in the EU and two on 
the borders, in the first quarter of 2015. Although these are 
notable successes, the size of bulk shipments means that 
relatively few non-intercepted consignments could have 
a significant impact on availability. It suggests the need 
for on-going review of the relative importance of different 
trafficking routes and a particular focus on maritime 
trafficking.
Secondly, heroin routes seem to be diversifying. In the past, 
most of the heroin trafficked to Europe from Afghanistan 
came overland via what has become known as the Balkan 
route. However, although the Balkan route probably remains 
the main heroin trafficking route into the EU, there is 
evidence of an increase in the diversity of routes and modes 
of transport being used (Figure 4.8; EMCDDA, 2015b).
The traditional Balkan route
A route linking Afghanistan to Iran then through Turkey 
represents the shortest distance and most direct land route 
to European consumer markets. This route has been used 
to traffic heroin into the EU since the 1980s, and possibly 
earlier. Turkey is crucial to the Balkan route, and Istanbul is 
a key location to arrange heroin transports to the EU. From 
Turkey, heroin may be shipped overland, by sea or by air. 
Three branches of the Balkan route depart from Turkey and 
lead into western Europe:
 n the southern branch runs through Greece, Albania and 
Italy, mostly by sea (ferries);
 n the central branch runs through Bulgaria, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, and into 
Italy or Austria, essentially by land;
 n the northern branch runs from Bulgaria and Romania 
to Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland or 
Germany, essentially by land.
FIGURE 4.6
A very large seizure of heroin
More than 2 tonnes of heroin seized near Athens, Greece, June 2015.
Photos © Drug Enforcement Department, Drug and Contraband Enforcement Directorate, Hellenic Coast Guard Headquarters
FIGURE 4.7
Trend in large seizures of heroin and their 
contribution to total seized in the EU, 2011–14
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Heroin is also trafficked from Turkey to multiple destinations 
in Europe by air (UNODC, 2014b). In 2013, Turkey 
intercepted more than three times as much heroin as the 
entire EU; for comparison, in 2001, the quantity seized in 
Turkey was only one-third of that seized in the EU.
Heroin may reach Turkey via a number of routes. A branch 
of the Balkan route seems to have developed through Iraq 
and Syria in recent years. It should be noted that Iraq is 
also used as a transit or destination country for shipments 
of acetic anhydride (see above). Similarly, another branch 
of the Balkan route goes through Iran, and possibly 
Central Asian countries such as Turkmenistan, by land or 
through the Caspian Sea, to the countries of the Caucasus 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).
Europol intelligence suggests that Turkish OCGs are the 
main importers and facilitators of distribution of heroin in 
key regions of Europe. They maintain control over various 
elements of the supply chain, including links to heroin 
suppliers and processors. They have an established 
presence and legitimate businesses facilitate their activities 
in key locations along the trafficking route, in Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary, the western Balkans, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Turkish OCGs rely 
on the support of other OCGs in their activities, such as 
Albanian-speaking, Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian 
groups. They have also adapted to the heroin market’s new 
dynamics. Some Turkish criminals previously based in the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Turkey have relocated 
to South Africa or travel there to broker the supply of heroin 
to the EU from Pakistan via southern Africa.
Albanian-speaking OCGs from different countries in 
the western Balkans play a secondary distribution role, 
linking Turkish heroin suppliers and OCGs in destination 
markets, and control an important share of the heroin 
market. Traffickers increasingly collaborate across ethnic 
lines, for example with shipping and other transportation 
arrangements and the sharing of assets. Generally, the 
organisational arrangements are such that it is the local 
OCGs that undertake the transport of the drugs and are 
thus at greatest risk of arrest. The main markets for heroin 
remain in the EU Member States, but the internal market in 
the western Balkans is expanding. It is also quite common 
for western Balkan OCGs to traffic multiple drugs.
The traditional method of transporting heroin via the 
Balkan route continues to be concealment in lorries, buses 
and, especially, cars. However, recently, sea containers 
have been used, especially through Turkish ports. This 
heroin traffic by maritime containers could help explain 
the increase in the number of very large heroin seizures in 
Turkey and elsewhere on the Balkan route.
The Southern route
In recent years, large heroin consignments, of the order of 
hundreds of kilograms, shipped from ports on the coast 
of Iran and Pakistan on the Gulf of Oman and the Persian 
Gulf (the Makran Coast), have attracted international 
attention, and some of this heroin is destined for Europe. 
This Southern route to Europe entails several modes of 
transport and transhipment points that may be combined 
in different ways.
The heroin exported by boat from the Makran Coast seems 
to be of relatively high purity, according to data released 
by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a US-led 
multinational naval task force that carries out random 
searches on vessels sailing between the Makran Coast, the 
Arabian Peninsula and the coast of East Africa (CMF, 2015).
The heroin shipped on the Southern route first reaches 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. Some 
FIGURE 4.8
Heroin trafficking routes into Europe
Afghanistan
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and Belgium
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Note: The trafficking routes represented are a synthesis of a number of 
information sources and should be considered indicative rather than accurate 
descriptions of the main trafficking routes.
Source: Europol and EMCDDA.
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may travel further north into the Red Sea as far as Egypt. 
A proportion of this heroin supplies local consumer 
markets in Africa and the Middle East, which appear to be 
growing (UNODC, 2014b). The heroin trade also seems to 
have destabilising effects in East Africa, with drug profits 
reportedly being used to fund armed groups in Kenya and 
possibly Somalia. However, significant and reportedly 
growing amounts are trafficked onward from East Africa 
and the Arabian Peninsula to other destinations, including 
Europe. Thus, heroin shipments may be broken down 
into smaller batches and sent by air to Europe directly 
or via southern and West Africa. Alternatively, some 
consignments are trafficked to South Africa, especially 
by sea but also by land (rail), before onward shipment to 
Europe.
Criminal organisations from several European countries, 
such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
have used South Africa as a departure and transhipment 
point for drug consignments for some time. Recently, as 
already mentioned, Turkish traffickers have become active 
in South Africa. Other criminal organisations active here 
include West African, especially Nigerian, and East African 
OCGs, as well as criminal organisations from Pakistan. 
There are indications that West African (Nigerian) OCGs 
control much of the heroin trafficking activity through 
East Africa and are the main receivers of the considerable 
cash profit derived. For example, Europol has noted that 
they trade with OCGs based in source countries, such as 
Pakistan, to obtain heroin and traffic it to Europe, relying 
primarily on couriers. They are also active in the intra-EU 
distribution of heroin and use the presence of Nigerian 
diaspora communities in many Member States to their 
advantage.
Pakistani OCGs, composed of Pakistani nationals as well 
as EU nationals of Pakistani origin, also appear to be 
playing an increasingly important role in facilitating heroin 
shipment to the EU. They have established businesses both 
in Pakistan and the EU, which they use as fronts for heroin 
operations. They have developed the capacity to traffic 
large quantities of high-purity drugs, using a wide variety of 
transportation methods, including containers, couriers and 
postal parcels, adapting to changes in demand and to law 
enforcement efforts.
Seizure data suggest that ports in Belgium, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom are the main targets for heroin 
shipped in containers from the Makran Coast. In the case of 
Belgium and the Netherlands, it is probable that the heroin 
is destined for distribution to other European countries, 
such as France and Germany. Large maritime heroin 
shipments may also be destined for southern Europe, as is 
illustrated by the 2.3 tonnes seized in Athens in June 2014 
mentioned earlier.
Finally, the Southern route also involves smaller amounts of 
heroin shipped by air couriers and freight, as well as postal 
parcels, from Pakistan directly to Europe, especially the 
United Kingdom.
The Northern route
The heroin trafficked on the Northern route is exported by 
land from Afghanistan’s northern borders and appears 
to be essentially destined for the consumer markets in 
Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, which have been 
expanding over the last 10 years. Most consignments cross 
from Afghanistan into Tajikistan and then are trafficked 
northwards through Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan 
before entering Russia. The fact that three of these four 
Central Asian countries and Russia rank among the top 26 
countries seizing the largest quantities of heroin at world 
At the end of 2014, a long-running international 
investigation ended in several days of action during 
which almost 400 suspects were arrested and 100 kg 
of heroin was seized, along with quantities of cocaine, 
cannabis and cash. Notably, 4 tonnes of drug-cutting 
agents was also seized, indicating the significant scale 
of the network’s operation. The criminal gang involved, 
operating from bases in Austria, Germany and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, brought heroin 
into the EU along the Balkan route and distributed it 
across several European countries.
The investigation focused on a number of OCGs working 
in concert and operating out of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. Their aims were to distribute 
high-quality heroin in Europe at very low prices and carry 
out large-scale drug trafficking, especially in Austria 
and Germany. Each member of the gangs worked in a 
specific area of operation, and the whole organisation 
was rigidly structured and hierarchical, with gang 
members lower down the hierarchy knowing very few 
other members of the group, and none of its principals.
Source: Europol.
Case study 10: Heroin trafficking by western Balkan OCGs
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level confirms that significant quantities of the opiate are 
shipped along the Northern route (UNODC, 2014b). A 
proportion of heroin shipped on the Northern route may 
eventually enter the EU via the eastern borders of Poland 
and the Baltic countries. Some heroin seized in Ukraine 
and Belarus in the last few years was reported to originate 
from Central Asia and was intended for western European 
markets. In addition, large amounts have been intercepted 
on either side of the Ukraine–Poland border, for instance 
150 kg was seized in Medyka, Poland, in April 2014.
The Southern Caucasus route
As can be seen from the above, the so-called ‘trafficking 
routes’ are very flexible and fluid, as are the methods of 
transportation and concealment used. An example of this 
is the emergence of a new Southern Caucasus route. On 
this route, opiates produced in the Golden Crescent are 
trafficked from Iran to Ukraine or Moldova via Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. This route came to attention as 
a result of three remarkable seizures carried out in the 
countries of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia) in 2014. The most spectacular of these 
came in July 2014 in the port city of Batumi, Georgia, with 
the seizure of 2 500 litres of an unusual liquid mixture 
containing acetic anhydride, 589 kg of heroin, 12 kg of 
morphine and 2 kg of codeine from a lorry that had come 
from Iran via Azerbaijan. The drugs were reported to be 
destined for the Ukraine and Moldova.
This suggests that the Caucasus is now being used to 
smuggle large amounts of opiates from Iran to northern 
Europe. The ferries that cross the Black Sea from Georgia to 
Ukraine and Moldova are likely to be used to that end. From 
Ukraine or Moldova it is possible to reach both lucrative 
western European markets and the large Russian market by 
a variety of overland routes.
Turkish OCGs are known to cooperate with Iranian and 
Georgian OCGs and individual facilitators in organising and 
controlling heroin trafficking from source countries through 
this region to the retail markets for heroin in western 
Europe. Turkish OCGs are known to have an established 
presence in legal businesses in key locations along this 
trafficking route, such as transport companies. Areas of 
conflict in the Southern Caucasus region provide OCGs 
with opportunities for the trafficking of heroin to the EU with 
a reduced risk of detection. The purity of heroin intercepted 
along the Southern Caucasus route is reportedly high.
In addition to security problems in many countries along 
these trafficking routes, the use of heroin within these 
countries can result in severe health and social problems, 
including HIV infections. In addition to the negative impacts 
on development in these regions it raises the issue of 
potential spill-over effects in neighbouring EU countries or 
as a result of migration to Europe.
Trafficking within the EU
Within the EU, trafficking is mainly organised by Turkish, 
Pakistani and Albanian-speaking OCGs with links to a wide 
range of local OCGs. Heroin is transported onward from the 
area of production by land, sea and air to the destination 
market. The major container ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp 
form an important hub, while Pakistani shipments to the 
United Kingdom and Spain (Barcelona) then flow to Portugal, 
France and Italy. The involvement of Turkish OCGs in the 
heroin trade in the Netherlands is illustrated by the extensive 
media coverage of a series of linked assassinations of 
members of Turkish heroin OCGs and Dutch-Turkish 
criminals in the Netherlands (Amsterdam) and in Istanbul in 
2014 and 2015 (see Case study 5 in Chapter 1).
In the period immediately following 2010, there was 
a marked decline in the number of heroin seizures 
in Europe, after a period during which the number of 
seizures was fairly stable (see Figure 4.9). However, 
more recent data show this decline levelling off, with 
the number of seizures reported in the EU and Norway 
stabilising at a little over 33 000 between 2012 and 2014, 
compared with over 51 000 in 2009. However, in Turkey 
the number of seizures generally increased over the same 
period. In terms of the quantity seized in the EU and 
Norway, the figures fluctuate more; nevertheless, the total 
quantity seized in the region declined from over 8 tonnes 
in 2009 to 5.6 tonnes in 2013, but then in 2014 increased 
markedly to 8.9 tonnes. In Turkey, the quantity seized, 
although fluctuating year on year, has been fairly stable 
overall at around 13 tonnes per year since 2007. In 2014, 
there were just over 7 000 seizures in Turkey, yielding a 
total of just under 12.8 tonnes.
These overall seizure figures encompass small seizures, 
often of low-purity heroin taken from users or dealers 
arrested on the street by police, as well as large seizures 
of higher-purity heroin intercepted in transit or at borders 
by customs agencies and destined to be subdivided and 
moved down the supply chain. Looking at the average size of 
seizures may give some indication of the level of the market 
where most activity is taking place. The average seizure 
size in the EU countries (18) in 2014 was 0.24 kg. Countries 
that had an average seizure size of over 1 kg, suggesting a 
(18) France, the Netherlands and Poland do not report numbers of seizures so 
they are not included in this calculation.
89
CHAPTER 4 I Heroin and other opioids
greater proportion of seizures relating to wholesale or middle 
market level, were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Greece. On the other hand, those countries with an 
average seizure size of less than 50 g, suggesting that most 
seizures occur at the retail level, were mainly countries 
also reporting fewer seizures, such as the Scandinavian 
countries, the Baltic states, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Slovenia 
and Slovakia, but also Spain. As part of a programme of 
development of the seizure statistics reported to EMCDDA, 
some countries have started to break down seizures into 
three market levels based on the size of seizure, as well as 
providing more information about individual large seizures, 
which will enhance our understanding of law enforcement 
activity and trafficking routes.
As part of this development programme, the collection 
of information on seizures of other opioids has also 
been instituted. In 2014, 18 EU countries as well as 
Norway and Turkey reported seizures of at least one 
opioid other than heroin (Table 4.3). Other opioids 
included the pharmaceutical products methadone, 
buprenorphine, tramadol and codeine, as well as fentanyl 
and its analogues, and morphine. In addition, 13 countries 
reported seizures of opium and five reported seizing poppy 
straw or plants.
Less information is currently available about the source of 
the increasing variety of opioids other than heroin that are 
increasingly being seen on the black market in Europe. As 
discussed in the section ‘Falsified, counterfeit, substandard 
and unauthorised medicines’ in Chapter 1, there are a 
number of ways in which these substances may appear on 
the black market. In Finland, buprenorphine dominates the 
opioid market, and evidence from seizures suggests that it 
is increasingly smuggled from France via Sweden, although 
large seizures are still made on the traditional shipping route 
between Tallinn and Helsinki (Finland: Reitox, 2015). It is 
reported that, in France, buprenorphine reaches the black 
market in two main ways. In the first way, which is organised, 
significant quantities are obtained by falsifying prescriptions 
or by obtaining multiple prescriptions for individuals who 
are not opiate dependent. The second way is by individual 
users in receipt of opioid substitution treatment selling some 
of their prescription (France: Reitox, 2015); similar small-
scale misuse of various types of opioid substitution therapy 
are reported by other countries but, when compared with 
the quantities prescribed, the amounts reaching the black 
market are quite low (Austria: Reitox, 2014). Nevertheless, 
in some countries there is a concern about the numbers of 
drug-related deaths in which opioid substitution medication, 
such as methadone, is mentioned. In Estonia, fentanyl is 
the most commonly used opioid and is reported to enter the 
country from Russia (Estonia: Reitox, 2015). Monitoring the 
illicit supply of opioid medication is an area that needs to be 
developed in the future.
FIGURE 4.9
Seizures of heroin reported in Europe, 2006–14
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Note: Some data for 2014 are not available and the most recent data have 
been used instead, except for the number of seizures for the Netherlands, 
France and Poland where no recent data is available so they are not included.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.
TABLE 4.3
Seizures of other opioids in the EU, Norway and 
Turkey, 2014
No of 
countries
No of 
seizures
Quantity seized
Methadone 14 1 666 29 kg
Buprenorphine 13 2 312 65 588 tablets
Tramadol 11  583 287 095 tablets
Codeine  7  321 0.5 kg
Fentanyl and 
analogues
 8  249 33 kg
Morphine 12  975 82 kg
Opium 13  357 342 kg
Poppy (straw and 
plants)
 5   46
393 kg and 94 
plants
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The retail market for heroin and other 
opioids
Information on how and where heroin users obtain their 
supplies is not widely available. Since heroin users are 
not well represented in general population surveys, these 
surveys are not able to provide much information on the 
heroin market, except that in general heroin is seen as 
less accessible than other drugs (TNS Political and Social, 
2014). More information can be obtained from special 
studies of heroin users. However, the samples for such 
studies may not be representative of all users as they are 
often snowball or convenience samples, such as people 
attending needle exchanges or entering treatment.
Most heroin users buy their drugs, and there is less sharing 
or gifting than is the case with other substances. A recent 
study of drug users in three European countries, Italy, the 
Netherlands and England, found that the vast majority of 
respondents (97 %) usually paid for their heroin. About 
one in five said that they sometimes were given it while 
about 1 in 10 said that they sometimes got it on credit 
and a similar proportion reported that they got it fronted to 
sell (Trautmann and Frijns, 2013). In many countries it is 
common for heroin users to engage in street-level dealing 
to finance their drug use. Such users are very vulnerable to 
arrest and effectively act as a buffer between the higher-
level dealers and traffickers and law enforcement.
There is considerable variation across Europe in how the 
heroin market operates. In some countries, street dealing of 
heroin appears to be the most important type of retailing. 
In the above study, half of respondents said that they 
usually bought heroin on the street or in a park. However, 
in some countries more closed markets are in operation, 
with dealing taking place in premises and telephones being 
used to arrange pick-ups or deliveries. In England, over half 
the respondents in the recent study said they usually obtain 
their heroin through a delivery service (Trautmann and 
Frijns, 2013).
The retail price of heroin can be viewed as a marker of 
availability relative to demand and has been declining 
steadily over the last decade, in real terms (EMCDDA, 
2015a). However, prices vary widely both within and 
between countries (Figure 4.10). The trend in purity 
presents a more complex picture, having been increasing 
but then showing a marked dip in 2010–11 when several 
EU countries reported heroin shortages (EMCDDA, 2015a). 
Since the low in 2012, purity has been increasing again 
and in 2014 was back to 2010 levels. Hence it appears that 
the market response to the heroin shortage was to reduce 
purity rather than price.
It has been suggested that the increased use of other 
opioids in some countries in previous years was partly 
in response to the reduced quality of the heroin on the 
market. This suggests users will revert to heroin now that 
purity has improved, a trend that is likely to continue given 
the recent record Afghan poppy crops.
FIGURE 4.10
Trends in heroin purity and retail price in the EU, 2010–14
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Note: Trends are based only on data from those EU countries that have submitted data consistently since 2010. Prices have not been adjusted for inflation.  
Typical values shown are the interquartile range (IQR) of the country average values, with high and low values showing the range.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.
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Action points
Improving responses to the market for heroin and other opioids
1.  Investment in evidence-based approaches to demand, supply and harm reduction 
interventions needs to be strengthened given that the retail market for heroin remains 
the second largest drug market in Europe and the most significant contributor to public 
health and social harms.
2.  There is a need to strengthen capacity to identify signals and respond to new outbreaks 
of heroin or other opioid use or use among new subgroups.
Targeting key production issues
3.  Monitoring of opiate production remains essential and needs to target information gaps 
in relation to the quantities of heroin produced globally and where heroin production 
occurs. There is a need to better understand the destination of the opium and morphine 
exported out of Afghanistan, as well as the dynamics of renewed heroin production in 
the EU.
4.  Forensic profiling of heroin seizures is of great value for strategic purposes and needs 
to be supported. A mechanism for sharing the results of analysis among stakeholders at 
national and European level in a timely manner would be beneficial.
5.  Prevention of the diversion of acetic anhydride is a key component of a robust 
control framework. Additionally, information on diversion cases or attempts has value 
for signalling changes in opiate production. The systematic collection and sharing 
of additional information pertaining to seizures and stopped shipments of acetic 
anhydride in Europe, especially the results of backtracking investigations, should be 
strengthened. This would facilitate targeting of OCGs specialising in the diversion of 
precursor chemicals in the EU.
Responding to change in trafficking methods and routes
6.  The threats posed by interaction between the heroin market and the markets for 
synthetic drugs and cocaine identified in this report need to be better understood at a 
strategic level. This is likely to require more efforts in information sharing and analysis 
between the operational and strategic levels at both national and European level.
7.  Active monitoring, forensic analysis and timely information sharing on large seizures 
at major entry points in Europe is strategically and operationally important and should 
be encouraged and supported to improve our understanding of the evolving criminal 
networks and routes.
8.  Tackling maritime trafficking of heroin needs greater attention drawing on lessons from 
cocaine interdiction measures. This should encompass both bulk consignments at sea 
and targeting containers at key departure and transit points, especially ports in Africa, 
Pakistan and Iran, in addition to landing points in Europe.
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Engaging with Turkey and understanding the Balkan route’s Middle 
Eastern connections
9.  Cooperation between the countries along the Balkan route, including destination and 
transit countries, especially Turkey, has proven successful and should be continued 
and reinforced with new partnerships where possible. This should include intelligence 
sharing to develop the understanding of the continued diversification and extension 
of the Balkan route as well as support to develop demand reduction activities in the 
countries affected by heroin trafficking.
10.  Continuous assessment and monitoring of the implications for heroin trafficking of the 
current instability in the Middle East and associated migration through Balkan countries 
is required.
Closing information gaps on opioid-containing medicines and new 
synthetic opioids
11.  Tools are needed to better monitor and prevent the diversion and misuse of medicines 
containing opioids both at the population level and within risk groups. This needs to 
include methods for early signal detection as well as the development and propagation 
of proven effective responses.
12.  The identification of source countries, the extent of production within the EU and online 
sales remain important information gaps for synthetic opioids.

5 24 %Cocaine€5.7 billion Share ofEU illicit drug market
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Key issues
The European cocaine market
With a retail market estimated to be worth at least EUR 5.7 billion per year (range 
EUR 4.5 to 7 billion), cocaine is Europe’s most commonly used stimulant, although a high 
prevalence of use is largely restricted to some western and southern Member States. While 
most cocaine consumption is recreational use of cocaine powder, small populations of 
marginalised crack cocaine users are present in a few countries.
Stable demand but signs of increased availability
Indicators of demand suggest generally stable or even slightly declining use and seizure 
data show stability since the high point reached in the mid-2000s. However, recent data 
suggest that availability may be increasing; the retail price appears to be relatively stable 
or falling slightly overall and retail purity, though generally still below 50 %, has recovered 
to the levels seen 10 years ago. Interpreting these trends is difficult because there are 
significant gaps in our knowledge of how the cocaine supply chain operates.
Understanding cocaine production
Coca bush cultivation is restricted to Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, and appears to be 
increasing after a period of decline. However, there is considerable uncertainty about how 
much cocaine is produced and where this occurs. It is difficult to reconcile, for example, the 
only available global estimate of cocaine production (about 700 tonnes annually) with that 
of seizures (687 tonnes in 2013).
Precursor control
Most seizures of potassium permanganate occur in South America, where it is likely to 
be illicitly manufactured in the region from potassium manganate. Occasional seizures of 
potassium permanganate are reported in Europe, as well as larger stopped shipments. 
Therefore, efforts to prevent diversion from licit channels continue to be important.
CHAPTER 5
Cocaine
96
EU Drug Markets Report: In-depth Analysis
Trafficking routes
Both sea and air are used for trafficking cocaine to Europe, with Colombia, Brazil and 
Venezuela being key departure points. The Caribbean and West Africa (mainland and 
nearby islands) act as important transit areas and Central America appears to be becoming 
more important in this respect. In the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica are 
considered to be the main hubs, although some displacement of trafficking activities to 
eastern Caribbean countries has been observed. Cocaine trafficked via routes established 
for other drugs is a growing concern, such as routes used to traffic cannabis in North Africa 
(Morocco and Algeria) and heroin in East Africa (Tanzania).
Important trafficking methods
A variety of methods are used to smuggle cocaine into Europe, including air couriers, fast 
parcels and postal services, private yachts and jets. The use of maritime containers is of 
increasing concern, with seizures increasing since the mid-2000s. Major European ports, 
such as Rotterdam and Antwerp, are important landing points for such cocaine shipments, 
although other large western European ports are also targeted by organised crime. A 
diverse and continually evolving array of concealment methods is used and the importation 
of cocaine in forms that require chemical extraction in Europe continues to be a concern.
Organised crime
The range of criminal organisations involved in cocaine trafficking is wider than ever before, 
although Colombian and Italian OCGs continue to dominate the supply to Europe. Within 
Europe, they cooperate with other groups such as Dutch, British and Spanish OCGs, 
which are important brokers, while the Netherlands and Spain are key distribution hubs. 
West African, especially Nigerian, groups are particularly active in transporting cocaine 
from Africa to Europe often using air couriers. In this diverse arena, other trafficking 
organisations, such as groups from the Balkan region, are reportedly emerging as an 
additional significant threat.
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Introduction
Cocaine is Europe’s most commonly used illicit stimulant 
drug, but most consumption is found in the south and west 
of Europe. Cocaine is used in two main forms (see box). 
Cocaine powder is primarily sniffed or snorted, but is also 
sometimes injected, while crack cocaine is usually smoked. 
Most use is of cocaine powder and is comparatively 
infrequent, but a small proportion use more frequently and 
may experience problems. There are also a few countries 
in which there are small groups of people who use crack 
cocaine in a more harmful way, often in conjunction with 
heroin use.
Most recent survey data suggest that in several countries 
rates of cocaine use may have stabilised or started to decline. 
These patterns are also reflected in data on people entering 
treatment; the number of treatment entrants for cocaine has 
stabilised at a level significantly below the peak in 2008.
The health harms associated with regular cocaine use 
include dependence, heart and mental health problems, and 
a heightened risk of accidents. Harms may be exacerbated 
when cocaine is used in conjunction with alcohol. Cocaine 
injection and the use of crack cocaine are associated with 
the greatest health risks. Although deaths associated with 
cocaine are likely to be underestimated, for example being 
attributed to heart conditions, over 800 deaths associated 
with cocaine use were reported in 2013. Most of these were 
attributed to drug overdose, with other substances also 
being detected in many cases, primarily opioids.
Cocaine is trafficked to Europe from the producer 
countries of South America by both air and sea using 
a range of methods and routes. The most common 
appear to involve transit through the Caribbean or West 
Africa, including the islands off the coast of West Africa. 
Trafficking of cocaine into Europe appears to mainly 
take place through western and southern countries, with 
Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy together 
estimated to account for over 80 % of the 61.6 tonnes 
seized in the EU in 2014.
Cocaine
Cocaine is a natural product extracted from the leaves 
of Erythroxylum coca Lamarck and Erythroxylum 
novogranatense (coca leaves). These tropical shrubs 
are cultivated widely in the Andean–Amazonian 
region, and are the only known natural source of 
cocaine (1), which is produced almost exclusively in 
Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.
In Europe, cocaine is available in two forms, the more 
common of which is cocaine powder (a hydrochloride 
(HCl) salt). Less commonly available is crack cocaine, 
a smokeable (free base) form of the drug. The crack 
cocaine available in Europe is typically manufactured 
from cocaine hydrochloride near where it is retailed and 
used and, therefore, cocaine in crack form generates 
very little cross-border or long-distance trafficking.
(1)  It is possible to obtain synthetic cocaine through various methods, 
but this is rare and is less economical than the extraction of the 
natural product.
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TABLE 5.1
46–91
(52–72)
EUR/gram
Range 
(IQR) (4)
Mean retail price
(2014) 
Best estimate (low–high)
Value (billion EUR)
  5.7 (4.5–7.0)
Estimated market
size (2013)
Quantity (metric tonnes)
91 (72–110)
26–64
(36–50)
Range 
(IQR) (4)
Mean purity
(2014)  
% in EU
All admissions
Number (% of admissions for all drugs)
First admissions
60 000 (13 %)
27 000 (16 %)
Drug treatment (2) 
(2014)
Trends
possession for use 
99 000 (9 %)
70 000 (8 %)
29 000 (12 %)
(2014)
Trends
5.1 (0.5–10.3)
6.7 (1.0–12.8)
1.1 (0.1–2.4)
1.9 (0.2–4.2)
0.4 (0.0–1.0)
0.7 (0.0–1.7)
Consumption (1) 
Age group
(years)
Lifetime
Last year
Last month
15–64
15–34
17.1
8.3
15–64
15–34
3.6
2.4
15–64
15–34
1.4
0.8
Estimated number
of users (million)
% of EU population
(range between countries)
EU  
EU plus Norway and Turkey
EU
EU plus Norway and Turkey
61.6
78 000
Seizures (3) 
(2014)
62.1
80 000
Number
Quantity Trends
(tonnes)
COCAINE IN EUROPE AT A GLANCE
Notes: 
(1)  EU estimates are computed from national estimates weighted by the population of the relevant age group in each country. They are based on surveys conducted 
between 2004 and 2014/15 and therefore do not refer to a single year.
(2)  Drug users entering treatment for cocaine problems. Units coverage may vary across countries.
(3)  The 2014 figures should be considered as estimates; where not available, most recent data were used in place of 2014 data, except for the number of seizures 
for the Netherlands, France and Poland where no recent data is available so they are not included. An additional 4.2 kg of coca paste (26 seizures), 35 kg of coca 
leaves (33 seizures) and 70 kg of crack (5 600 seizures) were seized in the EU, in 2014.
(4)  IQR: interquartile range, or range of the middle half of the reported data.
Data presented are for the EU unless stated otherwise. All trend lines shown in this table cover a 5-year period, 2010–14. All trends reflect absolute numbers except 
for trends on price and on potency which reflect averages of mean values. In the case of treatment, price and purity, trends are based only on data from those EU 
countries that have consistently submitted data since 2010.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.
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GLOBAL OVERVIEW – COCAINE
Quantities seized
(tonnes)
Proportion of 
global seizures
South America 61 %
Caribbean 13 %
Central America 10 %
Europe 9 %
North America 6 %
Others 1 %
Estimated users
Global
17 m
EU
3.6 m
Estimated potential production 
(tonnes)
Estimated coca cultivation
(hectares of coca bush)
732
976
924 914
844
782
694 671 687Global
2009 2010 2010 20142011 2012 2013 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
154
 
200
132 300
634
Main seizing regions
Europe
Past year,
aged 15–64
Note: The estimates presented are up to 2013; more recent EU figures are available but have not been used for the purposes of comparability. For the most up-to-
-date European data, please refer to Table 5.1.
Source: UNODC, World Drug Reports. EMCDDA, 2015a.
Global overview
In the three countries in which coca cultivation is almost 
exclusively concentrated, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, the 
leaves play a significant cultural role. In Bolivia and Peru, 
some growing of coca is permitted to supply licit domestic 
consumer markets for coca leaves and to supply de-
cocainised flavouring agents to international manufacturers 
of soft drinks, which complicates efforts to control cocaine 
production.
The extraction of cocaine alkaloids from the coca leaves 
also takes place almost exclusively in the three producer 
countries, which also account for the majority of the global 
production of cocaine hydrochloride. However, some 
cocaine processing laboratories have been detected in 
other South American countries and elsewhere, including 
Europe, and globally over 9 000 cocaine-type laboratories 
were dismantled in 2013 (UNODC, 2015a).
The majority of cocaine users are found in North and 
South America and western and central Europe. Although 
prevalence rates have been declining in North America 
(especially in the United States) and in western and central 
Europe, the number of people using cocaine in South 
America and in Australia has been increasing; in Asia 
prevalence rates are generally low (UNODC, 2015a).
Global seizures of cocaine reported by UNODC totalled 
687 tonnes in 2013, a figure very similar to that for 2012 
(UNODC, 2015a).
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Consumer market for cocaine in 
Europe
Extent and nature of cocaine use
In general, among users of cocaine a broad distinction can 
be made between more socially integrated consumers, 
who often sniff powder cocaine in a recreational context, 
and marginalised users, who inject cocaine or smoke crack, 
often alongside the use of opioids.
It is estimated that, in the EU in 2014, 1 % of the general 
population and about 2 % of young adults used cocaine in 
the last year. This equates to about 3.6 million adults aged 
15–64, including about 2.4 million aged 15–34. However, 
the vast majority consume the drug only rarely; even in 
surveys that focus on drug users, no more than 10 % of 
respondents report using once a week or more (Frijns 
and van Laar, 2013; Winstock, 2015). Most cocaine users 
consume the drug recreationally, with use highest during 
weekends and holidays (EMCDDA, 2015c).
There are also considerable differences between countries 
in the prevalence of cocaine use; in some countries 
amphetamines dominate the stimulant market and cocaine 
use is low. Only a few countries report last-year prevalence 
of cocaine use among young adults of more than 3 %, and 
in the two most prominent, the United Kingdom and Spain, 
the rates have been stable or decreasing in recent years.
The prevalence of problematic forms of cocaine use in 
Europe is difficult to gauge as only five countries have 
recent estimates and, for methodological reasons, these 
are not easy to compare. The limited figures available 
suggest that in those countries with higher rates of cocaine 
use the proportion of adults experiencing problems from 
cocaine use is in the region of between 2 and 6 per 1 000 
of the population.
Cocaine was cited as the primary drug for 13 % of all 
those entering drug treatment in 2014 (60 000), with the 
majority being reported by only three countries (Spain, Italy, 
United Kingdom). The number of cocaine clients entering 
treatment for the first time has now stabilised and was 
29 000 in 2014, substantially below the peak in 2008. Far 
fewer clients entering treatment in Europe reported crack 
cocaine as the main drug they use (5 500 in 2014), with 
the United Kingdom accounting for more than half of these, 
and Spain, France and the Netherlands accounting for 
most of the remainder.
The size of the market for cocaine
The estimated value of the retail market for cocaine in the 
EU is at least EUR 5.7 billion (range EUR 4.5–7 billion). This 
represents a little less than one-quarter of the total illicit 
market in drugs and makes it the third largest, after cannabis 
and heroin. Our estimates of amounts used suggest that in 
2013 about 91 tonnes of cocaine was consumed, with a likely 
range of 72 to 110 tonnes.
In reaching these estimates we have used information 
on numbers of cocaine powder users from the general 
population surveys conducted in most countries but, 
recognising that some groups of drug users are unlikely to 
be represented in these surveys, we have supplemented 
these with estimates of cocaine use by problem users 
in the few countries in which these exist. However, this 
almost certainly underestimates problem use, especially as, 
because of a paucity of data about numbers of users and 
use patterns, no attempt was made to undertake estimates 
of crack use. There are a number of other limitations to 
these estimates (see box on page 28) and further details 
of the estimation methods are given in the technical report 
published alongside this report (EMCDDA, 2016a).
Production issues
Although the cultivation of coca and the production of 
cocaine occur almost exclusively in Colombia, Bolivia and 
Peru, there is considerable uncertainty about the amounts 
of both produced, not least because in countries such as 
Bolivia a large proportion of the coca grown is consumed as 
leaves, tea or other coca products. There are two sources of 
estimates of coca cultivation and cocaine production within 
these countries, the UNODC and the US Office of Drug 
Control Policy, and there are some significant differences 
between these. These will be reviewed and, where possible, 
some general conclusions on recent trends drawn.
Recent trends in coca cultivation and 
cocaine production
In the period 2010–14, the South American cocaine supply 
chains witnessed some change, particularly with respect 
to (a) the estimated areas under coca bush cultivation and 
(b) the organisation and governance of the illegal business 
and the constellation of actors involved in it.
The available data suggest that in 2014, after several 
years of decline, the surface area under coca cultivation 
in the Andes increased again slightly to between 132 000 
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and 190 000 ha. This rise was mostly due to a significant 
increase in the coca acreage in Colombia, with the country 
regaining its rank as the world’s largest illicit producer of 
coca, ahead of Peru (Table 5.2).
Fewer data are available on cocaine production, but what 
data there are suggest that, as with coca cultivation, 
cocaine production has probably started to increase again 
following a period of decline (Table 5.3). However, the data 
are both incomplete and show considerable differences 
between the UNODC and US government sources. The 
estimates use different methodologies and both are 
associated with considerable uncertainties (19); and it is 
very difficult to reconcile the estimate of global cocaine 
production of about 700 tonnes annually with total seizures 
(687 tonnes in 2013) (UNODC, 2015a). This makes it 
very difficult to assess trends in cocaine hydrochloride 
production in the Andes.
(19) For example, the US Department of State ‘International Control Strategy 
Report, 2014’ states that: ‘The U.S. government estimates for coca leaf, 
cocaine, marijuana, opium, and heroin production are potential estimates; 
that is, it is assumed that all of the coca, marijuana, and poppy grown is 
harvested and processed into illicit drugs. This is a reasonable assump-
tion for coca leaf in Colombia. In Bolivia and Peru, however, the US 
government potential cocaine production estimates are overestimated to 
some unknown extent since significant amounts of coca leaf are locally 
chewed and used in products such as coca tea.’
FIGURE 5.1
The cocaine production process
CULTIVATION
Erythroxylum coca bush cultivated in the Andean-Amazonian region
Erythroxylum coca
EXTRACTION
Coca leaves crushed in pit with sulphuric acid, calcium carbonate and kerosene
Coca base paste
H
2
SO
4
CaCO
3
kerosene  
PURIFICATION
KMnO
4
Cocaine base 
CRYSTALLISATION
Ammonium hydroxide, acetone and hydrochloric acid are added to the cocaine base
NH
4
OH
Acetone
HCl
Cocaine hydrochloride 
ADULTERATION
‘Cutting agents’ (e.g. levamisole) are added to the cocaine hydrochloride 
and then the resulting powder is pressed into blocks and logos may be added
EXPORTATION
Blocks are smuggled to consumer markets including Europe
Phenacetin Levamisole?
Note: This illustration is intended to provide an indicative schematic overview 
of selected stages of a production process. It must be noted that alternative 
methods, chemicals and procedures may be used.
Source: EMCDDA.
TABLE 5.2
Estimates of area under coca bush cultivation in 
hectares, 2010–14
Country Source
Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Bolivia
UNODC (1) (2) 31 000 27 200 25 300 23 000 20 400
US government (3) 29 000 25 500 25 000 n/a 35 000
Colombia
UNODC (1) (4) 62 000 64 000 48 000 48 000 69 000
US government (3) 100,000 83 000 78 000 80 500 112 000
Peru
UNODC (1) (5) (6) 61 200 62 500 60 400 49 800 42 900
US government (3) 53 000 49 500 50 500 59 500 46 500
Total
UNODC (1) (7) 154 200 153 700 133 700 120 800 132 300
US government (3) 182 000 158 000 153 500 n/a 190 000
Notes:
(1) Source: UNODC (2015a), Annex 1; UNODC crop monitoring surveys.
(2) Source: UNODC (2015c).
(3) Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (2015).
(4) Source: UNODC (2015d).
(5) Source: UNODC (2015e).
(6)  The estimate for 2010 is based on satellite imagery and is not directly com-
parable to later estimates for Peru (in 2011 the estimate based on satellite 
imagery was higher than the one quoted here, at 64 400 ha).
(7)  The estimate for 2011 differs from that in the UNODC (2015a) report 
because it used the estimate shown here for Peru to be comparable with 
2012 and 2013 estimates. The 2010 estimate will therefore not be directly 
comparable with the later estimates.
n/a, not available.
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TABLE 5.3
Comparison of potential cocaine hydrochloride 
production estimates, in tonnes, 2010–14
Country Source
Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Bolivia US government (1) 160 175 145 n/a 210
Colombia
UNODC (2) (3) 424 384 333 290 442
US government (1) 240 180 165 185 245
Peru US government (1) 325 305 290 305 285
Total US government (1) 740 685 620 n/a 740
Notes:
(1) Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (2015).
(2) Source: UNODC (2015a), Annex 1.
(3) Source: UNODC (2015d).
Cocaine precursors
Potassium permanganate is an essential chemical in the 
illicit manufacture of cocaine. It is mostly used to turn coca 
paste into cocaine base, a process that seems to be carried 
out mainly in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru but probably 
also in neighbouring countries on a more limited scale. 
Potassium permanganate is listed in Table I of the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (20).
Efforts to control trafficking in potassium permanganate 
are complicated by the fact that it is a chemical used 
extensively by industries throughout the world, for instance 
in drinking water treatment, and the INCB received reports 
of 1 630 shipments totalling 27 500 tonnes in the 2013–14 
reporting period, of which imports to the three main 
coca-producing countries accounted for less than 1 %. 
The INCB estimates that at least 180 tonnes of potassium 
permanganate is required annually for illicit cocaine 
manufacture.
Global seizures of illicit potassium permanganate, which 
have in the past been dominated by seizures in Colombia, 
fell markedly in 2008 and have generally remained at a 
lower level since then. This is probably because of an 
increase in the manufacturing of potassium permanganate 
in clandestine laboratories in the cocaine-producing 
countries, especially Colombia, from ‘pre-precursors’ such 
as potassium manganate (INCB, 2015a). However, in 
recent years seizures have also been reported by a wider 
range of countries; in 2013, a total of 58 tonnes was seized 
(20) The corresponding EU legislation is set out in Council Regulation (EEC) no 
3677/90 (as later amended), which governs trade between the EU and 
third countries.
in 17 different countries, 80 % of which was in South 
America. Countries elsewhere reporting total seizures or 
stopped shipments of over 1 tonne included Spain (5.9 
tonnes). This large quantity was unusual and was made up 
of 19 stopped shipments and a single small seizure, and it 
represented 99 % of the total for Europe in 2013. The other 
European country reporting significant quantities seized 
in that year was the Netherlands (one seizure of 80 kg), 
while Poland, Germany, Austria and Slovenia reported 
a combined total of 7.8 kg (INCB, 2015a, and European 
Commission, DG TAXUD (Directorate-General for Taxation 
and Customs Union, unpublished data).
A number of other substances, such as acids and solvents, 
are used in the production of cocaine, and seizures of 
these are also reported to the INCB. There is evidence of a 
general decrease in quantities being seized over the last 
decade. It has been suggested that this is partly because 
there is more recycling of these substances and also 
because developments in processes are reducing solvent 
requirements (INCB, 2015a).
Cocaine laboratories
As indicated above, it appears that most cocaine 
manufacture takes place in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, as 
together these countries are responsible for the majority 
of the dismantled cocaine laboratories reported to the 
UNODC. However, there is evidence that some cocaine 
hydrochloride is refined elsewhere in South America, 
further along the trafficking routes, and also in Europe.
Cocaine traffickers make use of sophisticated concealment 
methods, including incorporating cocaine in various 
materials, in order to smuggle it into the EU undetected. 
Cocaine can be incorporated into a wide range of materials, 
including beeswax, fertilisers, coffee, cocoa, plastic, 
clothing, liquids, foods, fuels and paper. In some cases, 
this enables drug shipments to remain undetected even 
by common drug tests. Cocaine is recovered using a 
secondary extraction process; however, little information is 
available about the use of this process in the EU. This lack 
of intelligence gives rise to concerns that such methods 
are being used successfully by cocaine traffickers to 
smuggle large amounts of cocaine into the EU undetected. 
Secondary extraction laboratories have been identified in 
recent years in Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Poland 
(Figure 5.2).
Efforts have been undertaken at European level to improve 
the data collection on secondary extraction facilities 
such as those described above. Under the auspices of 
the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal 
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Threats (EMPACT) cocaine priority, Europol and the 
EMCDDA have developed a reporting tool for the Member 
States, the European reporting instrument on cocaine 
secondary extraction sites (ERICES). As a result, since 
2015, Member States have been able to report data on 
this particular smuggling modus operandi to Europol in 
a systematic way that will allow a more comprehensive 
analysis in the years to come and improve our 
understanding of cocaine trafficking routes and methods.
Environmental effects of cocaine 
production
Two categories of environmental harms derive from cocaine 
production: those due to the agricultural production of the 
coca plant and those caused by the chemical extraction of 
the cocaine alkaloid from coca leaves. The coca plant is often 
cultivated as a single crop over large patches of land, which 
need to be prepared for cultivation. The first harm caused 
here is deforestation, which is the most researched, at least 
in the Colombian case. Removing the vegetation from a 
patch of land in order to cultivate a single plant obviously 
harms biodiversity, which is often very rich in the tropical 
forest areas where much coca is cultivated in South America. 
It has been estimated that about 290 000 ha of forest, 
including primary forest, was lost as a direct consequence 
of the clearing of land ahead of coca cultivation in Colombia 
alone between 2001 and 2013. Since 2008, deforestation 
for coca cultivation is reported to be increasing in Colombia 
even though coca cultivation itself has tended to decrease 
(UNODC 2013d, 2015d).
The slash-and-burn practice that often follows the clearing 
of land so that crops benefit from the nutrients contained 
in the ashes removes all protective vegetal cover from the 
soil, which then becomes much more vulnerable to erosion. 
Erosion is another harm caused by coca production. It 
occurs as a result of the action of the wind and, especially, 
the rain and leads to soil depletion. This is particularly 
pronounced in areas with heavy rainfalls, such as tropical 
forest ecosystems, and is especially severe when the 
affected land is on slopes, which is the case for much 
coca cultivation in South America (Chouvy, 2003; UNODC, 
2015d).
Soil depletion due to erosion, as well as the drive to 
maximise yields, even on non-depleted soils, of what are 
essentially cash crops, often leads to use of chemical 
fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides in order to increase 
production. In the context of drug production, where no 
counselling from agriculturalists is available to farmers, 
this is likely to be done with little regard to dosage, further 
polluting already degraded soils and spreading to rivers and 
underground water deposits. An estimated 81 000 tonnes 
of often toxic fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides was 
used for coca cultivation in Colombia in 2005 according 
to the UNODC (Chouvy, 2003; UNODC, 2006b, 2015d). In 
addition, aerial spraying of herbicides to eradicate coca 
plantations may also pose a threat to the environment.
Many of the chemicals used to process coca leaves into 
cocaine hydrochloride, including potassium permanganate 
and solvents such as acetone, toluene, kerosene, acids, to 
mention only a few, are toxic. The waste product resulting 
FIGURE 5.2
A cocaine secondary extraction site dismantled 
in Portugal, September 2015
Photos © UNCTE-Polícia Judiciária, Portugal
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from cocaine production if these chemicals are used is 
often simply dumped on the ground or in streams and 
rivers in the areas where drug laboratories are located, 
which are often host to fragile ecosystems and human 
populations. Although scientific evidence as to the exact 
impact of this process on the environment is lacking, each 
year it is probable that millions of tonnes of hazardous 
waste resulting from cocaine production is released into 
the environment (UNODC, 2006b, 2015d).
Trafficking and supply
Wholesale supply activities
Much of our knowledge about trafficking routes results from 
law enforcement activity and intelligence. Information on 
quantities of drugs seized and information on the origin 
and destination of shipments can give an indication of 
the main routes and modes of transport. However, such 
information is also affected by many factors, including 
law enforcement strategies, resources and priorities, as 
well as changes to routes and practices in response to 
interdiction efforts or new opportunities. Hence, care is 
needed in interpreting these data. While the information 
below highlights the main known trafficking routes, these 
are not set in stone and the picture is constantly changing 
in response to new markets, technological developments 
and law enforcement activity.
Overview of recent changes to routes into 
Europe
Departure points
Cocaine is shipped from Latin America to Europe in vessels 
departing from Brazil and other countries such as Ecuador 
and Venezuela. The increasing use of Brazil as a departure 
point reflects the growing importance of Bolivia and Peru 
as the source of cocaine shipped to Europe. Venezuela 
has become more important in recent years as trafficking 
organisations move Colombian cocaine overland across 
a porous border and take advantage of the busy maritime 
traffic between the coast and the islands of the Caribbean. 
However, cocaine is also trafficked from Venezuela to 
Europe by air, either directly or via the Caribbean and Africa. 
In addition, although UNODC data suggest that Colombia 
has declined in importance as a direct departure point for 
cocaine heading to Europe over recent years, large seizures 
continue to be made on the Caribbean coast, including 
a 7-tonne shipment destined for the Netherlands seized 
in Cartagena in April 2014. This and the recent upturn 
in production suggest that Colombia is likely to remain 
an important departure point for maritime shipments of 
cocaine. Cocaine is also shipped through the southern 
cone of Latin America, particularly Argentina (Eventon and 
Bewley-Taylor, 2016).
Transit areas
There are two main areas through which cocaine shipments 
transit en route to Europe. The first is the Caribbean, where 
the Dominican Republic and Jamaica are considered the 
main hubs, although operations elsewhere appear to have 
pushed some trafficking through the eastern Caribbean. 
Central America and the Caribbean was the only region in 
which cocaine seizures rose in 2013, almost doubling to 
162 tonnes, from 78 tonnes in 2012; much of this increase 
is attributable to a ninefold increase in the amount seized 
in the Dominican Republic (86 tonnes) (UNODC, 2015a). 
This apparent increase in the use of the Caribbean route 
may be a reflection of recent crackdowns in Mexico and 
Central America (Eventon and Bewley-Taylor, 2016). From 
the Caribbean, the cocaine is generally shipped by sea via 
the Azores or by air, either on direct flights or a variety of 
different transfer points.
The other major transit area can be subdivided into the 
West African mainland and neighbouring islands, Cape 
Verde, Madeira and the Canary Islands. The Bight of 
Benin, which runs from Ghana to Nigeria, while no doubt a 
trafficking route and storage location, may have decreased 
in importance in recent years following a marked rise in 
seizures between 2004 and 2007. In 2013, seizures were 
reported by Nigeria (290 kg), Ghana (901 kg) and Ivory 
Coast (27 kg) (UNODC, 2015a). From West Africa, the 
cocaine is transported onward to Europe by air, sea or land 
routes. Transport through North Africa taking advantage of 
pre-existing cannabis routes was recognised as a concern 
when the West African route was growing in importance 
(UNODC, 2007). Seizures of cocaine in Morocco have 
reduced following the decrease in the use of the West 
African route. However, some occasional large seizures 
are still made, e.g. 226 kg was found aboard a lorry in 
September 2014 (AFP, 2014), and it appears that routes 
through the region are changeable in response to law 
enforcement activity or other changes to conditions on the 
ground (there was a spike in seizures in Algeria in 2012, for 
example) (AMERIPOL, 2013).
An increase in seizures in East Africa between 2010 
and 2012, particularly in Tanzania, might signal the 
emergence of a new cocaine trafficking route in a region 
heavily affected by the heroin trade (see Chapter 4). In 
addition, the enlargement of the Panama Canal may 
lead to an increase in cocaine trafficking via this route. 
Modifications in European waters and harbours, enabling 
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them to receive larger ships, may also lead to shifts in 
trafficking routes.
Modes of transport
As indicated above, cocaine traffickers make use of a 
wide range of trafficking methods that are used flexibly 
and evolve over time in response to enforcement efforts. 
Maritime transport allows the transportation of large 
quantities at one time, and over two-thirds of EU seizures 
in the period 2011–13 involved this form of transportation 
(Europol, 2014b). The nature of international commercial 
maritime traffic means that a vast number of routes can 
and will be used. In addition, smaller, private boats are able 
to bring in large quantities of cocaine in single shipments, 
entering Europe at many points; in September 2014, for 
example, a private yacht carrying a tonne of cocaine, which 
had been picked up in Venezuela, was intercepted off the 
coast of Ireland (Roche, 2015).
An important development has been an increase in the 
use of containers on commercial vessels to ship cocaine, 
making detection more difficult. Since 2006, maritime 
seizures that involve containers have increased sixfold, 
with a particularly steep increase since 2010. At the same 
time, the number of seizures from vessels, which was 
much higher than from containers at the start of the period, 
decreased from 2006 to 2010 and has since stabilised at 
about one-third of the level seen at the start of this period. 
Container seizures made up three-quarters of maritime 
seizures in 2012 and 2013, compared with one-tenth in 
FIGURE 5.3
Main trafficking flows of cocaine to Europe
To southern Africa
EMCDDA reporting countries
Main coca producer countries
Main areas of tra	cking activities
Air route (general)
Air route (commercial)
Land route
Maritime route
To transit 
countries 
and Europe
To Europe
To Gulf of 
Guinea
To Panama
Canal and
Caribbean
To Iberian 
Peninsula
To west 
and central 
Europe
Note: The flows represented are a synthesis of a number of information sources and should be considered indicative rather than  
accurate descriptions of the main trafficking flows.
Source: Europol and EMCDDA.
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2006 (Europol, 2014b). The largest seaports in Europe are 
in Rotterdam, the Netherlands (the eighth busiest shipping 
port in the world) and Antwerp, Belgium, and they are key 
points for this type of trafficking. After around 10 000 kg 
of cocaine was seized in Rotterdam over the course of 
2013, Dutch police estimated that 25–50 % of the cocaine 
reaching Europe now enters via the port, which handles 
around 11 million containers a year, only 50 000 of which 
are scanned (DutchNews, 2014, quoted in Eventon and 
Bewley-Taylor, 2016). However, Spain also reports a large 
number of container seizures coming through Algeciras 
and Valencia, as does Germany, especially in the port of 
Hamburg.
The methods used for container trafficking also evolve. For 
example, there has been a shift from concealment within 
the container or cargo to the rip-on/rip-off method (see box 
on page 106), which accounts for an increasing proportion 
of seizures (32 % in 2010, rising to 57 % in 2011 and 
70 % in 2012) (Europol, 2014b). Corrupt officials and port 
employees facilitate this form of trafficking, and there are 
concerns that the OCGs involved in cocaine trafficking may 
be making systematic efforts to corrupt workers in all major 
ports to facilitate shifting of routes as necessary. Staff 
involved in the aviation industry can also be vulnerable 
in this regard. An example of this was the case of a crew 
member of the Nigerian airline Arik Air who was arrested at 
Heathrow Airport in London on the suspicion of possession 
of cocaine in August 2015. The arrest came 2 years after 
two crew members of the same airline were arrested, also 
in London, for the same offence.
Cocaine is also trafficked by air, which involves individual 
couriers and air freight aboard commercial flights as well 
as the use of private aeroplanes, including jets. Aside from 
direct flights from Latin America, recognised stop-off points 
are in the Caribbean, Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and 
West Africa. However, compared with maritime shipments, 
the quantity transported by air appears to be smaller, with 
seizures at airports making up about one-eighth of the total 
amount of cocaine seized in Europe between 2011 and 
2013 (Europol, 2014b). However, although the size of each 
shipment is comparatively small, the number of seizures 
of cocaine transported in this way is high, and this mode 
of transport does have the effect of spreading the risk 
for traffickers. Couriers transport cocaine on commercial 
flights, either internally (swallowed or stuffed), in their 
baggage, or, less frequently, on their body. The average 
Case study 11: Cocaine trafficking to 
Europe
In 2014, Hungarian police investigated an OCG 
previously involved in synthetic drug production in 
the Netherlands and large-scale polydrug trafficking 
within the EU and beyond. It was discovered that 
the group was regularly sending 20-kg shipments 
of cocaine in containers coming from Panama to 
Europe. The cocaine was hidden among vehicle parts 
in false-bottomed crates in partially loaded crates 
known as ‘less than container loads’. Cooperation 
between Hungary and Germany, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia resulted in the three key members of the 
OCG being arrested after receiving 23 parcels each 
containing approximately 25 kg of cocaine.
Rip-on/rip-off method of cocaine smuggling
The so-called ‘rip-on/rip-off’ method involves loading 
the consignment in the port of departure and 
recovering it in the port of arrival. The use of one or 
more corrupt employees at both ends is therefore a 
key element.
A suitable container must be identified in South 
America with a legitimate cargo destined for Europe. 
The drugs are usually loaded in the dock area, so the 
‘rip-on’ team must be able to get the drugs into the 
container terminal and to locate the container, which 
must be in an accessible position. In most cases the 
security seal needs to be replaced with a duplicate to 
avoid obvious signs of tampering.
At the port of arrival, the drugs need to be retrieved, 
which can be achieved in a variety of ways. The drugs 
can be removed from the container by corrupt port 
workers or by external teams who gain access to the 
terminal. After the ‘rip-off’ is complete, the container 
is either left open or resealed with another false/
duplicate seal. The success of the rip-off depends 
on knowing the location of the container within what 
is often a very large container terminal with tens of 
thousands of containers. However, just knowing the 
container number is usually not enough. It must also 
be accessible, which again usually requires a corrupt 
port or company worker to manipulate the position of 
the container.
In December 2014, a joint customs–police team in Berlin 
examined a container transporting coffee. The container 
had left Santos, Brazil, and had arrived at Bremerhaven 
port, from where it would have been delivered to a coffee 
roaster in Berlin. Immediately after the container was 
opened, a sports bag and an unused container security 
seal were found. Inside the sports bag, 30 individual 
packages were found each containing 1 kg of cocaine 
marked with a ‘horseshoe’ logo.
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amounts of cocaine transported in this way in 2012–13 
were 4.3 kg in luggage, 0.7 kg in the body or 1.72 kg on the 
body (Europol, 2014c).
Some concealment methods, such as the use of cocaine 
incorporated into breast implants, involve surgical 
procedures on cocaine couriers and pose significant risks 
to the lives of couriers.
The ingestion by smugglers of numerous packages of 
cocaine is well documented and poses serious health risks, 
including death if a package ruptures whilst the courier is in 
transit. Cocaine smuggled in this way, up until recently, was 
always in powder form; however, there has been a switch 
by the smugglers to use cocaine in liquid form, presumably 
in an attempt to avoid scanning equipment now in use at 
several airports.
Numerous other concealment methods have been 
identified. Concealing the drugs within shipments 
of perishable goods is a common tactic as there are 
procedures to allow these to pass through ports more 
quickly. An example of this is shown in Figure 5.4.
Importation to and distribution within Europe
Cocaine is the second most seized drug in Europe, after 
cannabis. In 2014, about 78 000 seizures of cocaine 
were reported in the EU, amounting to 61.6 tonnes of the 
drug. The situation has been relatively stable since 2010, 
although both the number of seizures and the volume 
seized are at levels considerably lower than the peak 
values reached in the mid- to late 2000s (Figure 5.6). Spain 
and Portugal in the south, and ports in the Netherlands 
and Belgium in the north, are the most important entry 
points for South American cocaine reaching the European 
market. The countries that seized the most cocaine over the 
period 2011–14 were Spain (accounting for about 50 % 
of all seizures) and Belgium, followed by France, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and Portugal (data are not available for the 
Netherlands).
In the past few years, as highlighted in the last EU drugs 
market report (EMCDDA–Europol, 2013), seizure data have 
suggested some use of south-eastern Europe as an entry 
point, spurring talk of an emerging Balkan route, and even 
a ‘Balkan cartel’ for cocaine, overlapping the established 
heroin route. Some seizures in Baltic countries have also 
led to discussion of another possible passage for cocaine. 
However, the data suggest, first, that, to date, use of these 
‘routes’ appears to be sporadic and, secondly, that they 
remain of minor importance compared with established 
primary routes. The total amount seized in the 10 countries 
located on the eastern border of Europe (21) remained 
at 2 % of all seizures throughout the period 2011–14. 
Nevertheless, this may indicate a spread of the cocaine 
market eastward, where traditionally other stimulants have 
predominated, and in particular for a growing market in the 
Russian Federation (UNODC, 2015a). It is important that 
there is continued monitoring of this so that any escalation 
of the problem is detected quickly.
Based on data provided from 14 countries (22), a Europol 
report found that the European countries reporting the 
greatest number of interceptions of air couriers in 2013 
were the Netherlands and Spain, followed by France and 
Portugal, and then the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and 
Belgium. However, it needs to be borne in mind that the 
number of interceptions is to some extent a reflection of 
the resources directed towards such interceptions. While in 
2012 and 2013 the cocaine couriers that were intercepted 
were of over 100 different nationalities, in general, nationals 
of the intercepting country were predominant among the 
couriers identified. As a result, European nationals make up 
the majority of intercepted couriers (Europol, 2014c).
A recently observed discrepancy between the availability 
of cocaine and estimated cocaine use rates has led to 
speculations that Europe may be growing in prominence 
as a transit stop en route, it has been assumed, to markets 
in Russia, China, India, the Middle East and perhaps 
also the Oceania region. The Netherlands, Germany 
and the United Kingdom have been identified, based on 
(21) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Greece, 
Slovakia and Turkey.
(22) Belgium, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands  
and the United Kingdom.
FIGURE 5.4
Cocaine concealed in a shipment of perishable goods
A seizure of about 300 kg of cocaine concealed in a shipment 
of fresh bananas from Colombia discovered in a shop in Berlin, 
Germany, May 2015.
Photo © epa/Soeren Stache
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seizures in Australia, as primary transit points in Europe 
(UNODC, 2014b). Time and relevant data will add better 
understanding and suggest whether or not in fact the 
speculations are accurate.
Although crack cocaine is predominantly produced in 
Europe close to consumer markets, it is worth considering 
the data on seizures of crack, significant numbers of which 
are reported only by the United Kingdom, where, since 
2009, the number has stabilised at about 5 000 per year 
after declining from a peak of 7 578 in 2007. Much smaller 
numbers of seizures are reported by Germany and Spain 
(268 and 359, respectively, in 2014). When amounts of 
crack cocaine seized are considered, the United Kingdom 
(England and Wales) again stands out, with 33 kg seized 
in 2014 (down from 48 kg in 2013) (Hargreaves and Smith, 
2015), with France and Italy in second and third places, 
reporting, respectively, amounts of 19 kg and 2 kg seized 
(all other countries that provided data reported seizing less 
than 1 kg).
The changing face of cocaine production and 
supply
In the past, the production and trafficking of cocaine 
to the EU was largely organised by non-EU criminals, 
but this picture has been changing for several years, as 
discussed in the 2013 EU drug markets report (EMCDDA–
Europol, 2013). With respect to the actors involved in 
cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe, there 
appears to be a trend towards the further fragmentation, 
horizontalisation and expansion of the cocaine production 
and trafficking networks; some of the larger Colombian 
and Mexican trafficking outfits are effectively employing 
FIGURE 5.5
Branding on imported blocks of cocaine
A label and an embossed logo found on cocaine bricks belonging to different wholesale shipments seized in Portugal in recent years.
Photos © MAOC-N, courtesy of UNCTE-Polícia Judiciária, Portugal
FIGURE 5.6
Seizures of cocaine reported in Europe, 2006–14
2006 2010 2014
Number of seizures (thousands)
Quantities seized (tonnes)
EUEU +2 
2006 2010 2014
EUEU +2 
121
120
62
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83
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78
Note: Some data for 2014 are not available and the most recent data have 
been used instead, except for the number of seizures for the Netherlands, 
France and Poland where no recent data is available so they are not included.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.  
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a ‘franchise model’, whereby they sell their ‘brand names’ 
and ‘operating licences’ to smaller criminal groups and 
even individuals that are not part of their organisations. 
Mexican traffickers seem to have made inroads into the 
Andean cocaine supply markets, expanding their local 
networks with the aim of cutting out intermediaries. While 
they are also striving to expand their activities in Europe, 
particularly in Spain, some European OCGs appear to be 
building a more permanent presence in South America, 
possibly aiming to enhance their strategic position in what 
is an ever more crowded and competitive illicit market 
(Schultze-Kraft, 2016).
OCGs involved in the trafficking of cocaine are often 
highly innovative and are using increasingly sophisticated 
smuggling techniques and countermeasures to avoid the 
detection of cocaine shipments. In order to ensure the 
successful delivery of cocaine shipments, OCGs attempt 
to gain control over the entire chain of transportation from 
departure to arrival at the final destination in the EU. OCGs 
are thought to engage in the systematic recruitment of 
corrupt workers at all major (air)ports in the EU in order 
to enhance their flexibility and ability to shift between 
(air)ports when required. Certain ports are particularly 
vulnerable to this method because of a lack of personnel 
screening, poor working conditions or weak terminal 
security. Businesses operating in maritime transportation 
and related sectors are also targeted for infiltration by 
OCGs.
OCGs are adept at exploiting available technologies, such 
as encrypted communication devices, satellite mobile 
phones, dark net services for online communication, cloud 
services or GPS beacons, to track containers and to recover 
cocaine consignments thrown overboard for later recovery. 
In some cases, OCGs have been found to use frequency 
inhibitors.
Some distinct criminal networks continue to play key roles 
in the importation of cocaine into the EU.
Latin American and Caribbean organised crime groups
These are mainly composed of nationals of Colombia, 
Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, and traffic 
cocaine to the EU in large quantities.
The influence of Colombian groups in the supply of cocaine 
has decreased as law enforcement authorities have made 
a concerted effort to dismantle the major cartels. Mexican 
groups have taken advantage of this and have increased 
their activities throughout South America (23). However, 
(23) According to open sources, the Mexican Sinaloa cartel currently controls 
35 % of the cocaine exported from Colombia, representing about 
100 tonnes of drugs a year (El Tiempo, 21/07/2015).
there are no indications of increased activity of Mexican 
cartels in the EU. Despite a relative decline in influence, 
Colombian groups continue to play a key role in the supply 
of cocaine to the European market. They have settled in 
the EU to organise and facilitate their operations, and 
cooperate with many European groups, including Italian 
and Spanish criminal organisations.
West African organised crime groups
Mostly composed of Nigerian nationals, West African OCGs 
continue to feature prominently as organisers of cocaine 
trafficking using air couriers. Nigerian groups, in particular, 
have consolidated their involvement in the cocaine trade 
and are now on par with Latin American groups in their 
ability to source, finance and transport bulk quantities 
of cocaine from Latin America to Africa, Europe and 
elsewhere. Part of the profits of the drug trade is laundered 
by building houses and hotels in Nigeria. Nigerians also 
have a significant presence in many EU countries, including 
Austria, Spain, France, Italy and Germany.
EU organised crime groups
EU OCGs have benefited from the more open cocaine 
market that has resulted from the fragmentation of 
Colombian organised crime and increased involvement 
of other Latin American groups with access to cocaine 
sources. Some Dutch, British, Italian and Spanish OCGs 
are important brokers for cocaine trafficking to the EU 
and work directly with suppliers based in South America. 
British OCGs supply the large United Kingdom market with 
cocaine sourced from the Netherlands and Spain where 
they meet brokers capable of facilitating bulk importation. 
British OCGs maintain an important presence in Spain 
to facilitate their involvement in the secondary wholesale 
distribution of cocaine to the United Kingdom and other 
western European countries. Direct importations from 
Central America into Ireland and the United Kingdom 
indicate connections between Irish and British OCGs and 
drug cartels in South and Central America.
The retail market for cocaine
As mentioned above, cocaine powder is generally 
used recreationally, and most people use it relatively 
infrequently. On the other hand, most crack cocaine users 
are problematic users who may use crack alongside other 
drugs such as heroin. The retail markets for these drugs 
are therefore likely to be rather different. Crack cocaine 
use is less prevalent than cocaine powder use so more 
information is available about the retail market for powder.
Cocaine use in a recreational setting will often involve 
sharing of supplies, so not everyone who uses cocaine 
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will buy it. In fact, an online survey of drug users in 
six European countries (the Czech Republic, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and England and Wales) 
found that about three-quarters of respondents bought 
cocaine at least occasionally (about half of these said they 
sometimes bought it and sometimes shared or were given 
it). Respondents were also asked about where they bought 
cocaine, and the most common responses were at the 
seller’s home, at someone else’s home and on the street or 
in a park. In Italy and Sweden only, some respondents said 
they bought cocaine at school, college or university (Frijn 
and van Laar, 2013). Only in Sweden did anyone mention 
obtaining cocaine via the internet, and then it was only 
2 % of respondents. The Global Drug Survey (Winstock, 
2015), another online survey that also specifically targets 
drug users, found that the small sample of respondents 
from Sweden were the most likely to report having bought 
drugs online using the dark net. It also found that cocaine 
was mentioned as one of the substances being purchased 
through dark net markets. Nevertheless, it seems that most 
users still buy their cocaine from dealers.
As with other substances, retail markets evolve in response 
to technological developments and law enforcement. 
This is illustrated by developments in France, where, as 
a reaction to enhanced law enforcement in some areas 
where structured drug retailing organisations were 
operating ‘points of sale’, retail cocaine and crack sales now 
increasingly tend to take place ‘by appointment’ in different 
and constantly changing locations agreed by mobile phone 
(Cadet-Taïrou et al., 2015).
Trends for cocaine-related offences show an increase from 
2006 to 2008/9 but have since decreased. Supply offences 
increased at the start of the period and then decreased 
only slowly until 2014; use or possession offences also 
increased until 2009, after which they declined more 
rapidly. About 30 % of cocaine drug law offences are supply 
related.
The reported retail price of cocaine varies considerably 
between countries in Europe, ranging from EUR 46 to 
EUR 91 per gram with an interquartile range of EUR 52–72 
in 2014 (or most recent year available). Purity is similarly 
variable but is generally 64 % or less (Table 5.1). Not all 
countries are able to provide price and purity data every 
year so when considering trends the data presented come 
from a smaller group of countries who consistently provide 
data. These data show that the average purity of cocaine 
powder has been increasing from a low of 34 % in 2009, 
although now appears to have stabilised at about 40 % (see 
Figure 5.7) (EMCDDA, 2015a). It has been suggested that 
the low point in purity in 2009, which occurred at the same 
time as a dip in the purity of ecstasy in many countries, may 
have fuelled the increased interest in new psychoactive 
substances (NPS). In the United Kingdom, it is reported 
to have led to the development of a two-tier market in 
cocaine, with higher-quality cocaine being available at 
a premium, something that seems to have continued 
(ACMD, 2015a). In France, a second market has also been 
observed, with lower quantities sold at more affordable 
prices (France: Reitox, 2014). While the decrease in purity 
might be seen as indicative of a reduction in availability, 
the reported price has remained relatively stable. This, 
together with the decline in reported cocaine use in several 
countries, suggests that people may have turned away from 
using the drug. It remains to be seen whether or not the 
recent upturn in purity alongside the increased cultivation 
being reported in Colombia leads to a resurgence in use. 
In a telephone survey of young people aged 15–24 across 
Europe carried out in 2014, 25 % of those interviewed 
said that it would be fairly or very easy to obtain cocaine 
within 24 hours, a slight increase from 22 % in the 2011 
survey and a similar proportion to that for new psychoactive 
substances and ecstasy (TNS Political & Social, 2014).
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FIGURE 5.7
Trends in cocaine purity and retail price in the EU, 2010–14
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values shown are the interquartile range (IQR) of the country average values, with high and low values showing the range.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.  
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Action points
Monitoring the dynamics of the European cocaine market
1.  Monitoring of cocaine use in Europe needs to be configured to be more sensitive in 
order to detect early signals of changing patterns of use, diffusion to new countries or 
increased levels of harm, especially if availability increases.
2.  There is a need to improve the collection of drug supply data, including data on 
seizures, purity, prices and secondary extraction sites, to enhance the knowledge of the 
operation of the cocaine supply chain. This will require greater cooperation at Member 
State level to facilitate access to data for strategic purposes.
Better understanding of cocaine production and export
3.  Strategic partnerships in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the areas of both law 
enforcement and general drug information, should be further strengthened, taking 
advantage of existing resources such as EU Member State liaison officers in the region.
4.  Chemical profiling of cocaine seizures is valuable for both strategic and operational 
purposes at all market levels and needs to be supported.
Tackling trafficking routes and methods
5.  Efforts to inhibit maritime transportation of cocaine should remain a high priority; in 
particular, action at major container ports in northern and southern Europe should 
include:
 •  providing support for innovation in control and profiling methods;
 •  development of new approaches to improve port security, especially identifying and 
tackling the corruption of officials and port employees;
 •  sharing good practice and provision of training.
6.  Improve and share risk analysis and measures for intercepting internationally shipped 
parcels, exploring the potential of technology for this purpose.
7.  Increase knowledge exchange on concealment methods to support interdiction efforts 
on both sides of the Atlantic.
8.  Explore the potential of prevention programmes aimed at tackling courier recruitment in 
affected countries.
Focusing on organised crime; closing the information gaps
9.  Given the emerging evidence of the interaction between cocaine and heroin trafficking, 
greater cooperation, information and intelligence exchange between specialised law 
enforcement teams focusing on criminal groups trafficking these different types of 
drugs should be facilitated to ensure there are no gaps in the strategic analysis and 
consequent law enforcement responses.
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Key issues
The European market for synthetic stimulants
The market for stimulant drugs is dynamic and complex, with interactions found between 
the main synthetic stimulants, amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA, as well as 
with the market for cocaine and some new psychoactive substances (NPS), particularly the 
synthetic cathinones. Availability, price and perceived quality influence consumer choices, 
with these drugs appealing to both recreational and chronic and marginalised drug users. 
The market for these drugs is estimated to be at least EUR 1.8 billion per year (range 
EUR 1.2 to 2.5 billion) in the case of amphetamines and EUR 0.67 billion (range EUR 0.61 
to 0.72 billion) for ecstasy.
Problems associated with use
The availability of high-dose products constitutes an emerging threat and a challenge for 
public health and safety. There are growing concerns about high-dose MDMA products and 
the increased use of methamphetamine, and changes in routes of administration, such as 
injecting and smoking. Stimulant drugs are also becoming more important in the chronic 
drug problem in some countries, and have displaced opioids in some locations while being 
associated with higher rates of both drug and sexual risk behaviours. A negative impact 
on public safety may also arise from drugged driving and elevated levels of aggressive and 
even violent behaviour.
Production areas
The Netherlands and Belgium are the most important areas for MDMA and amphetamine 
production in Europe, although amphetamine production also takes place in Poland, 
the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Germany. Methamphetamine production in the EU has 
traditionally been limited to central European countries, principally the Czech Republic. 
However, small-scale production also occurs in countries bordering the Czech Republic, 
and some recent evidence suggests significant production capacity exists in the 
Netherlands.
CHAPTER 6
Amphetamine, methamphetamine and 
MDMA
116
EU Drug Markets Report: In-depth Analysis
Changing business models
Production business models are becoming more sophisticated, as is evident in the 
sourcing and innovation in precursors; the use of a decentralised, on-demand model and 
customised equipment; automated production; and the increased scale of production 
batches. Increasing diversity in synthetic drug production methods may increase the risk 
of consumers being exposed to harmful impurities or by-products or other more harmful 
substances. Aggressive marketing and branding is becoming more apparent in the ecstasy 
market. An increasing variety of tablets with novel shapes, colours and logos have been 
introduced, suggesting competition between suppliers and more active targeting of 
specific groups of users.
Production and precursors
Precursor chemicals are essential for the production of synthetic drugs. A large number 
of different routes and chemicals are now used, with new methods emerging in response 
to control measures, increasing the resilience of the market. This makes precursor control 
more challenging and, overall, purity and availability data support the assertion that 
precursors and essential chemicals are relatively accessible to producers. Ephedrine/
pseudoephedrine are precursors for methamphetamine that can be extracted from 
over-the-counter medicines or diverted in bulk from legitimate sources. National restrictions 
on the purchasing of these products have been imposed in some countries; however, these 
measures are not consistent across the EU.
Environmental impact
The disposal of hazardous and toxic waste from synthetic drug production poses 
substantial health risks and causes environmental damage, and the costs associated with 
the decontamination of dumping sites can be considerable. This is becoming more of an 
issue as a result of the diversification and increasing capacity of production methods as 
well as diffusion to previously unaffected countries.
Trafficking
Most synthetic drugs consumed in the EU are produced in the region, resulting in 
considerable intra-European trafficking. Some synthetic drugs produced in the EU are also 
exported to other regions, such as the Americas and Australia. The EU is also an important 
transit zone for methamphetamine produced in West Africa and Iran and occasionally 
elsewhere, with the potential threat that drugs in transit are diverted to European markets.
OCGs exploit opportunities provided by the global infrastructure that supports public 
transportation and commercial trade. Postal and parcel courier services are especially 
relevant to synthetic drug trafficking, as is the on-going development of online retail markets.
Organised crime and changing business models
Well-established Dutch, Belgian, German and British OCGs are particularly important 
for both MDMA and amphetamine trafficking for large consumer markets in western 
Europe. OMCGs remain important for synthetic drug trafficking and distribution to 
Nordic countries. In addition, OCGs operating from the Baltic Sea area, particularly from 
Lithuania and Poland, are important for the production and supply of amphetamine and 
methamphetamine in the Nordic countries.
OCGs trafficking synthetic drugs are often involved with the supply of other substances, 
and it is important to recognise the crossover with other drugs. For example, groups 
supplying MDMA and amphetamine produced in the Netherlands and Belgium are involved 
in the cannabis and cocaine market, while Vietnamese OCGs in the Czech Republic 
diversified from producing cannabis to methamphetamine production.
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Introduction
Amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA 
(methylenedioxymethamphetamine, often known as 
‘ecstasy’) are the most popular synthetic drugs in a 
crowded stimulant market in Europe, competing with 
cocaine and a range of new psychoactive substances 
(NPS). Although they have their own distinct patterns of 
use and profiles of users, they share a common chemistry, 
with the phenethylamine scaffold at their core (see 
Figure 6.1). The market is dominated by large producers 
with the ability to access the precursor chemicals, 
specialist equipment and, above all, the technical 
expertise needed to make these drugs. The market in 
these drugs is complex and volatile, with the availability 
of precursor chemicals being a key factor. In recent 
years, the gap between the supply and demand for these 
controlled synthetic stimulants created the opportunity 
for some new drugs, such as mephedrone and MDPV 
(methylenedioxypyrovalerone), to become established in 
some countries.
There are many similarities and overlaps with amphetamine 
and methamphetamine so they are sometimes grouped 
together as ‘amphetamines’ and therefore can be difficult to 
differentiate in some datasets. MDMA is normally reported 
separately from these. All three drugs can be produced 
relatively simply and exist in two chemical forms: base 
and salt. The pure bases are clear, colourless, volatile oils, 
insoluble in water, which can be readily converted into 
the most common salt forms: amphetamine sulphate, 
methamphetamine hydrochloride and MDMA hydrochloride.
Amphetamine and MDMA are much more common in 
Europe than methamphetamine, which is more popular in 
other regions of the world, although there are signs that 
methamphetamine use is gradually increasing. Europe is 
a producing region for these three drugs for the domestic 
market, but also for export of MDMA and methamphetamine; 
Europe also acts as a transit point for global trafficking, 
particularly of methamphetamine made outside Europe.
FIGURE 6.1
Synthetic drugs with phenethylamine at their core
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’ represents a carbon bonded to three hydrogen atoms  
(a methyl group).
Source: EMCDDA.
Common forms
Amphetamine sulphate is a white or off-white powder 
that is soluble in water. Illicit products mostly consist 
of powders, usually mixed with other ingredients, such 
as lactose, dextrose or caffeine, but tablets containing 
amphetamine are also available and may carry logos 
similar to those seen on ‘ecstasy’ tablets. Captagon 
tablets containing amphetamine are produced and 
consumed in large numbers in south-eastern Europe. 
Amphetamine sulphate may be ingested, snorted 
and, less commonly, injected. Unlike the hydrochloride 
salt of methamphetamine, amphetamine sulphate is 
insufficiently volatile to be smoked.
Methamphetamine hydrochloride is a crystalline solid 
that is soluble in water. In illicit methamphetamine 
powder, as is the case of amphetamine sulphate, 
finely ground crystals are usually mixed with 
other ingredients, such as lactose, dextrose or 
caffeine. Large white or translucent crystals of 
methamphetamine hydrochloride suitable for 
smoking, known as ‘ice’ or ‘crystal meth’, can be 
produced from a starting material that has a high 
concentration of methamphetamine (base or salt). 
Methamphetamine hydrochloride may also be found 
as an ingredient of tablets sold as ecstasy or yaba in 
some regions of South-East Asia.
MDMA hydrochloride is a crystalline solid, soluble in 
water. Until recently, it was normally found in ecstasy 
tablets for oral consumption. Nowadays, as well as 
the tablet form, it is also found in crystal or crystalline 
powder form, also for taking orally.
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TABLE 6.1
Consumption (1) 
Age group
(years)
Lifetime
Last year
15–64
15–34
12.0
5.9
3.6 (0.1–10.3)
4.7 (0.2–9.7)
15–64
15–34
1.6
1.3
0.5 (0.0–1.3)
1.0 (0.1–2.9)
Estimated number
of users (million)
% of EU population
(range between countries)
Best estimate (low–high)
Value (billion EUR)
1.8 (1.2–2.5)
Estimated market
size (2013)
Quantity (metric tonnes)
76 (52–102)
Trend not
available
Range 
(IQR) (4)
1–49
(12–27)
Mean purity
(2014)  
% in EU % in EU
9–73
(28–67)
Trend not
available
EUR/gram EUR/gram
Range 
(IQR) (4)
7–37
(10–25)
Mean retail price
(2014) 
7–116
(15–66)
Amphetamine Methamphetamine
All admissions
Number (% of admissions for all drugs)
First admissions
9 000 (2 %)
4 500 (3 %)
23 000 (5 %)
9 000 (5 %)
Drug treatment (2) 
(2014)
Trends
combined
Amphetamine Methamphetamine
EU  
EU plus Norway and Turkey
EU
EU plus Norway and Turkey
7.4
0.5
36 000 8 000
Seizures (3) 
Quantity 
Number(2014)
7.1
0.8
42 000 11 000
Number
QuantityTrends Trends
(tonnes) (tonnes)
AMPHETAMINES IN EUROPE AT A GLANCE
possession for use 
(2014)
60 000 (7 %)
79 000 (7 %)
19 000 (8 %)
Trends
Amphetamine
possession for use 1 800 (0.2 %)
4 900 (0.4 %)
2 900 (1.2 %)
Methamphetamine
Notes:
(1)  EU estimates are computed from national estimates weighted by the population of the relevant age group in each country. They are based on surveys conducted 
between 2004 and 2014/15 and therefore do not refer to a single year.
(2)  Drug users entering treatment for amphetamine or methamphetamine problems. Units coverage may vary across countries. Trend data are given for  
amphetamine and methamphetamine combined as separated data are only available for the last 2 years.
(3)  The 2014 figures should be considered as estimates; where not available, most recent data were used in place of 2014 data, except for the number of seizures 
for the Netherlands, France and Poland where no recent data is available so they are not included.
(4)  IQR: interquartile range, or range of the middle half of the reported data.
Data presented are for the EU unless stated otherwise. All trend lines shown in this table cover a 5-year period, 2010–14. All trends reflect absolute numbers except for 
trends on price and on potency which reflect averages of mean values. In the case of treatment, price and purity, trends are based only on data from those EU countries 
that have consistently submitted data since 2010.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.
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Consumption (1) 
Age group
(years)
Lifetime
Last year
15–64
15–34
13.0
7.8
3.9 (0.4–9.2)
  6.2 (0.6–12.8)
15–64
15–34
2.5
2.1
0.8 (0.2–2.4)
  1.7 (0.3–5.5)
Estimated number
of users (million)
% of EU population
(range between countries)
Best estimate (low–high)
Value (billion EUR)
0.67 (0.61–0.72)
Estimated market
size (2013)
Quantity (million tonnes)
87 (79–94)
EUR/tablet
Range 
(IQR) (4)
Mean retail price
(2014) 
3–16
(5–9)
Range 
(IQR) (4)
Mean purity
(2014)  
mg/tablet in EU
18–131
(68–95)
All admissions
Number (% of admissions for all drugs)
First admissions
1 200 (0.3 %)
700 (0.4 %)
Drug treatment (2) 
(2014)
Trends
possession for use (2014) 13 000 (1 %)
18 000 (2 %)
5 000 (2 %)
Trends
MDMA IN EUROPE AT A GLANCE
EU  
EU plus Norway and Turkey
EU
EU plus Norway and Turkey
6.1
17 000
Seizures (3) 
(2014)
9.8
21 000
Number
Quantity Trends
(tonnes)
Notes:
(1)  European estimates are computed from national estimates weighted by the population of the relevant age group in each country. They are based on surveys 
conducted between 2004 and 2014/15 and therefore do not refer to a single year.
(2)  Drug users entering treatment for MDMA problems. Units coverage may vary across countries.
(3)  The 2014 figures should be considered as estimates; where not available, most recent data were used in place of 2014 data, except for the number of seizures 
for the Netherlands, France and Poland where no recent data is available so they are not included. An additional 220 kg of ecstasy was seized in the EU, in 2014.
(4)  IQR: interquartile range, or range of the middle half of the reported data.
Data presented are for the EU unless stated otherwise. All trend lines shown in this table cover a 5-year period, 2010–14. All trends reflect absolute numbers except for 
trends on price and on potency which reflect averages of mean values. In the case of treatment, price and purity, trends are based only on data from those EU countries 
that have consistently submitted data since 2010.
Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.
120
EU Drug Markets Report: In-depth Analysis
In the north of Europe, amphetamine and 
methamphetamine are the stimulants of choice, whereas 
cocaine dominates in the south, and in some other 
countries, such as the United Kingdom. Methamphetamine 
use, which was once restricted to the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, has been slowly spreading in recent 
times to neighbouring countries. This is an important 
and concerning development because some modes of 
methamphetamine use, such as injection, or the smoking 
of the crystalline form, present greater risks in terms of 
public health and societal harm. Pockets of high-risk 
methamphetamine use among some subpopulations, 
e.g. men who have sex with men, is also threatening the 
progress made in Europe in tackling the spread of HIV 
(human immunodeficiency virus) and infectious diseases. 
While most users of amphetamine and methamphetamine 
take the drug only occasionally and experience few, if any, 
problems, a proportion may develop problematic patterns 
of use. Adverse health effects that may be associated with 
use of amphetamines include cardiovascular, pulmonary, 
neurological and mental health problems, and injection 
is associated with the risk of infectious disease. Although 
deaths associated with stimulant use can be difficult to 
identify, a few amphetamine-related deaths are recorded 
annually. In contrast, it is much less common for MDMA 
users to develop a pattern of problematic use.
GLOBAL OVERVIEW – AMPHETAMINES AND MDMA/ECSTASY
Estimated users Estimated users
19 m
MDMA (Ecstasy)Amphetamines
Main production regions
Proportion of 
global seizures
Proportion of 
global seizures
MDMAAmphetamine and 
methamphetamine
Methamphetamine only
EU 1.6 m
EU 2.5 m
Methamphetamine
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
34.0
68.0
109.0
115.0
88.0
MDMA
33.0
20.0
31.0
22.0
33.0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Europe
Europe
Global
Global
Amphetamine
Quantities seized
(tonnes or million tablets of MDMA)
5.0 4.7 3.6 4.9 4.2
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Europe
Global
Amphetamines
USA 26 %
China 22 %
Mexico 13 %
10 %
Australia 6 %
MDMA
Turkey 29 %
USA 21 %
Indonesia 8 %
Australia 8 %
Ireland 5 %
Global Global 
 34 m
Past year,
aged 15–64
Past year,
aged 15–64
Note: The estimates presented are up to 2013; more recent EU figures are available but have not been used for the purposes of comparability. For the most  
up-to-date European data, please refer to Table 6.1.
Source: UNODC, World Drug Reports. EMCDDA, 2015a.
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Global overview
Synthetic drugs are produced mainly in North America, 
Asia, Europe and Oceania but also in other regions. MDMA 
is produced mainly in Europe and methamphetamine in the 
United States of America; however, as with amphetamine, 
it is difficult to assess the relative volumes produced with 
any certainty. According to the US Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the MDMA seized in the United States 
is primarily manufactured in clandestine laboratories in 
Europe, predominantly the Netherlands and Belgium, 
but another significant source is Canada (USDEA, 2013). 
There have been occasional seizures of methamphetamine 
laboratories in West Africa, which may be significant from a 
European perspective (UNODC, 2013e).
In global terms, much more methamphetamine is seized 
annually than amphetamine, while ecstasy (24) is seized 
in even smaller quantities (UNODC, 2015a). In contrast, 
in Europe sizeable amounts of amphetamine and 
MDMA are seized, but only relatively small accounts of 
methamphetamine. 
The latest UNODC estimates suggest that there 
were between 14 million and 54 million users of 
amphetamines (25) worldwide in 2013, with prevalence of 
use in Oceania, Central America and North being higher 
than the global average (UNODC, 2015a). Recent estimates 
of prevalence for Africa and Asia are not generally available, 
but experts from these countries consider that the use 
of amphetamines is increasing (UNODC, 2014b) and 
Nigeria reported in 2012 that lifetime prevalence of use 
for amphetamine and methamphetamine was higher than 
most European countries (UNODC, 2014e).
The most recent estimate suggests that there were about 
18.8 million users of ecstasy worldwide in 2013, although 
data on use are sparse in many countries. The main MDMA 
markets appear to be Europe, North America and Oceania. 
However, recent seizure data and expert perceptions 
suggest that a regional shift may be occurring, with markets 
emerging in South-East Asia (UNODC, 2015a). Furthermore, 
South America is an emerging market for MDMA; seizures 
more than tripled in the period 2008–12 and there are 
reports of European OCGs exchanging MDMA for cocaine in 
Brazil (UNODC, 2014b; EMCDDA, 2016b).
(24) The term ‘ecstasy’ includes MDA (methylenedioxyamphetamine), MDMA 
and other chemically related substances. It is normally used as a generic 
term for these substances when the specific molecule is not known. 
(25) When the UNODC report refers to amphetamines in the plural, it means 
amphetamine, methamphetamine and related substances such as 
fenethylline, methylphenidate, cathinone, etc., but not ecstasy or its 
relatives. The two groups together — amphetamines and the ecstasy 
family — are sometimes referred to as amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS).
Consumer market in Europe
As noted above, amphetamine, methamphetamine and 
MDMA are part of a wider market for stimulant drugs, in 
which there is variation in the ‘stimulant of choice’ between 
countries and user groups. In Europe, amphetamine 
and MDMA are used much more extensively than 
methamphetamine, but there is also evidence of polydrug 
use and shifts in established patterns. For example, 
amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA may be 
substituted for each other or replaced by other stimulants 
such as cocaine or new psychoactive substances, 
in particular synthetic cathinones, which are closely 
chemically related to amphetamines.
There are two main groups of amphetamine and 
methamphetamine users: those who are considered casual 
users, who use the drug in a recreational environment 
or to improve performance; and those who would be 
considered high-risk users, who may inject or smoke the 
drug and may eventually seek treatment. The most recent 
estimates indicate that about 12 million Europeans have 
tried amphetamines at some point in their lifetime, and 
an estimated 1.3 million 15- to 34-year-olds have used 
the drug at least once in the last year. Prevalence rates for 
last-year use in most countries in Europe have remained 
fairly stable since about 2000. Exceptions are Spain and 
the United Kingdom, where there has been a statistically 
significant decrease in prevalence since 2000 (EMCDDA, 
2015a).
Patterns of use vary between countries, although in general 
most recreational users use infrequently. Recreational use 
is mainly in a social context; an online study of drug users 
in six EU countries found that in the Czech Republic and 
Sweden users most often consumed amphetamines in 
their own home, whereas in Bulgaria, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom (England and Wales) use was 
most commonly at a music concert or festival or other 
place of entertainment (Frijns and van Laar, 2013).
Problems relating to long-term, chronic and injecting 
amphetamine use have historically mostly been observed 
in northern European countries. In contrast, long-term 
methamphetamine problems have been most apparent in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the Czech Republic, 
a marked increase in the estimated number of people 
with problem or high-risk use of amphetamines, mainly 
by injection, was observed between 2007 to 2013 (from 
around 20 000 to over 34 000) (Czech Republic: Reitox, 
2015). Very few other countries have identified significant 
numbers of problem methamphetamine users, although a 
recent trend of injecting use of methamphetamine among 
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small groups of men who have sex with men in large cities 
such as London and Paris has also been noted (EMCDDA, 
2014b).
Consumers may have difficulty in distinguishing between 
amphetamine and methamphetamine. There is some 
evidence from seizures to suggest that there may be 
increasing amounts of methamphetamine on the retail 
market in some Nordic countries, resulting in users 
‘switching’ from amphetamine, perhaps unwittingly, to 
methamphetamine. For example, whilst methamphetamine 
seizure figures clearly indicate the drug’s presence in the 
market in Norway, there are still very few, if any, indications 
that it is particularly sought after. It appears that at present 
the two drugs are sold interchangeably and users do not 
necessarily know what they are getting (Norway: Reitox, 
2015).
Ecstasy use has historically been linked to the electronic 
dance music scene, and in most countries its use is 
concentrated among young adults, particularly young males. 
A web survey of drug users in six European countries found 
that almost half (46 %) of users said that they usually used 
ecstasy at a music concert or festival and one-third (34 %) 
said they used it at another place of entertainment (Frijns 
and van Laar, 2013). Use is generally relatively infrequent; 
this same survey found that only 5 % of respondents 
reported using ecstasy once a week or more.
The diversification of the drug markets described earlier in 
this report and in Chapter 7 also extends to amphetamines. 
Although most NPS appear to be quite transient, it is 
possible that some may have effects that meet particular 
user needs and they may then become established on 
the market, as may be the case for 4-fluoroamphetamine 
(4-FA), which has reportedly taken a share of the 
amphetamine and MDMA market in the Netherlands 
(Linsen et al., 2015; see Case study 12, Chapter 7).
Market size estimates
The estimated annual value of the retail market for 
amphetamines in the EU is at least EUR 1.8 billion, with 
a range of EUR 1.2–2.5 billion, while the estimate for ecstasy 
is at least EUR 0.67 billion (range EUR 0.61–0.72 billion). 
Together they make up about one-tenth of the total illicit 
market in drugs. Our estimates of amounts used suggest 
that in 2013 about 76 tonnes of amphetamines (likely range 
52 to 102 tonnes) and 87 million tablets (79 to 94 million 
tablets) of ecstasy were consumed.
In reaching these estimates we have used information 
on numbers of users from the general population surveys 
conducted in most countries but, recognising that some 
groups of drug users are unlikely to be represented in these 
surveys, we have supplemented these with estimates of 
the use of amphetamines by problem users. However, this 
almost certainly underestimates problem use. There are a 
number of other limitations to these estimates (see box on 
page 28) and further details of the estimation methods are 
given in the technical report published alongside this report 
(EMCDDA, 2016a).
Production and precursors
Synthetic drugs can be produced using a number of 
different production techniques, involving a range of 
different chemical precursor substances. The precursors 
needed to make amphetamine and methamphetamine 
overlap significantly, but are distinct from the precursors 
used to make MDMA. In Europe, and indeed globally, 
amphetamine is most frequently synthesised from benzyl 
methyl ketone (BMK) (26). To make methamphetamine, 
although BMK may also be used, ephedrine and 
pseudoephedrine are more common. MDMA is primarily 
produced from piperonyl methyl ketone (PMK), which can 
also be produced from safrole (or oils rich in safrole) and 
piperonal (see Figure 6.2).
Several methods can be used to produce each drug, 
and these may vary depending on precursor availability. 
Precursors are evidently a precious commodity; the fact 
that no excess precursors are seized during raids on 
illicit production sites suggests that the exact volumes of 
precursors required are provided ‘on demand’ for each 
production batch (EMCDDA, 2016b). All methods also 
involve the use of additional chemicals and processes 
that are inherently dangerous. Furthermore, the waste 
generated by the production process is often disposed 
of unsafely, causing environmental harm (see box 
‘Environmental impact’) and risk to public health and safety. 
For example, in August 2015, four children were taken to 
hospital with chemical burns after cycling through a pool of 
liquid caustic waste from a synthetic drug production site 
in Belgium (media report (27) and Belgian Federal Police, 
personal communication).
(26) BMK is also known as also known as 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), or 
phenylacetone, and PMK is also known as also known as 3,4-methylene-
dioxyphenyl-2-propanone (MDP-2-P).
(27) http://www.demorgen.be/binnenland/drugslabo-gedumpt-in-lim-
burgs-bos-4-fietsende-kinderen-zwaargewond-a2419039/
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Environmental impact
Hazardous waste is generated when synthetic drugs 
are produced, which takes place on a fairly large scale 
in the EU, particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The chemicals used include solvents (acetone, ether, 
methanol, etc.), precursors and a range of other 
substances such as formamide, methylamine, acids, 
etc. It is estimated that production of 1 kg of MDMA 
by reductive amination results in 6–10 kg of toxic 
waste while the manufacture of 1 kg of amphetamine 
by Leuckart synthesis produces 20–30 kg of waste. 
To illustrate the scale of the phenomenon in Europe, 
it can be very roughly calculated that the production 
of the 6.7 tonnes of amphetamine reported seized in 
the EU in 2013 would have generated between 134 
and 201 tonnes of toxic waste. This waste is disposed 
of in environmentally harmful ways, such as poured 
down the sink or toilet, although this is a risky option. 
Containers of the waste product may be dumped in 
a forest or field, or left in an abandoned apartment, 
or loaded in stolen vehicles, especially vans and lorry 
trailers (that are sometimes set on fire), as well as 
buried underground. Alternative elaborate methods 
include the use of a specially fitted van equipped with 
barrels, pumps and a hose through which the waste is 
drained on the road as the vehicle is moving (making 
detection difficult). There are also reports of synthetic 
drugs production waste being mixed with industrial 
waste and disposed of at sea. In the Netherlands, 
where 157 dump sites were found by the authorities in 
2014, the average quantity of waste dumped at each 
site in 2013 was 800 kg (see Figure 6.3).
Production can be undertaken in facilities ranging in 
size from small-scale ‘kitchen labs’ to sophisticated 
industrial-scale operations. As well as being flexible in 
the use of different precursors and production methods, 
laboratories can be set up quickly to fulfil a specific order 
and dismantled rapidly to avoid detection and transported 
easily to an alternative location. This variability and 
flexibility challenges efforts to reduce production 
(Figure 6.4).
A now well-established feature of synthetic drug production 
that demonstrates the innovation and ingenuity of the 
producers is the production of internationally controlled 
precursors using so-called ‘pre-precursor’ chemicals 
that are not subject to such strict controls. This situation 
parallels the cat-and-mouse game observed in the NPS 
field (see Chapter 7), and several examples are given 
below.
FIGURE 6.2
The synthetic drugs production process 
CHEMICAL SYNTHESIS
Synthetic drug production involves a chemical reaction using drug precursors, 
which can be made from pre-precursors. Other chemicals are needed and 
vary depending on the production process.
Pre-precursors
APAAN Chloroephedrine Safrole
Precursors
BMK Pseudoephedrine PMK
Other chemicals
Amphetamine Methamphetamine MDMA
Formamide Iodine
Red phosphorus
Methylamine
PURIFICATION
CRYSTALLISATION
Acids are used to convert the base oil to a solid salt form. Sulphuric acid is used 
to obtain amphetamine sulphate and hydrochloric acid is used to obtain 
methamphetamine hydrochloride and MDMA hydrochloride.
Amphetamine sulphate 
 
H
2SO
4
Methamphetamine hydrochloride  
MDMA hydrochloride 
HCl
FINISHING
as powder or crystals, or pressing as tablets.
e nishing stages include ltering, drying, cutting, processing and packaging
Microcrystalline
celluloseLactose
Amphetamine Methamphetamine MDMA
SEPARATION
After the chemical synthesis is complete, the drug is present in a reaction mixture, 
e crude base oil is then puried by distillation, or some other method.
and sodium hydroxide is added to separate the drug base, in the form of a crude oil.
Crude base oil
NaOH
Note: This illustration is intended to provide an indicative schematic overview 
of selected stages of a production process. It must be noted that alternative 
methods, chemicals and procedures may be used.
Source: EMCDDA.
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The extent and nature of production in 
Europe
It is currently believed that the amphetamine, 
methamphetamine and MDMA consumed in the EU is 
almost exclusively produced in the EU (UNODC, 2015a). 
While Europe is a main global production centre of MDMA, 
the amphetamine and methamphetamine manufactured 
in Europe are primarily for domestic use, although some is 
exported, principally to the Middle East, the Far East and 
Australia. Europe also seems to be an important transit hub 
for methamphetamine being trafficked from Africa and Iran, 
again to the Far East and Australia.
A large proportion of EU Member States note only very 
limited or no production of synthetic drugs on their 
territories. Data available indicate that in Europe MDMA 
production is centred around the Netherlands and Belgium 
and, although large-scale amphetamine production also 
takes place in these countries, amphetamine is also made 
in Poland, the Baltic states, Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, 
Germany and Turkey (see Figure 6.5). 
Methamphetamine production is concentrated in central 
Europe, particularly the Czech Republic, the Baltic states and 
occasionally the Netherlands; Bulgaria is also reporting an 
increase in the number of laboratories detected. Two recent 
large seizures of synthetic drugs trafficked from Europe to 
Australia indicate that significant export capacity exists. 
One case resulted in the seizure of more than 800 kg of 
methamphetamine and almost 2 tonnes of MDMA, while in 
the other over 100 kg of MDMA was seized (see box below).
Production methods depend considerably on the 
availability of precursors and the know-how of the 
producers. According to data reported to Europol, in 
2013–14 BMK was the precursor used in 77 % (48 out 
of 62 cases) of amphetamine production sites where 
the synthetic route was known, of which 32 were in the 
Netherlands and eight were in Poland.
The Czech Republic accounts for most of the 
methamphetamine production laboratories in Europe 
where ephedrine or pseudoephedrine is the precursor 
used, normally extracted from medicines. Although there 
is no clear EU-wide trend to indicate a notable spread of 
methamphetamine production, some Member States, 
including Germany and Austria, are experiencing an 
increase in the number of seizures, the quantities seized 
and the number of small-scale ‘kitchen’ methamphetamine 
laboratories. Although the scale and production potential 
is not routinely reported, between 2009 and 2013 
a significant number of laboratories manufacturing 
methamphetamine were dismantled in the EU, most 
notably in the Czech Republic (1 483), Germany (61) 
and Austria (21) (UNODC, 2014b, 2015). It is also worth 
noting that in Bulgaria, 53 small-scale production facilities 
were detected between 2011 and 2013, with 35 of these 
dismantled in 2013. The synthetic route was reported for 
17 of the laboratories found in 2013–14: 14 were based on 
ephedrine/pseudoephedrine and three used BMK.
FIGURE 6.3
Dump sites of waste from synthetic drugs 
production in the Netherlands and Belgium, 
2013–14
Belgium
France
Netherlands
Germany
Bonn
Cologne
Düsseldorf
Arnhem
Eindhoven
Brussels
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Antwerp
Breda
Tilburg
Rotterdam
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Amsterdam
Groningen
Note: Data reported to Europol by national authorities using the ERISSP 
(European Reporting Instrument on Sites related to Synthetic Production) tool.
Source: Europol.
Europe as a global supplier of synthetic 
drugs
In March 2013, the Australian Federal Police arrested 
a 32-year-old woman in Melbourne and a 38-year-
old man in Sydney, seizing 117 kg of MDMA base 
and dismantling an international organised crime 
syndicate spanning Australia, the United Kingdom, 
Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. The complex 
18-month investigation resulted in three arrests 
in Australia and one in the United Kingdom. It was 
estimated that the amount of seized MDMA base was 
sufficient to manufacture up to 1.37 million ecstasy 
tablets with a potential street value of up to EUR 41 
million (AUD 52 million).
Source: http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/drug-crime/mdma
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FIGURE 6.4
Amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA 
production sites in the EU, 2013–15
Amphetamine
Methamphetamine
MDMA
Note: Data reported to Europol by national authorities using the ERISSP tool.
Source: Europol.
Some of the methamphetamine produced in the 
Czech Republic is in the form of crystals of high-purity 
methamphetamine (‘crystal meth’). The quantities 
produced have typically been low, the output of ‘kitchen-
type’ laboratories; however, although there has been a 
gradual decrease in the number of laboratories detected, 
there has been a noticeable trend towards increasing 
production volumes within a single production cycle of the 
laboratories being dismantled (Czech Republic: Reitox, 
2015). This is achieved by connecting several smaller 
reaction vessels in parallel to increase production output. 
The use of novel uncontrolled precursors is another 
innovation.
In the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, the 
professionalism of production facilities is continuously 
improving. For example, production volumes have been 
rising and, in some MDMA production sites, custom-built 
reaction vessels with a capacity of 750 litres have been 
found (EMCDDA, 2016b). Some facilities feature a level 
of automation that allows the producer to leave the site 
FIGURE 6.5
The production of MDMA tablets
Two steel reaction vessels found at a 
clandestine MDMA production facility 
dismantled in Someren, the Netherlands, 
in 2015.
Bulk freshly produced MDMA crystals 
seized in the Netherlands in 2015.
A professional tableting site dismantled in 
Dronten, the Netherlands, in 2014 (note 
tableting machine on left-hand side of 
picture).
Drying closet for coloured tableting 
powders containing MDMA, pigments and 
excipients seized in Dronten in 2014.
Yellow MDMA tableting powder and 
‘gold bar’ ecstasy tablet seized in the 
Netherlands in 2014.
Photos © Dutch National Police/LFO
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once the synthesis process has been initiated and to return 
only upon completion of the production cycle. Dedicated 
tableting sites are also becoming more sophisticated, with 
brightly coloured pre-mixed excipients supplied ready to be 
combined with the MDMA and pressed into tablets in high-
output industrial machines. The tablets themselves are 
now increasingly produced with novel shapes, colours and 
logos, suggesting competition among suppliers and more 
active targeting of specific groups of users. Some designs 
are even produced for individual events, for example music 
festivals (see Figure 6.6).
Certain production stages also seem to be increasingly 
spread over various locations. Several countries, including 
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and Norway, have 
reported amphetamine base oil from the Netherlands being 
converted to amphetamine sulphate on their territories, 
and this activity is associated with risks of fire, explosion, 
intoxication and waste dumping (NCA, 2015c).  
The Netherlands is one, but probably not the only, source of 
amphetamine base oil. In 2013, Estonian law enforcement 
dismantled a laboratory where amphetamine powder was 
being produced from base oil from Russia (Estonia: Reitox, 
2015). A problem with this development (and the use of 
pre-precursors) is the increased potential for the production 
of unwanted by-products and impurities resulting from the 
use of inexperienced ‘cooks’ or poor-quality chemicals, or 
from unfinished chemical reactions. This hypothesis  
is supported by analytical data pointing to greater levels  
of impurities found in MDMA tablets, obtained from  
a pill-testing programme in 2014 (EMCDDA, 2016b) 
and the forensic analysis of seized amphetamine  
(Power et al., 2014).
Dutch and Belgian criminal groups remain the most 
important producers and traffickers of synthetic drugs 
in the EU. The large-scale production of synthetic drugs 
appears to be linked to a small number of interconnected 
OCGs, which share and exchange knowledge, resources 
and expertise. Dutch and Belgian criminal organisations 
possess the most advanced production capabilities. 
Investigations have shown that prominent criminal 
groups are involved in the production of several drugs, 
typically MDMA, amphetamine and, less frequently, 
methamphetamine. Since 2000, OCGs have been active 
in the Belgian–Dutch border region, setting up synthetic 
laboratories, sometimes combined with cannabis 
cultivation (Belgium: Reitox, 2015, quoting Smet et al., 
2013). Some of the Dutch OCGs producing synthetic drugs 
have also established themselves as important suppliers 
on the online market. The methamphetamine produced by 
Dutch OCGs is mainly intended for export to Australia and 
New Zealand. MDMA is also trafficked in large quantities 
to these destinations. Furthermore, it is known that Dutch 
OCGs have provided expertise on methamphetamine 
synthesis to OCGs in India.
The involvement of Dutch OCGs is also evident in the 
production of synthetic drugs in other countries, often 
making use of the services of local criminals. For example, 
Dutch and Belgian OCGs often rely on Polish criminals, 
and/or legitimate businesses based mainly in Poland, for 
the provision of essential chemicals and pre-precursors 
for synthetic drug production. It has also been noted that 
the pre-precursor alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN) 
is often converted into BMK in Poland, because the 
chemicals needed for this conversion are easily obtained 
there. In addition, Lithuanian OCGs are suspected of 
producing methamphetamine for domestic consumption 
as well as for export to other Member States. Members of 
Lithuanian OCGs, known to be involved in the production 
and trafficking of synthetic drugs, travel on a regular basis 
to Scandinavian countries. It is suspected that they may be 
FIGURE 6.6
MDMA tablets made for specific music events
Ecstasy tablet made for the Tomorrowland electronic music 
festival (Belgium). This tablet was analysed in Switzerland in 
2015 and found to contain a dangerously high level of MDMA 
(more than 200 mg).
Photo © Pharmaceutical Control Laboratory, Office of the 
Cantonal Pharmacist, Bern, Switzerland
Ecstasy tablet made for the Amsterdam Dance Event (ADE) 
electronic music festival, also found to contain dangerously high 
levels of MDMA (2015). 
Photo © DIMS, Trimbos Institute, the Netherlands.
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involved in the conversion of amphetamine oil into the final 
product in these countries.
Precursors
Clearly, synthetic drugs cannot be produced without 
precursors; hence the restriction of access to precursors 
is critical to efforts to control illicit production. The main 
precursors are under international control and are listed in 
Table I of the 1988 United Nations Convention; however, 
the current reality is characterised by the emergence 
of novel precursors and pre-precursors that challenge 
the global control regime. Scientific investigation is the 
key to understanding these developments, and critical 
information about precursors and production methods 
comes from forensic profiling of seizures and samples from 
dismantled production sites. For example, specific markers 
have been identified that show when amphetamine has 
been made with BMK produced from APAAN (Power et al., 
2014). Such forensic methods are an extremely useful, but 
perhaps underutilised, tool for understanding changes in 
synthetic drug production.
Precursors for amphetamine and 
methamphetamine
BMK and its pre-precursors
Seizures of BMK decreased steadily from 2010 to 2013. In 
response to strict controls preventing the diversion of BMK, 
resourceful producers have, for a number of years, been 
making BMK from other substances — the so-called ‘pre-
precursors’. Despite these developments, there are recent 
indications that BMK may be re-emerging as a significant 
precursor in its own right. China reported the seizure of 
almost 5 500 litres of BMK in 2013, despite it having been 
absent from the market for some years previously, and it is 
believed that the BMK seized was destined for Spain (INCB, 
2015a). In addition, at the end of March 2015, Polish law 
enforcement authorities discovered 7 000 litres of BMK in 
Warsaw which had been shipped from China to Poland via 
Germany, with the declared destination being a company in 
the Czech Republic. In the subsequent investigation, links 
with an amphetamine production site in the Netherlands 
were established (Europol, 2015e).
BMK can be made from other chemicals, e.g. from 
phenylacetic acid (PAA) and either acetic acid or acetic 
anhydride (Krawczyk et al., 2009), and by the so-called 
‘nitropropene route’, using benzaldehyde and nitroethane 
(Krawczyk et al., 2005); and in the past large quantities of 
a white powder known as ‘BMK bisulphite adduct’, sourced 
from Russia, have been seized (Europol, 2009).
One of the most important developments in the story of 
BMK was the discovery that it can be produced from alpha-
phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN), an innovation that was 
probably driven by erratic availability of other precursors. 
Since this development was first identified in 2009, APAAN 
has become an increasingly important pre-precursor and 
is imported into Europe primarily from China (on some 
occasions misdeclared as other products or substances) 
and converted into BMK using large quantities of acids, 
often in dedicated conversion laboratories. In 2013, large 
seizures of APAAN were made in Europe, notably 36 
tonnes in the Netherlands and 5.4 tonnes in Belgium. In 
Poland, a laboratory for the conversion of APAAN to BMK 
was found and 1.4 tonnes of APAAN was seized (INCB, 
2015a). In December 2013, APAAN was scheduled as a 
precursor under European legislation, and international 
control followed in October 2014. Despite these control 
measures, APAAN continues to be seized; in March 2014, 
Bulgarian authorities seized almost 1 tonne of APAAN 
that had arrived on a truck from Turkey, misdeclared as 
‘soluble dyes’ (INCB, 2015a). Seizure data suggest that 
large quantities of APAAN were stockpiled in Europe prior 
to controls being introduced and, consequently, BMK made 
from APAAN continues to be used by OCGs for the large-
scale production of amphetamines (see Figure 6.7).
The control of APAAN, however, has prompted further 
chemical innovations in the precursor market. The finding of 
3-oxo-2-phenylbutanamide, a substance that can be readily 
converted to APAAN, in a Dutch amphetamine laboratory 
in 2013, indicates that criminal groups have managed to 
circumvent controls on APAAN. This would appear to be the 
first example of a substance used to make a synthetic drug 
FIGURE 6.7
European seizures of controlled precursors used in 
the production of amphetamine and methamphetamine 
(2005–14), and of APAAN (2010–14)
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Note: APAAN was scheduled as a precursor in the EU in December 2013 and 
at international level in October 2014.
Sources: INCB Precursors reports (controlled precursors) and European 
Commission (APAAN).
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pre-precursor. In addition, in the first half of 2015, more 
than 600 kg of alpha-phenylacetoacetamide (APAA, closely 
related to APAAN) was seized in Poland and Germany. This 
substance is reported to be easily sourced online and may 
be converted to BMK using methods similar to those using 
APAAN.
Pseudoephedrine and ephedrine
Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are produced and 
traded globally for legitimate ends and therefore are 
easily targeted for diversion, whereas BMK has few 
legitimate applications. Global seizures of ephedrine and 
pseudoephedrine in bulk and pharmaceutical preparations 
peaked at almost 97 tonnes in 2009, when special 
international operations were mounted (INCB, 2015a). 
Since then, seizures have consistently been significantly 
lower, with West Africa, Iran and South-East Asia identified 
as areas of concern. The 1988 UN Convention does 
not require countries to monitor trade in the ephedra 
plant, although it is the raw material for ephedrine and 
pseudoephedrine which may constitute a weak point for 
diversion. The last seizures of ephedra reported to the 
INCB were in 2011; however, Chinese authorities report ‘a 
continuously worsening situation’, despite strict controls.
Pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are the main precursors 
used for production of methamphetamine in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Germany and a number of other EU 
Member States. They can be extracted from medicines sold 
over the counter in pharmacies, but also may be trafficked 
in bulk powder form. Against a background of gradually 
decreasing amounts of BMK, the amount of bulk ephedrine 
and pseudoephedrine seized in 2012 indicates an 
increased demand around that time. In 2013, although the 
amount of ephedrine preparations seized increased, the 
amount of bulk material decreased significantly, perhaps 
indicating problems with the supply chain.
Ephedrine- and pseudoephedrine-containing medicines are 
trafficked within Europe to producing countries, particularly 
the Czech Republic, notably from Poland and Turkey. 
Bulgarian criminal groups are known to be involved in 
these trafficking operations, and Bulgarian authorities have 
been seizing considerable quantities of these medicines. 
In addition, Vietnamese OCGs also use their networks 
to procure medicines containing pseudoephedrine 
for the production of methamphetamine. Associates 
of Vietnamese OCGs buy the medicines in multiple 
pharmacies in Member States not typically associated with 
methamphetamine production and traffic them back to the 
Czech Republic, on occasion exploiting legitimate business 
structures, such as pharmacies, for this purpose.
Currently, the size and numbers of the packages of 
medicines containing pseudoephedrine sold in a single 
transaction are not regulated by EU legislation. Some EU 
Member States, such as the United Kingdom, the Czech 
Republic and Germany, have implemented national 
restrictions on their sale, limiting purchases to small packet 
sizes and only under the supervision of a pharmacist. 
However, since sales are not restricted in all Member 
States, trafficking of such medicines takes place from 
Member States with less restrictive regimes to countries 
where methamphetamine is produced. Internationally, 
some countries, such as Australia, China and Russia, have 
also amended their legislations to monitor this more closely 
(UNODC, 2014e).
Precursors for MDMA
PMK and its pre-precursors
MDMA is produced primarily from PMK, which itself can 
be produced from piperonal and safrole (and safrole-rich 
oils). The global licit trade in PMK is almost non-existent, 
whereas legitimate trade of piperonal is significant, 
amounting to almost 2 400 tonnes in 2013. The licit 
trade in safrole/safrole-rich oils is considerably less, at 
approximately 4 500 litres per annum (INCB, 2015a).
According to the INCB, in 2013, five countries reported 
seizures of PMK: Austria, Belgium, China, the Netherlands 
and Slovenia. China would appear to be a source country, 
with two of the three Belgian seizures as well as the 
Slovenian seizure originating there. Spain accounted for 
1 400 kg of the 1 405 kg of seized piperonal reported to 
the INCB from Europe in 2013 (INCB, 2015a). Seizures of 
safrole/safrole-rich oils decreased considerably between 
2008 and 2012, a period that coincided with the reduced 
availability of MDMA in Europe. This was followed by a 
dramatic increase in seizures in 2013, with 13 838 litres 
seized, mostly in the Netherlands, once again underlining 
Europe’s global importance as a producer of MDMA (see 
Figure 6.8).
However, analogous to the situation for APAAN, PMK may 
be produced from other chemicals, such as PMK glycidate/
PMK glycidide, and their salts. Seizures of such chemicals 
were first reported in 2013, perhaps as a result of the 
poor availability of safrole in the preceding years. Seizures 
of safrole decreased again in 2014 whilst seizures of 
piperonal and PMK glycidate/PMK glycidide and their salts 
steadily increased, perhaps indicating that PMK itself is in 
short supply. Thus, it seems that most MDMA production in 
Europe now includes a step in which PMK is produced from 
other substances.
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In 2014, during a survey by the INCB on the use of pre-
precursor materials, several governments mentioned 
a substance called ‘Helional’ (2-methyl-3-(3,4-
methylenedioxyphenyl)propanal), a novel precursor for 
MDA and possibly MDMA. In May 2014, Dutch authorities 
reported a seizure of 800 litres of Helional at a ‘clandestine 
warehouse’; more than 500 kg of APAAN was also seized 
from the same site (INCB, 2015a), indicating that precursor 
developments continue to evolve and must be carefully and 
continuously monitored.
Other chemicals of interest
Other chemicals play a role in the production of 
amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA depending 
on the process, and disrupting the supply of these may 
have an impact on production. Formamide is an important 
chemical used in the synthesis of amphetamine from  
BMK by the Leuckart synthesis method. In 2013, over 
15 tonnes of formamide was seized in the EU in the 
Netherlands (over 14 tonnes) and Poland (846 kg).  
As formamide is to the production of amphetamine, 
(mono)methylamine is a key chemical for the manufacture 
of methamphetamine from BMK and MDMA from PMK  
(as well as some of the new synthetic cathinones). Notably, 
in 2013, 46 tonnes of (mono)methylamine was seized in 
Belgium, in the container port of Antwerp from a ship that 
had originated in China and routed via Guatemala (INCB, 
2015a). The Netherlands also reported seizing 1.2 tonnes, 
and Germany reported having stopped two shipments with 
a total quantity of almost 1.2 tonnes. Another chemical 
worthy of attention is red phosphorus, which is used in the 
production of methamphetamine by the method commonly 
used in so-called kitchen laboratories in the Czech 
Republic.
Recent experience has shown that producers of 
amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA are 
resourceful and resilient, and likely to innovate and identify 
additional precursors and production methods if the 
traditional precursors become unavailable or prohibitively 
expensive. As will be discussed later, they appear to now also 
be experimenting with the production of new psychoactive 
substances. A growing European methamphetamine market 
or increased demand for synthetic drugs from outside the 
EU, particularly for MDMA, may prompt OCGs to increase 
their outputs and is also likely to further stimulate innovation 
in the production process.
Trafficking and supply
Wholesale supply activities
As indicated earlier, most of the amphetamine, 
methamphetamine and MDMA consumed in the EU is 
produced in Europe. However, most countries do not 
produce significant amounts, so intra-European trafficking 
occurs, mainly using the road and rail networks. Postal 
services are increasingly used to traffic all types of drugs 
not just at retail level, but at wholesale level also. 
The role of organised crime
Dutch, German, British and Belgian OCGs traffic large 
consignments of amphetamine and MDMA to the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Spain and other countries with large 
consumer markets. Generally, OCGs tend to cooperate 
with each other and use their common capacities for drug 
production and share supply channels. EU-based OCGs 
with strong links to Lithuania are involved in the trafficking 
of methamphetamine to the Nordic states, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom and neighbouring states, including 
Estonia, Latvia and Poland. Lithuanian OCGs cooperate 
with domestic OCGs and criminals in these countries to 
traffic their product to these markets. Norway is emerging 
as a particularly significant market for methamphetamine 
thought to originate from Lithuania, although information 
on production in Lithuania is limited. 
OCGs from the Baltic states and OMCGs appear to 
dominate the wholesale distribution of synthetic drugs in 
FIGURE 6.8
European seizures of controlled precursors used 
in the production of MDMA (2005–13)
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Nordic countries, while Vietnamese groups are of rising 
importance in methamphetamine trafficking.
OMCGs maintain chapters across Europe and are involved 
in polydrug trafficking, especially in the Nordic countries, 
where it is likely that OMCGs are involved in the distribution 
of methamphetamine procured from OCGs involved in 
trafficking, such as Lithuanian OCGs, and then distributing 
the drugs in their domestic markets. The OMCGs most 
frequently mentioned in relation to drug trafficking are 
the Bandidos MC and the Hells Angels MC. Satudarah 
MC, infamous for threats of violence if debts are not paid, 
seems to play a significant role in the Netherlands where 
members are believed to source drugs for distribution in 
the Nordic countries. Germany seems to be an important 
strategic ‘in-between’ point, where meetings take place 
to arrange drug deals. In addition, some OMCG members 
also have contacts and travel regularly to South American 
countries (i.e. Venezuela and Argentina), suggesting links to 
the cocaine trade.
Vietnamese OCGs, as well playing a prominent role in 
the production and distribution of methamphetamine in 
the Czech Republic, are involved in the trafficking and 
distribution of methamphetamine in several Member 
States as well as a range of other criminal activities, 
including cannabis production, the facilitation of illegal 
immigration and human trafficking. Their trafficking 
activities often rely on links between the Vietnamese 
groups in the main countries of production and contacts 
among the Vietnamese diaspora communities in consumer 
countries. For instance, criminals of Vietnamese origin in 
France have been found to be involved in the smuggling 
of methamphetamine from the Czech Republic to France, 
where the drug is distributed among the Vietnamese 
and Philippine diaspora communities. Vietnamese 
groups have also been found to be involved in the trade 
in methamphetamine in Poland, Slovakia and the Nordic 
countries. In addition, OCGs in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia have also started collaborating with 
Bulgarian and Vietnamese nationals in the distribution of 
cannabis and methamphetamine (Czech Republic:  
Reitox, 2015).
The number of groups dealing exclusively with synthetic 
drugs is small. In most cases, OCGs have diversified 
their activities to include other drugs, such as cocaine 
and cannabis, and to a lesser extent heroin. There is also 
evidence of wider diversification, for example an exchange 
of precursors for amphetamines between Poland and the 
Netherlands. Other illicit goods may also be involved; it is 
reported that a Polish OCG smuggling cigarettes to the 
United Kingdom collects amphetamine in the Netherlands 
on the return journey.
The EU as a transit region
With respect to synthetic drugs, Europe appears to be 
evolving from a producer and consumer region only, to one 
of transit and export also. This globalisation of the drugs 
market has been facilitated by the exploitation of the EU 
logistical infrastructure by international criminal syndicates. 
The reason is clear: synthetic drugs are highly profitable. 
As an example, the production cost of MDMA is between 
EUR 0.25 and 0.40 per tablet, but the cost to the European 
consumer is normally between EUR 5 and 10 per tablet. 
The price depends on location, but, in principle, the further 
from the production location, the more expensive the 
tablets become.
Some methamphetamine transits Europe en route from 
Africa, mainly West Africa, to other markets, notably Japan 
(UNODC, 2015a). However, while West Africa is the most 
prominent region of origin of methamphetamine trafficked 
via Europe, EU Member States have also intercepted 
couriers departing from other regions in Africa, including 
East Africa (Kenya) and South Africa. Nigerian OCGs are 
probably among the most prolific groups involved in the 
trafficking of methamphetamine on a global scale. These 
groups often rely on the recruitment and use of non-
Nigerian couriers in order to avoid checks based on risk 
profiles. Over the past years, Europol has consistently noted 
an increase in the number of methamphetamine couriers 
originating from the EU arrested in lucrative destination 
markets, particularly Japan.
In addition to West Africa, Iran is also a region of origin 
for methamphetamine smuggled via Europe to the East. 
In 2011, Bulgarian law enforcement intercepted a large 
quantity of methamphetamine routed from Iran via Turkey, 
Bulgaria and Romania and which was destined for Japan. 
Mexico is a major producer of methamphetamine, and it 
is likely that some trafficking occurs from Latin America on 
a regular basis via the EU to destination markets in Asia 
and Australia. Germany has reported the interception of 
a courier attempting to smuggle a significant quantity of 
methamphetamine via Argentina and Germany to Japan. 
The methamphetamine, which was of high purity (96.9 %), 
is thought to have originated in Mexico. However, seizures 
at airports indicate this to be a much less significant 
phenomenon than the trafficking of methamphetamine 
originating in West Africa or Iran.
Trends in synthetic drug seizures
Seizures of drugs can occur at many different stages of 
the supply chain and can vary enormously in size. Large 
seizures are often made at borders when large shipments 
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are intercepted or a large laboratory is dismantled. At the 
other end of the chain, action against street dealers and 
users may result in a large number of small seizures. This 
variability, and the lack of data from key countries such as 
the Netherlands and Poland, complicates the interpretation 
of the data although, clearly, both the number of seizures 
and the amount seized give an indication of the importance 
of the market for that drug in countries reporting data.
A further complication is that amphetamine and 
methamphetamine are not separately identified in some 
datasets. Of the two drugs, amphetamine has historically 
been much more common in Europe, and this is reflected in 
the seizures data. Seizures of amphetamine in the EU have 
remained relatively stable for a number of years, in terms 
of both the number of seizures (approximately 30 000–
35 000 seizures per year) and the amount seized (around 
6–8 tonnes per year). However, three significant countries 
— France, the Netherlands and Poland — do not report the 
number of seizures, which limits this analysis. In 2014, EU 
Member States reported 36 000 seizures of amphetamine, 
totalling 7.1 tonnes. The quantity seized was slightly higher 
than in the immediately preceding years, and Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom accounted for more 
than half of the total.
In contrast, total seizures of methamphetamine in the 
EU increased between 2006 and 2012 but since then 
appear to be stabilising, at around 7 000 seizures and 
0.5 tonnes seized per year. In 2014, Germany reported 
3 900 seizures, and, as in the Czech Republic, France, 
and Poland, although fluctuating from year to year the 
quantities of methamphetamine seized have tended 
to increase over the last few years. In contrast, in some 
other Member States, such as Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Finland, quantities of seized methamphetamine 
have generally declined. Norway also seizes significant 
amounts of methamphetamine; between 2008 and 
2013, methamphetamine was seized more frequently 
than amphetamine; however, this trend reversed in 2014 
when the number of methamphetamine seizures reduced 
from 4 200 seizures in 2013 to 2 700, while seizures of 
amphetamine increased from 3 000 to 5 400 (Figure 6.9).
Determining recent trends in MDMA seizures is difficult 
because of the absence of data from some countries 
that are likely to make important contributions to this 
total. The information available (contents of tablets sold 
as ecstasy; number of seizures and quantities of MDMA 
seized; and number of production facilities dismantled) 
suggests that MDMA availability dropped sharply in Europe 
in 2008, reaching a low point in 2009. At this time, MDMA 
virtually disappeared from some markets and tablets sold 
as ecstasy often contained other synthetic substances. 
It seems likely that the relative ‘drought’ of MDMA on 
European markets in 2008–09 was caused by successful 
international cooperation and law enforcement efforts in 
both Europe and Asia that targeted the suppliers of the 
main ecstasy precursor, PMK. Indicators now suggest 
that this trend has reversed, and that MDMA availability, 
since 2010, has increased again, and has almost reached 
pre-shortage levels (Figure 6.9). No data at all are available 
from the Netherlands for 2013 and 2014, and the number 
of seizures for that year is not available for France or 
Poland. Assuming that the Netherlands seized the same 
amount of MDMA in 2014 as in 2012, it can be estimated 
that 6.1 million MDMA tablets were seized in the EU in that 
year. Seizure data suggest that Turkey, which was a strong 
market for amphetamine in the mid-2000s, with 4 tonnes 
seized in 2006, is now more focused on other stimulants, 
particularly MDMA; 3.6 million MDMA tablets were seized in 
Turkey in 2014 (Turkey: Reitox, 2015). It has been reported 
that ecstasy is trafficked to Turkey by the same criminal 
groups that are trafficking heroin from Turkey to western 
Europe, and by the same routes, mainly using motor 
vehicles, the couriers being of Bulgarian, Turkish and Dutch 
origins (Bulgaria: Reitox, 2014).
A recent upturn is also evident in trends of MDMA-related 
offences. Among those countries reporting consistently, 
trends also point to increases in MDMA content since 
2010, and the availability of high-MDMA-content products 
prompted joint alerts from Europol and the EMCDDA in 
2014. Taken together, these indicators of the MDMA market 
all point to recovery from a low reached about 6 years ago.
Retail supply
The way in which consumers obtain amphetamines and 
ecstasy reflects the largely recreational nature of most use, 
and there is evidence of a significant amount of sharing. In 
a web survey in six European countries, 17 % of users said 
that they were usually given amphetamines by someone 
else for free and 42 % reported that they sometimes bought 
and were sometimes given amphetamines. In the case of 
ecstasy, 9 % of respondents said their supply was usually 
free, while 33 % said they sometimes bought it and were 
sometimes given it.
Overall, the most commonly reported usual place of 
purchase of amphetamines was the seller’s home or 
someone else’s home (mentioned by about one-quarter of 
respondents), with the street or park mentioned by more 
than 1 in 10 respondents. The responses obtained for the 
usual place of purchase of ecstasy were similar, although 
in addition about 1 in 10 respondents said that they usually 
bought their ecstasy at an ‘other place of entertainment’. 
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Purchase through the internet was mentioned by only 1 % 
of respondents for both amphetamines and ecstasy. The 
majority of respondents said that the reason for choosing to 
buy from their usual location was related to purchase from 
personal contacts (Frijns and van Laar, 2013).
These drugs appear to be quite readily available. About half 
of the ecstasy and amphetamine users in the survey said 
that they were able to obtain these drugs within an hour, 
although times to obtain the drugs were slightly longer in 
Sweden than in the other countries (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 
In all countries except the Netherlands, over one-third of 
ecstasy and amphetamine users said that there had been 
times when they had been unable to buy any of these 
drugs even though they had the cash to do so. The most 
commonly cited reasons for not being able to do so was 
that sellers were not available or had no supplies (Frijn and 
van Laar, 2013).
Although data on price and purity are not collected 
consistently across the EU, particularly in the case of 
methamphetamine, some broad comparisons between 
amphetamine and methamphetamine can be made. In 
general, the average purity of methamphetamine is higher 
than that of amphetamine, probably because the purity 
of crystal meth tends to be high, bringing the average up. 
Interestingly, it would appear that crystal meth adulterated 
with piracetam or dimethylsulphone (see box below) is 
present in the Czech Republic (Institute of Criminalistics, 
Prague, personal communication, July 2015). Despite 
recent increases in the purity of amphetamine (Figure 
6.10), in 2014 the interquartile range (IQR) of mean 
amphetamine purities reported to EMCDDA was 12–27 %, 
compared with 28–67 % for methamphetamine (Table 6.1).
The reported price of amphetamine has been stable or 
increasing slightly over the last few years (Figure 6.10), 
although after adjusting for inflation is likely to be stable or 
decreasing in real terms. In general, amphetamine tends 
to be cheaper than methamphetamine; in 2014, the IQR of 
the average amphetamine prices reported to EMCDDA was 
EUR 10–25 per gram while that for methamphetamine was 
EUR 15–66 per gram (Table 6.1).
EMCDDA data collection suggests the typical MDMA 
content of tablets in 2014 was between 68 and 95 mg 
(Table 6.1). Trend data based on a smaller group of 
countries that regularly submit data and which excludes 
several key countries indicates that after a period in which 
the majority of ecstasy tablets sold in Europe contained low 
concentrations of MDMA or alternative substances, such 
as new psychoactive substances, more recently purity has 
been increasing (Figure 6.11).
Large numbers of users take MDMA but relatively few seek 
treatment; 0.3 % of treatment admissions in the EU are 
related to ecstasy. Most of the harms associated with the 
use of ecstasy are the result of dangerously high levels 
of MDMA in a tablet or the presence of something other 
than MDMA, such as para-methoxymethamphetamine 
(PMMA). The latter is thought to be related to the use 
of certain precursors, as the adulteration of PMK with 
4-methoxy-BMK gives rise to the subsequent production 
of MDMA adulterated with PMMA (EMCDDA, 2016b). The 
Dutch Drug Information and Monitoring System (DIMS) has 
detected the harmful substance PMMA in an increasing 
number of tablets sold as ecstasy, rising from less than 30 
in 2011 and 2012 (1.3 and 1.4 % of ecstasy tablets tested 
in those years) to 47 tablets (2.5 % of tablets) in 2013 and 
40 tablets (1.9 %) in 2014 (Netherlands: Reitox, 2016). 
MDMA, in addition to being found in ecstasy tablets, is 
available in powder and crystal forms, although injecting 
and smoking have rarely been reported. The emergence of 
the crystalline form is possibly a reaction of the market to 
the low quality of ecstasy tablets that have been available.
Another trend to emerge recently has been an increase in 
the MDMA content of tablets. In 2014, the Dutch Reitox 
national focal point reported that the average MDMA 
content of tablets sold as ecstasy was at an all-time 
high. The highest MDMA content recorded that year was 
366 mg, compared with an average content of 66 mg in 
2009, suggesting that the shortage of MDMA precursors 
had been resolved. Indeed in 2014, over half (11 out of 
17) of the countries that provided data reported maximum 
MDMA contents of greater than 200 mg. In March 2014, 
the EMCDDA and Europol released an early-warning 
notification that tablets containing dangerously high levels 
of MDMA had been found in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Adulteration of crystal meth
Many believe that crystal meth is always a pure 
form of the drug, and often it is. However, it is 
possible that those large seemingly pure crystals 
of methamphetamine are in fact adulterated with a 
substance called methylsulphonylmethane (MSM), 
also known as methylsulphone or dimethylsulphone. 
Pure MSM is an odourless, white, crystalline powder 
that is highly soluble and mixes readily with most 
substances without leaving a residue. It is usually 
added to methamphetamine during the final stages 
of production. This substance is ideally suited for 
cutting crystal meth because, after the chemicals are 
combined and the mixture cools, the MSM and meth 
recrystallise, resembling pure methamphetamine.
Source: http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs1/1837/index.htm
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FIGURE 6.9
Seizures of amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA reported in Europe, 2006–14
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Source: EMCDDA/Reitox national focal points.
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FIGURE 6.10
Trends in amphetamine purity and retail price in the EU, 2010–14
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FIGURE 6.11
Trends in MDMA tablet content and retail price in the EU, 2010–14
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Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Data from the DIMS 
of the Trimbos Institute show this trend to be continuing, 
with more than half of all MDMA tablets tested in 2015 
containing more than 140 mg (Figure 6.12). The Swiss 
NGO SaferParty which runs a pill-testing scheme, advises 
users that the maximum safe dose is 1.5 mg/kg for a man 
and 1.3 mg/kg for a woman. In the EU, the average adult 
male weight is around 80 kg and the average female weight 
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is 65 kg (28), so tablets containing more than 140 mg 
of MDMA present a risk to many users, but particularly 
women. Anecdotal reports indicate that MDMA mortality 
rates have been slowly increasing; however, the time 
taken to report death data in national statistics makes this 
difficult to quantify.
It would appear that some consumers of MDMA may 
not favour the higher-strength MDMA tablets or the 
crystal substance, and as a result the use of alternative 
substances, such as 4-FA, has emerged (Linsen et al., 
2015). A danger with a high-purity crystalline product is the 
difficulty in estimating the dose, which may lead to users 
taking more than the desired amount of MDMA. This has 
led to awareness campaigns such as ‘crush–dab–wait’ 
in the United Kingdom, designed to minimise harm when 
MDMA is used in this way. 
Other synthetic drugs of importance
The focus of this chapter has been on the main synthetic 
stimulant drugs used in the EU, but there are other drugs 
that, although they appeal to a smaller number of users, are 
worthy of note.
(28) Based on surveys in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Wales).
Ketamine, which is not currently controlled internationally, 
is a drug used in veterinary medicine and in human 
medicine, mostly in anaesthesia, in some 62 countries 
worldwide. It has been misused by some subgroups of 
users for many years because of its dissociative properties. 
Almost all Member States have reported seizures of 
ketamine through the EU Early Warning System on new 
psychoactive substances, and an EU-level risk assessment 
was carried out in 2001. There is growing recognition of 
ketamine-related non-acute health effects, such as bladder 
and urinary tract symptoms, among chronic or heavy users. 
Since 2009, around 2 000 seizures have been reported 
each year; however, in 2014, this figure fell to less than 
1 000, perhaps as a result of the emergence of alternative 
new psychoactive substances with similar effects, such as 
methoxetamine, which was marketed as a ‘bladder-friendly’ 
alternative to ketamine. Seizure data suggest that Spain 
and the United Kingdom are particularly affected, together 
reporting more than 90 % of the total quantity of ketamine 
seized in 2014.
In 2014, the Expert Committee on Drug Dependence of 
the World Health Organization recommended that gamma-
hyroxybutyrate (GHB) be moved into Schedule II of the 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971, on the 
basis that its abuse liability was substantial whereas its 
therapeutic usefulness was little to moderate. GHB and its 
precursor, gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), sometimes called 
‘liquid ecstasy’ or simply ‘G’, are used by certain subgroups 
of users in the EU, mainly in recreational environments. 
GHB has a steep dose–response curve, meaning that even 
a small increase in dose can cause serious toxic effects, 
including impaired consciousness and coma. According 
to recent data collected by the EMCDDA and Europol, 
Belgium and Norway appear to be particularly affected, 
with both countries reporting in excess of 400 seizures 
of GHB/GBL, while large-scale production appears to be 
concentrated in the Netherlands, occasionally occurring in 
the same place as the production of other synthetic drugs 
such as amphetamine and MDMA.
The prevalence of the hallucinogenic semisynthetic drug 
LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) is described as low and 
stable, as few people are interested in the type of effects 
it provides. Seizures of LSD reached a low point in the 
early 2000s, and remained fairly stable at below 1 000 
seizures per year until 2012, when seizures started to show 
modest increases. In 2014, just under 1 900 seizures were 
reported in the EU and Norway, with Germany, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom all reporting more 
than 100 seizures in 2014, as did Finland in 2013 (29). 
(29) Final data on number of seizures in Finland in 2014 were not available at 
the time of writing.
FIGURE 6.12
MDMA content of tablets tested in a pill testing 
scheme in the Netherlands, 2005–15
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A significant overlap between the LSD market and the 
market for new psychoactive substances emerged in 2012 
during the risk assessment for the psychoactive substance 
25I-NBOMe. It was found that 25I-NBOMe was being sold 
on the illicit drug market as LSD, in the form of ‘blotters’, 
and was also touted online as a legal replacement for 
LSD. Although they share some hallucinogenic properties, 
25I-NBOMe is associated with some severe adverse health 
effects, probably attributable to its fundamental chemistry 
— like amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA, it 
belongs to the phenethylamine family and has stimulant 
properties.
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Action points
Targeting the key threats
1.  There is a need to continue to focus on and support actions in the important 
geographical centres for synthetic drug production, prioritising the Netherlands and 
Belgium, as well as the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria.
2.  Improved analysis and information sharing is needed on new modi operandi of intra-
European trafficking in synthetic drugs, such as the smuggling of liquid amphetamine 
oil, in order to improve capacity for interdiction.
3.  There is a need to share information and analysis on seizures of synthetic drugs 
exported from, or transiting through, the EU. This should include improved profiling and 
risk analysis of couriers transporting methamphetamine via EU international airports, as 
well as exports from Europe to markets such as the Americas, Oceania and Asia.
Improving responses to a growing problem
4.  Prevention, treatment and harm reduction interventions, as well as policing strategies, 
need to be more sensitive to the growing importance of synthetic stimulants and the 
specific public health and safety challenges posed by the misuse of this group of 
substances.
5.  Targeted monitoring is required for the early detection of new patterns of use, particularly 
the smoking and injection of methamphetamine, with particular attention given to 
potentially harmful transitions between other substances such as heroin and new 
psychoactive substances.
Better understanding of production processes: implications for 
enforcement and health
6.  Systematic forensic profiling of seizures would deliver key strategic and operational 
insights, and identify intervention opportunities. For this reason, a mechanism for 
sharing the results of analysis among stakeholders at national and European level in a 
timely manner would be beneficial.
7.  Forensic information is also useful to identify health risks, including those posed by 
high-potency products or the synthesis of particularly harmful compounds that can 
arise from new production processes. Existing mechanisms, such as the EU Early 
Warning System on new psychoactive substances, may be used to rapidly exchange 
information and develop effective early-warning activities to protect public health.
Building capacity to respond to production in the EU and associated 
environmental harms
8.  There is a need to strengthen and support training and knowledge transfer on the 
dismantling of illicit production facilities, giving particular attention to the needs of 
countries beginning to detect synthetic drug production on their territories.
9.  Data should be collected systematically using standardised tools such as the ERISSP 
and the Europol Illicit Laboratory Comparison System (EILCS).
10.  There is a need to systematically collect data on chemical waste dump sites in order to 
better understand the environmental costs and health risks associated with synthetic 
drug production in the EU. Best practice in approaches to address this issue should be 
shared in order to protect public safety and the environment.
7
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Key issues
The European market
Available indicators suggest there are no signs of a slowdown in the number, type or 
availability of new substances. A large number of substances are now sold openly as 
‘legal’ replacements for illicit drugs such as cannabis, methamphetamine, cocaine, 
MDMA, heroin and benzodiazepines. The EU Early Warning System currently monitors 
more than 560 substances, which is more than double the number of drugs controlled 
under UN conventions. The market supplies both recreational and, increasingly, chronic 
and marginalised drug users. A characteristic of this market is that producers are adept at 
reacting to and even anticipating legal and regulatory controls by rapidly developing and 
introducing new substances.
Production and distribution
Globalised supply chains and the internet play a major role in driving the availability of new 
substances in Europe. Underpinning this growth is the ability to order bulk quantities of 
new substances from companies in China and to transport them rapidly to Europe by air or 
sea. Actors in the EU then package and market them either on the open market or directly 
on the illicit drug market. Given the large profits and low risk of operating in this area, it is 
possible that criminal organisations will become even more active. In this respect, there are 
signals suggesting an increase in the production of a range of new substances in Europe.
Marketing and retail supply
Entrepreneurs have developed sophisticated and aggressive marketing techniques related 
to new substances. This includes the development of distinct but overlapping markets such 
as ‘legal highs’, ‘research chemicals’ and ‘dietary supplements’. Bricks-and-mortar shops 
and online shops are important sources of supply.
New substances: greater risks?
As the availability of new substances has increased there has also been an increase in 
serious harms, particularly acute poisonings, sometimes resulting in death; they also 
include broader public health and social harms, such as those caused by chronic and 
marginalised drug users switching from injecting heroin to synthetic cathinones. Some 
new substances can pose an immediate and pronounced threat to public health, causing 
outbreaks of mass poisonings. Others may cause outbreaks of blood-borne viruses and 
bacterial infections. In the past couple of years, the EU has experienced such outbreaks 
caused by synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic opioids.
CHAPTER 7
New psychoactive substances
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Introduction
Over the last decade, and particularly in the last 5 years, an 
increasing number of new substances have been detected 
on the European market, with two new substances detected 
every week. Under EU law, these drugs are known as new 
psychoactive substances (NPS) and they constitute a broad 
group (30). The increase in the number of these substances is 
the result of a significant shift in the way that drugs can now 
be manufactured, marketed and sold, which is driven by rapid 
changes in both technology and globalisation (Figure 7.1). The 
availability of potent new substances is no longer limited to 
clandestine production or the diversion of medicines, although 
these remain an important part of the overall market. Now, a 
huge range of substances can be made on a large scale by 
legitimate chemical companies half-way around the world, 
rapidly shipped to Europe, and then packaged into products 
— ‘legal highs’, ‘research chemicals’ and ‘food supplements’ 
— and sold off the shelf in the high street and on the web, as 
well as directly on the illicit drug market.
FIGURE 7.1
From synthesis to consumer
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Source: EMCDDA.
(30) Council (Decision (EC) No 2005/387/JHA of 10 May 2005 on the 
information exchange, risk-assessment and control of new psychoactive 
substances, OJEU L 127, 20.05.2005, p. 32.
Many of the NPS on the market in Europe today are 
sold openly as ‘legal’ replacements for cannabis, heroin, 
cocaine, amphetamines, MDMA, benzodiazepines and LSD. 
Entrepreneurs and, increasingly, crime groups recognise 
that new substances often sit in a legal grey area, check 
drug laws to ensure the substances are not controlled 
and sometimes even go as far as to seek expert legal 
advice. They have also embraced mainstream marketing 
techniques so that potent drugs have effectively become 
‘ordinary commodities’ with the result that, as well as 
an increase in the number of these substances, a wider 
range of substances are increasingly available to European 
citizens.
Since the first edition of this report (EMCDDA–Europol, 
2013), our understanding of the market in NPS has 
improved significantly. However, the market is still young, 
and there remains a great deal to learn and understand 
about this highly dynamic threat and its likely impact on the 
health and security of Europe as a whole. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, many of the data discussed below, which 
are largely based on the analysis of signals identified 
from the EU Early Warning System, give serious cause 
for concern. The market apparently continues to grow; 
consumer groups are no longer limited to experimental 
users such as psychonauts and clubbers, but also include 
broader groups of recreational users, people who self-
medicate, prisoners, people looking to improve their 
performance or how they look, as well as chronic and 
marginalised drug users; while the number of harms being 
reported is also increasing.
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Understanding the market for new 
psychoactive substances in Europe
Much of what is known about NPS in Europe comes 
from the EU Early Warning System. This system is the 
cornerstone of Europe’s response to new substances, and 
allows the Member States to directly report data to the 
EMCDDA and Europol on events such as law enforcement 
seizures, acute poisonings and deaths. The two agencies 
then analyse and assess the data to detect signals of 
harm, allowing the agencies and the Member States to 
react in a timely manner in order to reduce that harm. Such 
measures include public health alerts, law enforcement 
operations and risk assessments; in some cases, control 
measures across the EU may be applied by the Council of 
the European Union (EMCDDA, 2015d).
Because of the highly diverse and dynamic nature of the 
market, many of the existing epidemiological indicators 
of drug use are poorly suited or configured to measure 
and monitor new substances. In addition, the seizure data 
collected on new substances which are used in this report 
should be regarded as minimum estimates because of the 
lack of standardised reporting in this area. These data are 
not directly comparable to the data on established illicit 
drugs. Nevertheless, they provide useful information on the 
nature and extent of use of these substances.
Substances and seizures
The EMCDDA monitors a broad range of new psychoactive 
substances that have been reported through the EU Early 
Warning System. These include ‘synthetic cannabinoids’ 
(mainly synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists), synthetic 
cathinones, phenethylamines, opioids, tryptamines, 
benzodiazepines, arylalkylamines and a range of other 
substances. In 2015, 100 new substances were detected 
for the first time, bringing the total number of new 
substances monitored to more than 560 — with more 
than 380 (70 %) of these detected in the last 5 years 
alone (Figure 7.2). There are now more than twice as many 
new substances on the market as drugs controlled under 
international drug control conventions.
Seizure data from law enforcement agencies also serve to 
confirm the growth and importance of this drug market. 
In 2014, almost 50 000 seizures of new substances, 
amounting to almost 4 tonnes, were made across Europe 
— many of these substances are vastly more potent than 
their controlled counterparts (Figure 7.3). Synthetic
TABLE 7.1
New psychoactive substances reported for the rst time
Numbers reported
(2015) 100
Substances currently monitored by the EMCDDA 
Numbers monitored
(2015) >560
Public health alerts issued in the past two years Health alerts 34
Risk assessments carried out in the past two yearsRisk assessments 7
NEW PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES IN EUROPE AT A GLANCE
Seizures
(2014)
Total
Synthetic cannabinoids
Synthetic cathinones
48 437 almost 4 tonnes
  
29 395 >1.3 tonnes
  
8 343 >1 tonne
Number Quantity
Note: Data presented are for the EU plus Norway and Turkey.
Source: EMCDDA.
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cannabinoids, which are sold as replacements for cannabis, 
accounted for the majority of these seizures, almost 
30 000, and weighing more than 1.3 tonnes. Synthetic 
cathinones, which are sold as replacements for stimulants, 
such as amphetamine, MDMA and cocaine, were the 
second largest group, with more than 8 000 seizures with a 
combined weight of more than 1 tonne. Together, synthetic 
cannabinoids and cathinones accounted for almost 80 % 
of the total number of seizures and over 60 % of the 
weight seized during 2014. However, the other groups, 
while smaller in number, also reflect important changes 
in the drug market. This includes the benzodiazepines 
and exceptionally potent narcotic analgesics — such as 
fentanyls — which may be sold as heroin.
The availability of new substances to European consumers 
through the internet as well as bricks-and-mortar shops 
in some countries is also high. In 2013, 651 web shops 
were identified on the surface net; and recent targeted 
snapshots and test purchasing show that new substances 
continue to enjoy high availability on the surface web. 
In addition, data from the monitoring of anonymous 
marketplaces on dark nets suggest that such sites may 
also be an important supply route, although further study 
is required (Abouchedid et al., 2015; EMCDDA, 2015d,e; 
Ho et al., 2015a,b). In addition, and apparently benefiting 
from the economies of scale that this expanding market 
brings, new substances are also increasingly sold on the 
illicit drug market, where they are specifically sold and 
sought either by name, or passed off as illicit drugs such 
as amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, ‘ecstasy’ or genuine 
medicines.
FIGURE 7.2
Number of new psychoactive substances 
reported to the EU Early Warning System for the 
first time, 2005–15 
0 
50 
100 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Other substances Opioids Benzodiazepines 
Arylalkylamines Piperidines and pyrrolidines Plants and extracts 
Aminoindanes Arylcyclohexylamines Synthetic cannabinoids 
Cathinones Piperazines Tryptamines Phenethylamines 
Source: EMCDDA.
FIGURE 7.3
Seizures of new psychoactive substances 
reported in Europe, 2005–14
Seizure case numbers
Quantity (kg), all forms
Synthetic
cathinones 
29 395
8 343
10 699
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Other
substances
Synthetic
cannabinoids
Synthetic
cathinones 
Other
substances
Synthetic
cannabinoids
1 549 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 082 
1 356 
Note: Data on new psychoactive substances reported to the EU Early Warning 
System are drawn from case reports rather than routine monitoring systems, 
therefore estimates represent a minimum and are not comparable to other 
seizure data. 
The figures supplied for cannabinoid and cathinone seizure case numbers 
and quantity below are the figures reported for all forms of those substances 
seized, e.g. including powders, plant material, blotters, etc., for both categories 
of new psychoactive substances.
Source: EMCDDA.
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TABLE 7.2
Major groups of new psychoactive substances 
monitored by the EMCDDA
Group
Number 
monitored
Examples
Synthetic 
cannabinoids
160
JWH-018 (1), AM-2201(1), 
5F-AKB48, UR-144
Synthetic cathinones 103
Mephedrone (1), alpha-PVP, 
pentedrone, 3-MMC, methylone 
(1)
Phenethylamines  86
2-PEA, 4-FMA, 4-MA, 
25I-NBOMe (1), DOPR, 4-CMA
Benzodiazepines  15
Pyrazolam, diclazepam, 
nifoxipam
Arylcyclohexylamines  11
Methoxetamine, 3-MeO-PCP, 
deschloroketamine
Arylalkylamines  32
Bromo-dragonfly, 5-APB, 
5-APDI, 5-IT, 2-EAPB
Piperidines and 
pyrrolidines
 12
2-DPMP, desoxy-D2PM, HDMP-
28, ethylphenidate
Indolalkylamines 
(tryptamines)
 37
AMT, DMT, 5-MeO-MiPT, DiPT, 
MET, AL-LAD
Piperazines  17
BZP (1), mCPP, 2C-B-BZP, NSI-
189, 2,3-XP, DB-MDBP
Opioids  18
Acetylfentanyl, ocfentanil, W-15, 
W-18 
Plants and extracts   8 Kratom, kava, arecoline
Aminoindanes   5 MDAI, N-methyl-2-aminoindane
Other  64
Etaqualone, pregabalin, DMAA, 
iso-ethcathinone, 5-HTP, LSZ
(1) Now controlled internationally under the UN system.
Prevalence
Estimating the prevalence of use of NPS is often a 
challenge, especially in general population surveys; 
because of the rapidly changing nature of the substances 
on offer and the fact that the same brand name may be 
used to market completely different substances, people 
often do not know what they are consuming. Such 
surveys, if they do seek to elicit information on NPS use, 
often ask about the use of ‘legal highs’ and ‘research 
chemicals’. Some may also ask about the use of groups of 
products such as smoking mixtures containing synthetic 
cannabinoids or groups of substances, such as the 
synthetic cathinones.
One insight into the use of new substances in Europe is 
provided by the 2014 Flash Eurobarometer, a survey of 
just over 13 000 young adults aged 15–24 in the Member 
States, which asked about the use of new types of products 
such as ‘legal highs’ and ‘research chemicals’. It was found 
that 8 % of respondents had used such a substance at 
least once, with 3 % using them in the last year. The highest 
levels of use in the last year were in Ireland (9 %), Spain, 
France (both 8 %) and Slovenia (7 %), with the lowest 
reported by Malta and Cyprus (0 %). Most respondents who 
had used such substances in the last year either bought 
them from, or were given them by, a friend (68 %). Just over 
a quarter (27 %) bought them from a drug dealer, while 
10 % purchased them from a specialised shop, such as a 
‘head shop’ or ‘smart shop’, and 3 % bought them on the 
internet (multiple answers were possible).
In the case of some new substances that are sold directly 
on the illicit market, the user groups will reflect, to some 
degree, the existing markets for controlled drugs such as 
amphetamine; this is the case for 4-methylamphetamine 
and 4-FA. In the case of ‘legal highs’, most surveys have 
examined use in targeted groups, such as dance music 
fans, night club patrons and psychonauts. These groups 
tend to comprise larger numbers of ‘early adopters’ of new 
substances. These findings are not representative outside 
the survey population. However, the use of new substances 
in these populations can be very high and may provide 
early signals of the potential harms associated with a 
drug, as well as an indication of substances that may be 
attractive to other users and which could become more 
widespread. In addition, new substances are increasingly 
being used in some countries by chronic, marginalised drug 
users such as opioid and stimulant injectors, which are 
under-represented in general population surveys.
Harms
New psychoactive substances pose a range of challenges 
to health, as well as for law enforcement and policy. 
Some of these challenges are the same as those posed 
by controlled drugs; others are unique to the substances 
themselves and the market. The market rapidly adapts to, 
or may even pre-empt, legal and regulatory attempts to 
control it.
Despite the limitations to the available data, there is now 
strong evidence that new substances are causing a wide 
range of serious harms in Europe. These include an increase 
in the number of serious acute poisonings, including deaths, 
as well as harms arising from changes in the patterns 
of drug injection, as injecting drug users switch to new 
substances. This is particularly evident with stimulant 
drugs such as mephedrone, α-PVP, MDPV, pentedrone, 
and ethylphenidate. These changes have been linked to 
drug-related infectious disease, such as HIV and hepatitis 
C, as well as bacterial infections (Péterfi et al., 2014; ACMD, 
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2015b; Giese et al., 2015; Néfau et al., 2015; Public Health 
England et al., 2015; Rácz et al., 2015). In some cases the 
harms arising from new substances have manifested as 
outbreaks of mass poisonings or infections, which can place 
substantial demands on health care systems. Over the past 
two years, serious harms such as those that required urgent 
attention led to 34 public health alerts being issued by the 
EMCDDA, while seven risk assessments were conducted 
(see box above).
Production
The blueprints and recipes for many of the NPS that 
have been detected on the European drug market, and 
thousands more, are catalogued in the scientific and patent 
literature. In fact, many originate from the good intentions 
of pharma and academia: some were either once used 
as medicines or are currently used as medicines; while 
many were intended as new medicines but were never 
commercialised because they did not work as expected, or 
they caused adverse effects, or they were not commercially 
viable; while others were used in studies to get a better 
understanding of how our bodies work, and in the hope of 
developing better medicines or diagnostic imaging. In other 
cases, a totally new substance may emerge having been 
specifically designed either for curiosity by an amateur 
chemist or specifically for the new substances market. 
Often the inspiration for these comes from the original 
endeavours of pharma and academia. This was the case 
for methoxetamine, which was sold as a legal replacement 
for ketamine; 4,4′-dimethylaminorex which, using the 
brand name Serotoni, was pitched as a legal replacement 
for MDMA; as well as a range of synthetic cannabinoids 
(Morris, 2011; EMCDDA–Europol, 2014). Sometimes, 
new substances also emerge as a result of a switch in the 
chemical precursors used in illicit laboratories that produce 
drugs such as amphetamine and MDMA.
Until about a decade ago, only a handful of new substances 
were seen each year in Europe. Some were produced in 
small amounts in amateur laboratories or on a commercial 
scale in clandestine laboratories by OCGs. These were 
mostly sold on the illicit drug market, where they would 
be passed off as amphetamine or ecstasy; some were 
specifically sold and sought after by name; others were sold 
as a new type of ecstasy. These types of new substances 
were often called ‘designer drugs’ — a nod to the fact 
that they appeared to have been specifically designed 
to circumvent drug control legislation. Sometimes new 
substances were also sourced from legitimate chemical 
companies. Another important section of the market at the 
time was the diversion of medicines from the legitimate 
supply chain.
Today, the so-called ‘designer drugs’ and medicines remain 
an important part of Europe’s market in new substances. 
In the former case, they usually appear as a result of the 
activities of organised crime. Sometimes this is because a 
non-controlled precursor chemical may be used during the 
synthesis of a substance, which results in a new substance 
being produced either accidentally or deliberately. This 
issue with precursors has led to recurring problems in 
Europe. As mentioned briefly in Chapter 6, in some cases, 
MDMA manufacturers have instead made PMMA, which 
in 2014 and 2015 caused clusters of deaths across 
Europe after high-strength tablets were sold as ecstasy to 
unsuspecting users. Amphetamine production has also 
been affected; in the late 2000s, there was a shortage of 
precursors, which led to two new substances being sold 
as amphetamine on the European drug market: in 2007, 
4-FA was detected on the market because of the use of the 
precursor 4-fluoro-BMK (see Case study 12), which was 
followed in 2009 by 4-methylamphetamine, which arose 
from the use of the precursor 4-methyl-BMK (EMCDDA, 
2014c). The reason behind a switch to a non-controlled 
precursor may be the limited availability of a controlled 
precursor, or a chemical supplier may deliberately 
substitute a precursor for another — unbeknownst to 
a producer; in other cases it may be because a non-
controlled precursor is cheaper to buy and/or easier to 
traffic. In the case of both 4-FA and 4-methylamphetamine, 
the substances were sold as amphetamine and produced 
by crime groups involved in the supply of amphetamine. At 
other times, crime groups have sourced new substances 
from chemical suppliers in Europe as well as China 
in order to plug a gap in the availability of substances 
such as MDMA; such substances include mCPP, BZP 
Risk assessment of new substances at 
European level
The EMCDDA, through its Scientific Committee, 
is responsible for the risk assessment of new 
psychoactive substances. The risk assessment 
takes into account all factors that, according to the 
1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs or the 1971 United Nations Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, would warrant the placing 
of a substance under international control. This 
ensures an evidence-based assessment. Reflecting 
the growth in the market, over the past two years, 
seven new substances — 25I-NBOMe, AH-7921, 
methoxetamine, MDPV, 4,4′-DMAR, MT-45 and 
α-PVP — required risk assessment by the EMCDDA’s 
Scientific Committee.
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and mephedrone. There are also increasing signs that 
crime groups are interested in producing a range of new 
substances in Europe. These are discussed below.
Notwithstanding the importance of so-called ‘designer 
drugs’ and medicines to the market, what is responsible 
for the huge growth in the contemporary market in new 
psychoactive substances — in terms of the increase in 
their number, type and availability — is globalisation. The 
convergence between modern transport networks, the 
internet, payment systems, low labour costs and the large 
growth — and increasing dominance — of the Chinese 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries that has occurred 
over the last few years has allowed a new market to flourish 
(Levinson, 2006; Smil, 2010; Morris, 2011; Stearns, 2011; 
Halford, 2015).
The internet, and particularly the web, is now a part of 
everyday life, and, coupled with cheap, efficient and reliable 
shipping, has allowed China to become the chemical and 
pharmaceutical wholesaler and retailer to the world while, 
to a lesser extent, companies in India are also important 
suppliers, particularly with respect to medicines. Many 
new substances — such as the synthetic cannabinoids, 
cathinones, opioids and benzodiazepines — are produced 
by legitimate companies in these countries that appear to 
be operating lawfully; some not so legitimate companies 
are also involved. The companies advertise their catalogue 
of substances on major online business-to-consumer and 
business-to-business marketplaces and through their own 
websites. If a particular substance is not in their catalogue, 
then it can often be made to order. They accept payment 
by major credit and debit cards, online payment services or 
direct bank transfers. Escrow services and online reputation 
systems — similar to those used by ecommerce giants 
Amazon and eBay — may also be used, which decreases 
risk and increases trust between buyer and seller, helping 
secure trade (Masum and Tovey, 2012). Some suppliers 
also guarantee to replace the substance or issue a refund 
if the shipment is intercepted by customs agencies. The 
amounts offered range from a few milligrams to tens or 
even hundreds of kilograms; the purity is often claimed to 
be high. The reach of these companies is global.
Once sold, the substances are then shipped to Europe 
using express mail and delivery companies; the cost can be 
as little as EUR 50 or less, and the substances discretely 
delivered directly to the purchaser’s door in as little as two 
days — an attractive feature for distributors, retailers and 
consumers alike. The packages easily blend in among the 
thousands of small packages shipped from China to Europe 
each day. Larger amounts are shipped by air or sea cargo. 
Once in Europe they are processed and packaged into a 
range of products; the other required materials, packaging 
and equipment can be sourced from lawfully operating 
suppliers in China as well in Europe. To get an idea of the 
potential impact of these developments, it costs around 
EUR 100 to express ship 1 kg of a new substance from a 
manufacturer in China to Europe. In the case of some of 
the fentanyls and synthetic cannabinoids that have been 
detected, this amount could equate to tens of thousands 
of doses. The low cost of delivery facilitates the importation 
of the substances into Europe and their movement across 
Europe, and small letters and packages can easily be 
disguised. As the number of items transported by express 
mail, courier, and air and sea cargo increases (express mail 
increased by 20 % in 2015), the chances of detection are 
likely to decrease.
Given the grey nature of much of the trade in NPS, it 
appears that suppliers and importers have less need to 
resort to the high-tech smuggling techniques used to 
transport controlled drugs. Despite this, investigations 
by law enforcement have identified some practices 
designed to conceal the true nature of the substances 
and businesses. For example, customs agencies report 
that consignments containing new substances are often 
misdeclared as common chemical products and/or of a 
low value in order to conceal their true nature and avoid 
suspicion by law enforcement. Recent seizures of the 
potent opioid acetylfentanyl (which was linked to 32 
deaths in 2015 in Europe) originating from China were 
misdeclared as ‘hot melt powder’, the suppliers attempting 
to conceal the drug as a commonly used adhesive. In 
addition, suppliers and importers may deliberately route 
substances to specific European air and sea ports in 
countries where the substance is not controlled in order 
to reduce the chance of interception. Once imported, the 
Case study 12: 4-Fluoroamphetamine 
(4-FA)
Of note is that 4-FA is specifically sought after by 
some party-goers in the Netherlands and Belgium 
because they perceive its effects to be ‘milder’ and 
between those of MDMA and amphetamine. One 
large study of Dutch users was used to investigate the 
emergence of the new drug and found a prevalence 
of use similar to that for GHB and ketamine. 
Interestingly, it has been suggested that some users 
have also switched to this drug in order to avoid the 
high-strength MDMA tablets currently present on 
the European market. Helping drive the use of this 
substance is the increase in its availability through its 
open sale in bricks-and-mortar shops and on the web 
(Brunt et al., 2011; Goossens et al., 2013; Linsen et al., 
2015).
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substances can then be freely moved around much of 
Europe.
In addition to supplying new substances, chemical 
companies may also sell the precursor chemicals that are 
needed to produce new substances. These are offered on 
the surface web as well as in anonymous marketplaces. 
Recent seizures by police of illicit laboratories in Europe 
operated by OCGs suggest that there may be increasing 
interest in producing NPS closer to home, where the profits 
may be higher, and, for some, the risks may be lower. This 
seems to be the case particularly for substances targeting 
the lucrative stimulant and opioid markets. The analysis of 
materials seized at these illicit laboratories confirms that 
in Europe there is both the capability and the capacity to 
produce a range of new substances — from cathinones, 
such as mephedrone and α-PVP, to fentanyls such as 
butyrfentanyl (see Case study 13). It will be important to 
closely monitor these developments, and to be alert to 
signals that suggest that the range of substances being 
produced in Europe has diversified and expanded beyond 
the illicit substances.
Similar to new substances, shipments of precursors may 
be misdeclared on custom declaration forms in an attempt 
to avoid detection by authorities. In 2015, customs seized 
a multi-kilogram shipment of the precursor 2-bromo-4-
methylpropiophenone, which was being imported into 
Europe and which can be used to produce synthetic 
cathinones such as mephedrone. The precursor was 
misdeclared as ‘butadiene acrylonitrile rubber’ — which 
is an oil-resistant synthetic rubber used to produce a 
range of components for the automotive and aeronautical 
industries. Interestingly, also in 2015, the same precursor 
was seized in two clandestine laboratories in Europe 
producing mephedrone.
It is unclear if Europe is an important hub either for bulk 
quantities of new substances or as a supplier of finished 
products to third countries. Reports from law enforcement 
in both Europe and the United States suggest that both 
these activities take place, but, at this time, it is not 
possible to estimate their overall importance.
Impurities and adulterants
Information on the impurities in new substances and the 
products that contain them is severely limited. However, 
based on knowledge of known chemical synthesis 
pathways and experience, it is clear that some impurities 
arising from the production of new substances can cause 
serious health risks to users. Two examples of impurities 
leading to serious harms are relevant for the markets in 
cathinones and opioids. They relate to the synthesis of 
methcathinone and MPPP, impurities in both of which 
have been linked to brain damage that mimics Parkinson’s 
disease.
Similarly, there are limited data on the risks posed by other 
chemicals used in the manufacture of products containing 
new substances. In the case of some products, the new 
substance is dissolved in a solvent and then is sprayed 
on, or mixed with, plant materials. In addition, other 
substances used as excipients, such as microcrystalline 
cellulose (refined wood pulp), which is commonly used as 
an excipient/diluent in tablets, can cause serious injuries 
if injected. Chemical analysis of products also commonly 
finds a number of other active substances, not only new 
substances, but also illicit drugs and ‘cutting agents’, 
that may themselves pose risks or potentiate risk through 
interactions.
It appears that in some cases new substances are 
produced by companies that also produce a range of 
pharmacologically active substances — including other 
new substances and medicines — as well as other 
chemicals. This gives rise to important concerns about 
quality control with respect to cleaning procedures to 
prevent cross-contamination or carryover of potentially 
toxic residues.
Little is currently known about the potential for genotoxicity 
and carcinogenicity of new substances, or about the 
impurities and the adulterants they contain.
Case study 13: α-PVP production in 
Europe
α-PVP is a synthetic cathinone that was risk assessed 
by the EMCDDA in 2015, after signals of serious 
harms were detected from data reported to the EU 
Early Warning System. The risk assessment found 
that most α-PVP originates from companies in China, 
including a single seizure of almost 260 kg made 
at a European airport in 2015. In addition, in 2013 
and 2014, two illicit production sites were seized in 
Poland, where multi-kilogram quantities of α-PVP 
were synthesised. The synthesis was supervised by 
trained chemists, and the laboratories were supported 
by suppliers, producers and distributors of chemicals. 
The companies involved operated their own websites 
selling and distributing α-PVP across Poland. In 
addition, Hungary reported two tablet manufacturing 
sites that were dismantled in 2013 and in 2014, and 
it appears that the operators of the sites intended to 
produce α-PVP tablets.
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Given that most NPS are produced by companies outside 
the EU, it is difficult to gauge the potential impact on the 
environment. The new substances that are produced in 
Europe appear to be made by the same OCGs involved in 
the production of amphetamine and MDMA, so it is likely 
that the chemical waste is dumped in a similar way.
Marketing and supply
The retail market
Using market segmentation techniques, suppliers and 
vendors target specific user groups with so-called ‘legal 
highs’, ‘research chemicals’ and ‘dietary supplements’. 
This includes the use of sophisticated modern mainstream 
marketing and branding techniques (Figure 7.4).
Food, medicine and consumer protection laws may be 
circumvented by labelling products as ‘not for human 
consumption’, ‘for research only’ or as ‘novelty items’, with 
enforcement action leading to rapid adaptive responses by 
the market (see Case study 14). In some cases, substances 
are marketed as ‘natural’ or ‘herbal’ extracts in order to 
deceive regulators and consumers as to the true nature 
of the product, and exploit the common belief that natural 
products are better. In other cases, it is made very explicit 
that the content of the product is a ‘powerful’ synthetic 
drug. The marketing approach taken depends on the 
specific product and the intended audience. This includes 
packaging that is symbolic of controlled drugs or the use 
street names or names that allude to controlled drugs — 
such as ‘doves’, which is a street name for a type of ecstasy 
tablets — or the effects that the products will have.
Other mainstream marketing techniques that are used 
include giving free samples or early access to new 
products to loyal customers or in exchange for reviews on 
user websites. Although it is not clear what extent such 
techniques increase sales, these are all commonly used 
marketing techniques that appear to work for other types 
of consumer goods. In this respect it is interesting to 
note that some vendors reportedly use ‘sock puppets’ — 
tricksters who pose as genuine customers — to entice and 
encourage consumers.
These finished products then compete with controlled 
drugs but with the added advantage of being sold openly in 
shops — known as head shops or smart shops — as well 
as in fast food outlets, adult shops, fuelling stations and on 
the web: ‘legal’ replacements for cannabis, amphetamine, 
MDMA, cocaine and heroin can be found on the physical 
and virtual shelves of shops across Europe (Figure 7.5). 
FIGURE 7.4
The branding of new psychoactive substances
Legal highs
Marketed in bright and attractive packaging. 
Sold openly in head/smart shops and online. 
Aimed at recreational users.
10g
Research chemicals
Sold under the guise of being used for scientic research.
Aimed at ‘psychonauts’ who explore the eects
of psychoactive substances. Sold openly online.
Food supplements
Sold under the guise of being food or dietary supplements. 
Aimed at people wanting to enhance their body and mind. 
Sold openly in tness shops and online.
Designer drugs
Passed o as drugs such as MDMA and heroin.
Produced in clandestine labs by OCGs. 
Sold on illicit drug market by drug dealers. 
Medicines
Medicines that are diverted from patients or illegally 
imported into Europe. 
Sold on illicit drug market by drug dealers. 
Source: EMCDDA.
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FIGURE 7.5
Deschloroetizolam sold as a research chemical
Photo © Karolinska Institute, Sweden
Case study 14: Redefining organised crime?
The authorities in Hungary were surprised when they 
noticed that a website selling new substances that had 
been shut down had re-opened even though the previous 
operator was in prison. On investigation they found that 
another group had cloned the original site as it had a 
well-established client base. Actively avoiding controlled 
substances, the group sold EUR 35 000–40 000 of 
products per week; when one substance was banned, 
they quickly sold off the remaining stock and ordered 
new uncontrolled analogues from China. Members of the 
group were arrested after their products were linked to the 
hospitalisation of more than 20 people over a short period.
Despite the pseudo-legal status of the business, 
those involved in this enterprise showed some of the 
classic features of a traditional OCGs. The group had 
a hierarchical structure, with the boss using street 
dealers and web distribution methods with lower-level 
operatives receiving the substances and producing the 
products. They attempted to avoid law enforcement by 
communicating using Viber and SMS messaging and 
moving their internet servers to another country. They used 
false details on orders. They also used well-recognised 
methods for laundering their profits, such as establishing 
fake companies in other countries and using offshore 
bank accounts. Although it did not use violence, the group 
showed a lack of regard for the safety of the users, being 
blasé about the serious acute health effects of its products.
Retail outlets
Recognising that access to new substances needs to 
be convenient for consumers, distributors and retailers 
have developed a range of sales channels. The two most 
important are specialised bricks-and-mortar shops and 
web shops on the surface web.
It appears that vendors on the surface web may also be 
an important source of new substances for consumers 
— particularly for so-called ‘legal highs’, research 
chemicals and food supplements. Some bricks-and-mortar 
shops also have web-based front ends that extend their 
customer base; other retailers only have web presences. 
In 2013, the EMCDDA identified 651 shops on the surface 
web that were selling legal highs, research chemicals and 
food supplements to European consumers. Recent targeted 
snapshots and test purchasing show that new substances 
continue to enjoy high availability on the surface web, and 
this includes a large range of psychoactive medicines.
Over the last few years, bricks-and-mortar shops have 
been important sources of new substances to chronic, 
marginalised users in some areas. These include stimulants 
such as ethylphenidate, which mimics the effects of the 
stimulant medicine methylphenidate and has been linked 
with a range of harms, including an outbreak of soft-tissue 
infections (ACMD, 2015b; Public Health England, 2015).
Retailers accept a range of payment methods, including 
credit and debit cards, and cash payments. Payment in 
cash extends the customer base for ‘legal high’ products to 
young or marginalised people who may not have access to 
other modes of payment.
New substances — here to stay?
It is too early to tell what the fate will be for many new 
substances. In part this is because they have only recently 
appeared on the market; societies and their (sub)cultures 
also change and, as they do, so do their tastes and 
demands. In addition, at least initially, it can be difficult to 
distinguish a longer-term adoption of a substance from 
what is merely a passing fad. The latter may be driven, 
in part, by the fact that a new substance is more readily 
available than an illicit drug. Interestingly, it appears that 
controlling such a substance may lead to its disappearance 
from the market and hence a reduction in use simply 
because there is no specific demand for it. Overall, making 
broad predictions about NPS as a whole group is difficult 
and could be potentially misleading. Nonetheless, case 
studies of different new substances suggest that they are 
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disrupting the illicit market and creating new markets as 
well as helping support the illicit market.
In some cases, new substances are used as temporary 
replacements for illicit drugs. They may also displace 
— either temporarily or more permanently — illicit drugs. 
In some countries, shortages of heroin coupled with 
increased availability of synthetic cathinones have led to 
a general shift towards the latter. In addition, recent data 
from the Netherlands suggests that while initially most new 
substance use was unintentional, being related to their use 
to adulterate illicit drugs, in the past few years there has 
been an increase in the use of some new substances in 
their own right (Hondebrink et al., 2015). It will be important 
to follow these developments carefully.
Some new substances pose a challenge as a group, such 
as the synthetic cannabinoids. In this case, suppliers 
care less about a specific substance and more about 
mimicking, broadly speaking, the pharmacological effects 
of cannabis. In essence each synthetic cannabinoid is 
disposable: as soon as a substance is controlled, or even 
before, manufacturers can have one or more replacement 
substances ready for sale, while suppliers and retailers can 
have ‘legal’ replacement products on the shelves.
Since the late 1960s, only a relatively small number of 
drugs have emerged beyond small-scale experimental 
use by psychonauts, gained a foothold on the market and 
diffused to broader sections of the population. Ketamine, 
GHB, and particularly MDMA are prominent examples 
of such substances. However, the diffusion of these 
substances was not the speedy affair that was portrayed 
by much of the popular media. As an example, although 
MDMA was first detected on the illicit drug market in the 
1970s, broader use only occurred some 10–15 years 
later. The same also appears to be true for some new 
psychoactive substances, and in many cases it may simply 
be too early to predict what will happen to many of them. 
One possible substance that appears to have created a 
specific demand and carve its own distinct market share is 
mephedrone (see Case study 15).
Finally, given the nature of the market and the continuous 
stream of new substances, it is unfeasible that all of 
them can be controlled. In October 2015, the Chinese 
government controlled 116 new substances — which 
is just over the number currently identified each year in 
Europe. It is unlikely that any regulatory system can be 
designed to sufficiently limit the stream of new substances 
being manufactured without resorting to a ban on a huge 
range of chemicals.
Case study 15: Mephedrone — once a 
temporary replacement for MDMA, now 
more than that?
In the late 2000s, first mCPP, then BZP and finally 
mephedrone were new substances used by OCGs 
to plug the gap in the availability of MDMA in Europe 
that resulted from the reduced availability of precursor 
chemicals. For a time ecstasy tablets containing 
MDMA in the Netherlands became increasingly less 
common, and most tablets contained new substances. 
Similar situations were seen in other European 
countries (Vogels et al., 2009; EMCDDA, 2011; Brunt 
et al., 2011, 2012a,b). In the case of mephedrone the 
rationale for its use was quite obvious: multi-kilogram 
quantities of the substance could be bought relatively 
cheaply from China, and easily imported in to 
Europe. In addition, most users found its effects were 
acceptable — certainly in comparison with mCPP 
and BZP, whose effects made them unacceptable 
substitutes for MDMA (Brunt et al., 2012b). Since then, 
it appears that mephedrone is specifically sought by 
some user groups, including chronic and marginalised 
drug users (Public Health England, 2015). It is 
tempting to speculate that the pharmacology of 
mephedrone — with some similarities with MDMA, 
cocaine and methamphetamine — is one of the 
reasons for this.
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Action points
European new substances market
1.  In order to reduce the harm caused by new psychoactive substances and protect public 
health, there is a recognised need to strengthen the EU Early Warning System and the 
national systems that support it in order to keep pace with the challenges posed by this 
rapidly developing market.
2.  Suitable epidemiological indicators should be developed in order to allow the collection 
of more reliable information across Europe on the use of new psychoactive substances.
Production and distribution
3.  The capacity of law enforcement agencies, in particular customs authorities, should be 
strengthened by providing training and sharing best practice for detecting shipments of 
new substances and precursors at European borders and within the postal, transport 
and logistic services.
4.  The capacity of forensic science laboratories to identify new substances and precursors 
should be increased. This should include mechanisms to allow analytical data, 
reference materials and expertise to be shared.
5.  There is a need to systematically monitor online market places, particularly those selling 
wholesale quantities on the surface web and anonymous marketplaces, and to develop 
partnerships with industry to restrict illegal activities.
6.  An improved understanding of the production of new substances within Europe, the 
involvement of crime groups and the interaction between the new substances market 
and the established market in controlled drugs is urgently required and could be 
achieved through intelligence sharing, research and monitoring, and threat assessment.
Marketing and retail supply
7.  Greater knowledge of the methods used by those involved in the retail market is 
needed, as is research on the marketing strategies used, in order to develop more 
effective supply and demand reduction interventions.
8.  There is a need to improve intelligence on bricks-and-mortar shops as well as retail 
surface web vendors and anonymous marketplaces selling new substances to develop 
effective interventions, e.g. developing partnerships with industry to restrict illegal 
activities.
New substances — greater risks?
9.  The capacity to identify and report serious adverse events associated with new 
substances should be increased, including the monitoring of open source information. 
This will facilitate the timely identification of emerging toxicological problems and 
support an earlier response at national and EU level.
10.  Forensic toxicology laboratories engaged in identifying new substances in biological 
samples associated with serious harms must be supported. This should include 
mechanisms to allow analytical data, reference samples and expertise to be shared.
11.  EU-level and national initiatives should be developed to strengthen cooperation 
between public health and law enforcement agencies in order to rapidly identify and 
remove substances causing immediate and pronounced threat to public health from 
the market.
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12.  Research into the pharmacology and toxicology of new substances should be 
prioritised according to signals identified by the EU Early Warning System.
13.  Evidence-based responses to use should be developed, including appropriate harm 
reduction services tailored for the broad range of user groups.
III
PART III 
Tackling the illicit drug market
CHAPTER 8
Drug supply reduction policies and 
responses
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Drug supply reduction is part of several policy areas at the 
EU level and a core component of the drug strategies and 
responses of Member States. This section of the report 
looks at the main EU policies and strategies addressing drug 
supply reduction, the supporting institutional arrangements, 
and some of the operational actions undertaken by the EU, 
Member States and international partners.
Relevant EU strategic actions
The EU drugs strategy (2013–20) and action plan 
(2013–16) provide a framework for addressing illicit 
drugs in the EU, complementing Member States’ national 
strategies and supporting joint actions. In the area of 
supply reduction, the framework reflects the challenges 
identified earlier in this report. These include the dynamic 
nature of illicit drug markets, changes in trafficking 
routes and the role of cross-border organised crime and 
new technologies in the trafficking of illicit drugs and 
new psychoactive substances (NPS). It also notes the 
importance of preventing the diversion of drug precursors 
and cutting agents from licit industries that can be used 
in the production of illicit drugs (Council of the European 
Union, 2012a).
The overarching objective of the EU drugs strategy 
(2013–20) in the area of supply reduction is a measurable 
reduction of the availability of illicit drugs, through:
 n the disruption of illicit drug trafficking;
 n the dismantling of OCGs that are involved in drug 
production and trafficking;
 n efficient use of the criminal justice system;
 n effective intelligence-led law enforcement and increased 
intelligence sharing;
 n an EU-level emphasis on large-scale, cross-border and 
organised drug-related crime.
Tackling groups involved in the illicit drug trade is an 
important element in the EU policy cycle for organised 
and serious international crime (the policy cycle), through 
which EU Member States coordinate common priorities 
and operational action. The policy cycle consists of four 
main steps: (1) policy development, (2) priority setting, 
(3) implementation and monitoring, and (4) evaluation 
of the current policy cycle and definition of the next one. 
The process involves the Presidency of the Council, the 
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on 
Internal Security (COSI) and the European Commission 
developing a policy advisory document, based on the 
SOCTA produced by Europol (see Figure 8.1). This 
document is then used by the Council of the EU to 
agree conclusions, drafted by COSI, which define the 
crime priorities in the policy cycle — it is the Council’s 
responsibility to make political decisions in the justice 
and home affairs area. Subsequently, multi-annual 
strategic plans are established and implemented through 
operational action plans (OAPs), both of which are 
developed by the Member States, the Commission and 
the EU agencies under COSI’s coordination. Following 
this, project groups are established to manage each OAP. 
EMPACT functions as the coordination platform for the EU 
Member States and institutions to implement operational 
law enforcement actions and to develop and manage 
actions supporting the policy cycle. Amongst the priorities 
in the 2014–17 policy cycle, two specifically concern drugs: 
disrupting the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs 
in the EU, including NPS; and disrupting the cocaine and 
heroin trafficking into, and their distribution within, the EU.
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FIGURE 8.1
The policy cycle on organised and serious crime
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The production and trafficking of drugs are key issues in 
the EU’s renewed internal security strategy, ‘the European 
Agenda on Security 2015–20’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2015c). Drug smuggling has been identified as one 
of the activities contributing to organised cross-border 
crime. It challenges border control and the movement of 
people and goods and is a financing tool for terrorist and 
OCGs. These activities undermine the area of freedom, 
security and justice created by the EU. The European 
Agenda on Security notes the dynamic nature of drug 
markets, in particular the production of NPS within and 
outside of the EU. It also underlines the key role played by 
the EU policy cycle on organised and serious international 
crime against drug trafficking in the internal and external 
security policy nexus (31).
The European Agenda on Security recognises the 
importance of the European Maritime Security Strategy 
in addressing drug trafficking as a security issue. This 
includes, for example, the use of coordinated patrol 
actions and the establishment of interoperable information 
systems. Similarly, it supports the approach taken in the 
European Agenda on Migration, given the links between 
OCGs involved in the trafficking of drugs and the facilitation 
of illegal migration (Council of the European Union, 2015c). 
The global nature of drug production and supply activities 
highlighted throughout this report makes the international 
responses an essential component of any EU action to 
(31) Detailed descriptions of the EU’s internal security policies as they relate to 
drug supply reduction are the subject of an EMCDDA report: http://www.
emcdda.europa.eu/publications/emcdda-papers/sr-internal-security
tackle drug markets. The EU engages in political dialogues 
with third countries in its immediate geographical 
neighbourhood and other parts of the world though EU 
delegations and the European External Action Service. 
This involves working with other regions and countries to 
achieve common goals, such as strengthening democracy 
and the rule of law, supporting trade, and promoting 
sustainable and alternative development. Drug issues 
often feature in these political conversations and as part 
of EU-level policy documents including drugs-specific and 
broader strategies, regional programmes, and political 
declarations and agreements.
Institutional, legal and financial 
arrangements
The multifaceted impact of drug markets means that a wide 
range of EU institutions are involved, alongside the Member 
States, in designing and implementing different aspects 
of the EU’s drug policy. Alongside these are the financial 
instruments and legislation that support the action taken to 
address the illicit drug phenomenon within the EU.
The main institutions, bodies and other structures involved 
in responding to illicit drug supply in Europe are highlighted 
in Figure 8.2, together with the main roles they undertake.
EU institutions and working groups
The EU consists of several institutions (32). Alongside 
the Member States, these institutions are tasked with 
designing and implementing different aspects of the EU’s 
drug policy through the different priorities and actions set 
out in strategic planning documents.
The EU institutions have different roles with respect to 
policymaking and implementation, and establishing any 
necessary legislation to implement policies. The European 
Parliament’s functions include passing laws, approving 
the EU budget and discussing EU policies (European 
Parliament, 2013). Drug issues arise in different areas 
of the Parliament’s work when, for example, it considers 
internal security matters or relations with non-EU countries 
(third countries).
(32) The European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union (the Council), the European Commission, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the European 
Court of Auditors. 
157
CHAPTER 8 I Drug supply reduction policies and responses 
The Council of the EU (the Council) adopts legislation 
(often in conjunction with the European Parliament), plays 
a policy coordination role for the Member States, devises 
the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), signs 
off on agreements between the EU and third countries, 
and adopts the EU’s annual budget (Council of the 
European Union, 2013a). The Council also has a number of 
committees and working groups that are involved in drug 
policy implementation, in particular COSI and the Horizontal 
Working Party on Drugs (HDG). COSI plays a leading role 
in defining, implementing, monitoring and evaluating EU 
activities in the policy cycle (Council of the European Union, 
2010). The HDG plays a central role in the development 
of EU drugs strategies and action plans and its purview 
encompasses all areas of drug demand reduction and drug 
supply reduction (Council of the European Union, 1999). 
A number of other Council working groups also play an 
important role in drug policy including, for example, the 
Customs Cooperation Working Party, the Working Party on 
Customs Union and the Coordinating Committee in the area 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
The European Commission proposes new legislation, 
and is responsible for ensuring that Member States 
correctly implement EU laws (European Commission, 
2015a). Alongside drafting the EU’s annual budget and 
overseeing how funds are used, it undertakes international 
negotiations on behalf of the EU. It consists of 33 
Directorates-General (DGs). Because of their cross-cutting 
nature, drug supply reduction issues arise in a number of 
different areas of its work, but mainly within DG Migration 
and Home Affairs, and DG Justice. The Commission 
addresses all aspects of drug control policy, including the 
reduction of drug use and the prevention of drug-related 
crime and drug trafficking. It also proposes measures for 
the control of NPS and ensures the implementation of 
EU laws designed to prevent the diversion of chemical 
precursors for illicit drug production. Finally, it promotes 
European cooperation in addressing drug problems 
through the provision of financial assistance.
In addressing the EU’s capacity to deal with external action, 
the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU) called 
for the establishment of the post of High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (TEU 
article 15) and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) (TEU article 27) (Council of the European Union, 
2012b). The High Representative is in charge of the EEAS 
and is responsible for, among other things, conducting the 
EU’s CFSP, developing policy proposals and chairing the 
Foreign Affairs configuration of the Council. Assisting the 
High Representative, the EEAS develops policy proposals 
and implements after approval from the Parliament and 
the Council (European External Action Service, 2015). 
The EEAS oversees the EU delegations in more than 130 
countries, coordinates the EU’s external action and is the 
permanent chair of the Council’s Political and Security 
Committee, which is responsible for the CFSP. The EEAS 
also carries out the strategic programming for EU external 
assistance, which is then implemented by EuropeAid.
EU specialised agencies’ role against 
drug trafficking
Much of the implementation of the EU drug policy is 
undertaken by specialised EU agencies, in particular 
the two agencies that have produced this report, in 
collaboration with Member States.
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and  
Drug Addiction
The EMCDDA provides the EU and its Member States with 
factual, objective, reliable and comparable information 
at European level concerning drugs and drug addiction 
and their consequences (EMCDDA, 2010). It collects 
data from its Reitox national focal points on a range of 
drug supply reduction and demand reduction issues. 
This includes information about drug law offences, drug 
seizures, drug purity and potency, as well as retail prices 
FIGURE 8.2
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for drugs (EMCDDA–Europol, 2013). It also operates the 
Early Warning System (EWS) on NPS in conjunction with 
Europol and the European Police Office, and conducts risk 
assessments.
Europol
Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency, which supports 
law enforcement authorities through the exchange and 
analysis of criminal intelligence. As a result of Europol’s 
mandate, countering drug production, drug trafficking 
and money laundering is amongst the organisation’s 
recurring priorities (Figure 8.3). Evidence of this is that in 
the last decade almost 25 % of all messages exchanged 
via Europol relate to drugs. The recurring objective is to 
contribute to a measurable reduction of the availability of 
illicit drugs by providing strategic and operational services 
to law enforcement agencies. In the drugs supply reduction 
area, customised products and support services include 
operational analysis, technical and forensic expertise, 
on-the-spot support including dismantling of laboratories/
cultivation sites, technical and comparison reports on 
chemicals and equipment seized in illegal synthetic drug 
production/storage locations and waste dump sites, 
operational meetings, participation in joint investigation 
teams (JITs), execution of asset tracing requests and training 
events (e.g. dismantling illicit synthetic drugs laboratories). 
Europol also carries out threat assessments and produces 
the SOCTA and the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend 
Report, which inform policymaking and planning processes, 
such as the policy cycle. It works with EU Member States 
through Europol national units and functions as a specialist 
information hub, supporting policing operations throughout 
the EU and beyond. It operates the Europol Criminal Assets 
Bureau and the Europol Cyber Crime Centre. Europol 
provides secretariat services for the Camden Asset Recovery 
Inter-Agency Network (CARIN). It facilitates action under 
the EU policy cycle through its specialised information 
services and supports EMPACT, through which coordinated 
operational actions are implemented. Europol hosts a wide 
Liaison Officer (LO) network from all Member States of 
the EU and from other countries with which Europol has 
concluded an operational agreement. The major national 
law enforcement agencies are also represented, therefore, 
in addition to having access to LOs of nearly 40 different 
countries, Member States have access to a large panel of 
law enforcement expertise.
Eurojust
Eurojust is the EU judicial cooperation unit, which facilitates 
and coordinates cooperation in cross-border serious crime 
cases, helping Member States to collaborate and synchronise 
their investigations and prosecutions. Its work covers the 
activities of OCGs, such as drug trafficking and money 
laundering. Eurojust can ask Member States to investigate or 
prosecute a crime, to work together and to establish a JIT and, 
for example, works with EU Member States on the use and 
coordination of controlled deliveries of illicit drugs (Eurojust, 
2015a). It works closely with the European Judicial Network 
and Europol, and assists national authorities with the use of 
mutual legal assistance and mutual recognition legal tools 
(e.g. European arrest warrants).
Drug trafficking continues to be one of the most common 
criminal offences dealt with by Eurojust. Between January 
2013 and December 2014, Eurojust registered 527 
high-level drug trafficking cases, a slight increase from 
512 in 2011–12 and 484 in 2009–10. It also organised 11 
coordination meetings with prosecutors and investigators 
in the same period, while 21 JIT agreements were signed, 
up from 10 in the 2-year period 2010–11 (Figure 8.4 and 
Case study 10 in Chapter 4).
The geographic distribution of cases referred to Eurojust 
has not changed much in recent years. The Member 
States most involved in these types of cases, as indicated 
by requesting and being asked for judicial cooperation in 
2013–14, were Spain (178 cases; 46 requests made and 
132 requests received) and the Netherlands (140 cases; 
15 requests made and 125 received), followed by Italy 
(97 cases in total), France (84), Germany (82), Belgium 
(75) and the United Kingdom (70). More detailed analysis 
of these interactions between countries reveals the central 
role played by Spain and France, closely followed by the 
Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Germany, in Eurojust 
casework (see Figure 8.4). In 2015, based on the analysis 
FIGURE 8.3
Europol supporting national authorities
Europol officer at work in Palermo, Italy, during a 10-tonne 
cannabis resin seizure in June 2015.
Photo © Europol
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of its casework, Eurojust published the ‘Implementation 
Report of the Action Plan on Drug Trafficking’ (Eurojust, 
2015b), which focused on and made recommendations 
concerning a number of areas highlighted elsewhere in 
this report, including controlled deliveries from a judicial 
perspective; judicial cooperation in cases involving NPS 
and (pre)precursors; and cooperation with third states. 
Frontex
Drug supply reduction issues arise in several areas of 
the work of the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union (Frontex). The Agency 
was established to improve the integrated management of 
the external borders of the EU. Among others, it carries out 
risk analysis, launches joint operations at the EU’s external 
(air, land and sea) borders, facilitates research and develops 
training standards. While fulfilling its mandate, Frontex 
liaises closely with international partners such as Europol, 
Eurojust, CEPOL, Interpol and the UNODC. Frontex develops 
and operates information systems enabling the exchange 
of information, including the European Border Surveillance 
System (Eurosur). Joint operations coordinated by Frontex 
have a multi-purpose character, and in addition to tackling 
irregular migration they aim to prevent and counteract 
cross-border crime, including drug trafficking.
According to statistics covering 2014 and the first half of 
2015 that Frontex made available to the EMCDDA for this 
report, the drugs most often seized are cannabis (both 
herb and resin) and heroin. Most of the heroin seized 
during Frontex-coordinated operations was confiscated 
at land border-crossing points, mostly with countries 
of the western Balkans, reflecting trafficking along the 
Balkan route, although some was also seized in Greece in 
a maritime context. In contrast, most of the cannabis was 
seized at sea or in ports, with most resin seizures occurring 
at the external borders of Spain and most seizures of 
herbal cannabis at the external borders of Italy. A significant 
exception was the seizure of 12 tonnes of cannabis resin 
FIGURE 8.4
Eurojust casework in drug trafficking, 2013–14
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FIGURE 8.5
Technical equipment used for chemical identification
Handheld chemical identification analyser devices used on a synthetic drug manufacturing site in Belgium in 2015.
Photos © Europol
by Italian authorities, from a Turkish cargo ship coming 
from Morocco, in June 2015 in the Strait of Sicily, within 
the operational area of Joint Operation Triton. This case 
illustrates the emergence of Moroccan resin trafficking 
routes towards the eastern Mediterranean as highlighted in 
Chapter 3 of this report.
CEPOL
CEPOL, the European Police College, is involved in building 
police cooperation across the EU. It provides a wide range 
of training courses relevant to different aspects of supply 
reduction and security activities, for example, a training 
course on dismantling illicit synthetic drug laboratories 
(Figure 8.5) (CEPOL, 2015). In conjunction with Europol 
and the EMCDDA, it provides training to national law 
enforcement officers on a range of topics, influenced 
by the findings of the previous EU drug markets report 
(EMCDDA–Europol, 2013). Training is delivered in a range 
of different formats, including residential courses, webinars 
and exchange programmes, which together had a total of 
1 390 participants in 2013 and 2014 (Table 8.1). Although 
the majority of participants come from EU Member States, 
others were from candidate and acceding countries, EU 
bodies and networks, and other countries and organisations.
EU legislation
The EU has adopted legislative tools designed to 
discourage and disrupt drug smuggling, bringing OCGs 
TABLE 8.1
CEPOL drugs and drug-related course information, 2013–15
2013 2014 2015
Grand 
total
Residential Webinars Total Residential Webinars Total Residential Webinars Total 2013–15
Drug-specific  30  56  86 151 345   496 134 403   537 1 119
JIT-related  81 196 277  84  86   170 119  85   204   651
Financial 
investigations
 54   0  54  29  91   120  89 339   428   602
Other drug-
related
148 320 468 124  66   190 142 238   380 1 038
European Police 
Exchange 
Programme
 18    30    31    79
Total by year 903 1 006 1 580 3 489
Source: CEPOL, 2015.
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to justice and depriving them of the proceeds from their 
activities (Table A.1 in Annex). The trade in drug precursors 
has been regulated to prevent diversion to illicit drug 
production (see box ‘Combating the supply of illegal drugs 
at the source — drug precursors control in the EU’ on page 
163), and provision has been made for the movement of 
samples of controlled drugs during investigations (Council 
of the European Union, 2001, 2005a; European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union, 2004). A response 
to the emergence of NPS involving a three-step process 
of information exchange, risk assessment and control has 
been implemented, resulting in EU-wide bans on certain 
drugs (Council of the European Union, 2005b, 2014a).
Financial instruments
As part of its comprehensive drug supply reduction 
approach, the EU finances a wide range of activities 
within and outside the EU. Financial instruments with 
a broad focus are used to implement the drug supply 
reduction, international cooperation and other objectives 
of the EU drugs strategy (2013–20) and its action plan 
(2013–16) (see table A.2 in Annex). These instruments 
fall into four categories: framework programmes (e.g. the 
Internal Security Fund); programmes for EU candidate and 
potential candidate countries (e.g. Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance); geographic or regional programmes 
(e.g. European Neighbourhood Policy); and specific 
programmes that complement geographic ones (e.g. 
Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability). The tools 
are funded through the EU budget and in cooperation with 
consortiums of Member States and international partners.
Operational actions and 
initiatives
The supply reduction objectives of the policy and legislative 
frameworks outlined above are addressed through a range 
of different activities and initiatives, which target different 
aspects of drug markets that may be grouped into three 
broad categories. First are those that directly target the 
drug markets and those engaged in production and supply 
activities. The second category target the facilitators of 
drug supply activities, for example the large sums of money 
and the professionals who assist in various ways. Finally, 
other activities seek to address those factors that underpin 
engagement in drug production and trafficking, the poverty 
and other conditions that make people participate in 
production and dealing as a survival strategy, and the 
weak and unstable states that facilitate criminal activities. 
Conceptualising responses at the EU and international 
levels on the basis of these categories together with the 
main types of response, i.e. coordination, capacity building 
and information sharing, provides a useful way of getting 
an overview of activity. The resulting typology is set out 
in the matrix in Table A.3 in Annex, with some examples 
of international activities provided without aiming at 
an exhaustive list. Some of the main programmes are 
described in more detail below to provide some insight 
into the wide range of initiatives being undertaken to tackle 
drugs in Europe.
Interventions targeting drug markets
The international nature of drug trafficking and its 
widespread ramifications means there are many 
organisations at national and international levels 
addressing the problem, and some examples 
demonstrating the range of programmes and international 
organisations involved are described here. Effective 
coordination mechanisms for the EU and its Member 
States and the development of intelligence-led policing 
are central to the EU’s approach to tackling organised 
crime. Europol’s intelligence reports and threat 
assessments are used as priority-setting tools for the 
Council’s working groups in defining what crime areas 
need to be urgently addressed. EMPACT is a coordination 
platform for the EU Member States and institutions 
to implement operational law enforcement actions, 
supporting defined EU-level crime priorities from the 
policy cycle. Bringing together representatives from 
the Member States, EU agencies, public and private 
organisations, and third countries, it is multidisciplinary 
in nature. It is here that the crime priorities agreed by the 
Member State representatives of COSI are implemented 
by National EMPACT Coordinators (NECs).
OCGs move large shipments of illicit drugs by sea, either 
on their own ships or using legitimate commercial vessels 
that carry cargo containers. Because of the large quantities 
that can be transported in this way, this mode of transport 
is becoming increasingly important. The European Agenda 
on Security (2015–20), the EU drugs strategy (2013–20) 
and the European Maritime Security Strategy seek to target 
maritime drug trafficking through intelligence sharing 
(Council of the European Union, 2012a, 2014b; European 
Commission, 2015b). Similarly, Eurosur is designed to 
enhance situational awareness and reaction capabilities at 
the EU’s external borders. National Coordination Centres 
(NCCs) bring together national authorities responsible 
for border security in one team, sharing information 
with Member States and Frontex. Eurosur allows the 
intelligence resources and interception capabilities of EU 
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Member States and Schengen countries to be used in 
a complementary way to interdict illicit drug smugglers 
(European Commission, 2014b).
When bulk shipments of illicit drugs are interdicted, 
OCGs suffer heavy financial losses, so targeting these 
is important. The MAOC-N is an operational platform for 
Member States and third countries and agencies set up 
principally to tackle the transatlantic flow of cocaine from 
South America to Europe. It was established in 2007 by 
seven EU Member States (Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom) and 
is funded by the European Commission. Its operation 
relies on the physical co-location of Member State liaison 
officers/experts from police and customs, and naval 
attachés, who are joined by the United States Drugs 
Enforcement Administration and the Joint Inter-Agency 
Task Force (SOUTH). This facilitates coordination, 
development and fusion of actionable intelligence and 
access to military and naval assets. The MAOC-N is further 
supported by, and collaborates with, a wide range of other 
EU and international agencies as well as other countries. 
This collaboration and intelligence sharing resulted in the 
seizure of more than 22 tonnes of cocaine and 63 tonnes 
of cannabis from a total of 29 successful interdictions 
between 1 October 2014 and 30 September 2015, with an 
estimated value of EUR 2 billion. The international nature 
of drug trafficking is illustrated by the fact that the 163 
primary arrests made involved prisoners from 26 different 
countries. The importance of this high level of collaboration, 
a one-team approach, is illustrated by the fact that in 
58 % of the interdictions, the Member State that made the 
intervention was different from that providing the primary 
intelligence. The growing reach of the MAOC-N is shown 
in recent seizures, in places ranging from Queensland, 
Australia (100 kg in June 2015), to the United Kingdom 
(3.2 tonnes in April 2015) (MAOC-N, 2015a,b).
The Cocaine Route Programme focuses on capacity 
building in countries along the cocaine supply route, 
establishing links between countries in West Africa, South 
America and the Caribbean. The programme seeks to 
support regional and transregional law enforcement and 
judicial cooperation in countries on the cocaine trafficking 
route. It does this through eight projects that address 
drug interdiction, targeting the proceeds of crime and 
enhancing information exchange (European Commission, 
2015d). The programme commenced in 2009 and 
involves the European Commission collaborating with a 
range of international partners. Through the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the Commission 
has contributed roughly EUR 50 million to the programme, 
supporting the implementation of projects in over 40 
countries.
Phase II of the ‘Fight against trafficking and organised 
crime on the Heroin Routes’ programme targets the 
trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan to Europe, which 
poses a range of shared security challenges for the EU and 
the countries on smuggling routes. With funding from the 
IcSP, the programme was established to counter the threat 
posed by OCGs. Through it the EU works in partnership 
with different organisations and governments impacted 
by the smuggling routes that pass through Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, the Central Asian countries, the Caucasus, the 
Black Sea Basin and the western Balkans. Its projects have 
focused on developing the capacity of regional agencies, 
implementing information systems, halting the flow of 
drugs and chemical precursors, developing Port Control 
Units (PCUs) and detecting drug trafficking (European 
Commission, 2014b).
The Container Control Programme (CCP) is an example 
of a direct intervention again targeting maritime shipping. 
The CCP is a capacity-building joint initiative operated by 
the UNODC and the World Customs Organization (WCO). 
Currently 40 countries participate. Through the programme, 
PCUs are established close to container terminals. From 
its establishment in 2004 up to 2014 some 100 tonnes of 
cocaine, almost 3 tonnes of heroin, 60 tonnes of cannabis 
and 1 275 tonnes of precursor chemicals were seized by 
PCUs. In 2014, some 19 428 kg of cocaine (67 seizures), 
466 kg of heroin (15 seizures), 4 593 kg of cannabis (30 
seizures) and 34 000 litres of precursor chemicals (two 
seizures) were seized (UNODC and WCO, 2015).
The operation of modern border controls lies at the 
heart of maintaining reliable trade routes and safe and 
secure societies. The Border Management Programme 
in Central Asia contributes to the security of Central 
Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). It implements integrated 
border management, enhancing the management of 
the movement of people and goods at border crossing 
points and developing the capacity of border agencies. 
The programme receives funding though the EU’s 
Development and Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and 
was allocated EUR 33.6 million between 2003 and 2014. 
Phase 9 of the programme, between 2014 and 2017, 
has a contribution of EUR 5.5 million from the EU and a 
consortium of EU Member States (EEAS, 2014; European 
Commission, 2015e). 
Globally, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are, after 
cannabis, the second most consumed illicit drugs, and 
the market for them is interlinked with the use of NPS. 
One response to the rapidly changing marketplace for 
these drugs is UNODC’s ‘Global Synthetics Monitoring: 
Analyses, Reporting and Trends’ (SMART) programme. It 
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is focused on capacity building in East and South-East 
Asia, the Pacific, the Near and Middle East, Latin America 
and Africa. It seeks to build capacity though the provision 
of technical support to Member States to help them 
collect and manage data on synthetic drugs, such as 
information from law enforcement. The programme aims to 
increase understanding of drug problems by reporting and 
providing early warning on emerging data. It also supports 
the development of evidence-based drug policies by 
developing policy-relevant information (UNODC, 2014f,g). 
Interventions targeting the facilitators of 
drug production and supply
Factors that facilitate drug production and supply include 
the availability of money to buy drugs and pay those 
involved in the business, professional services to both help 
with the drug supply activities and to assist with laundering 
and concealing the proceeds of crime, as well as access to 
precursors and logistical support. Some of these facilitators 
are specific to drugs but others are similar to other crime 
areas and so are covered by wider programmes.
In addition to the action by the EU and Member States 
to tackle the availability of chemical precursors used 
to manufacture illicit drugs (see box below), the INCB 
monitors the global trade in these substances and helps 
to foster collaboration. It operates several information 
systems in conjunction with national governments to 
facilitate transaction visibility, monitoring of importers and 
exporters, and the exchange of operational information 
(INCB, 2015a). Two on-going INCB projects function as 
platforms for monitoring licit trade, preventing diversions 
and launching time-bound operations. Project Cohesion 
targets chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin 
(acetic anhydride) and cocaine (potassium permanganate), 
while Project Prism addresses chemicals used to 
produce amphetamine-type stimulants (phenylacetic 
acid, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine). Additionally, the 
INCB’s Project ION (International Operations on New 
Psychoactive Substances) is an international operational 
initiative to support national authorities’ efforts to prevent 
non-controlled new substances from reaching consumer 
markets. A specific focus is on synthetic substances 
with little or no known medical, scientific or industrial 
uses. Project ION activities are primarily engaged in the 
coordination, collection and communication of strategic 
and operational information related to suspicious 
Combating the supply of illegal drugs at the source — drug precursors control in the EU
Drug precursors, chemicals needed to manufacture 
illicit drugs, have primarily large and varied legitimate 
uses such as in the production of plastics, medicinal 
products, cosmetics, detergents and aromas. Because 
many uses are legitimate, trade in drug precursors 
cannot be prohibited but, instead, their licit trade needs 
to be monitored to ensure they are not ‘diverted’ to illicit 
uses. Preventing the diversion of drug precursors can 
be an effective and efficient way of limiting the supply of 
illegal drugs and is therefore an important part of the EU 
drugs strategy.
The EU legislation on drug precursors implements Article 
12 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against 
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances via two basic regulations:
 n Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 on trade in drug 
precursors between EU and third countries, amended 
by Regulation (EU) No 1259/2013;
 n Regulation (EC) No 273/2004, on trade in drug 
precursors within the EU, amended by Regulation (EU) 
No 1258/2013.
The amendments to both regulations in 2013 
significantly strengthened powers to control the 
export of medicinal products containing ephedrine or 
pseudoephedrine (precursors for methamphetamine), 
and the use of acetic anhydride (precursor for heroin) 
in the EU and the use of so-called ‘non-scheduled 
substances’ in illegal drug manufacture. Additionally, it 
is now possible to react more quickly to new diversion 
trends and add new chemicals to the lists of scheduled 
substances through a fast-track procedure.
Seizures and stopped shipments of drug precursors are 
useful indicators of the scale and type of illegal drug 
manufacture. For instance, during the period 2012–13 
the seizures of PMK (a precursor for ecstasy) increased 
significantly, suggesting that the illegal manufacture of 
ecstasy in the EU was increasing again after a period 
of lower production. The European Commission, the EU 
Member States and the EMCDDA are currently working 
on improving the data collection and analysis of seizures 
and stopped shipments of drug precursors, and the 
Database on Drug Precursors has been established for 
the collection and processing of statistics on seizures 
and stopped shipments on a quarterly basis.
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shipments of, trafficking in, or manufacture or production 
of, new substances. Real-time communication of such 
incidents is shared using a secure online communication 
platform known as the Project ION Incident Communication 
System (INCB, 2015b).
A directive on preventing financial systems being 
used for money laundering or terrorist financing, and a 
regulation on information accompanying fund transfers 
were adopted in 2015 (European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union, 2015a,b). The European 
Commission works with different organisations to develop 
and implement anti-money laundering responses and is 
a member of the international Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF). Europol provides support to CARIN, which covers 
over 50 jurisdictions and includes EU Member States. 
It addresses all stages of the process of asset recovery 
including asset tracing, freezing and seizing, management, 
confiscation/forfeiture, and sharing (Europol, 2013).
The Egmont Group of Financial Investigation Units is a 
world-wide entity whose aim is to facilitate the enquiries of 
inter-financial investigation units across borders. It provides 
a forum for national financial intelligence units and their 
cooperation, particularly in the areas of information 
exchange, training and the sharing of expertise. Presently 
the Group comprises 151 member financial intelligence 
units.
Interventions tackling the conditions 
enabling drug supply
Factors that enable drug supply are often social factors that 
require a local response. Hence, many of the interventions 
tackling these are local in nature. At the EU and 
international levels, as is the case for direct interventions, 
the focus is on sharing best practice, coordination and 
intelligence sharing.
The overlap between drug trafficking and human 
trafficking and exploitation, which itself overlaps with 
illegal immigration issues, is discussed in Chapter 1. The 
wider efforts to tackle illegal immigration are therefore 
of relevance to drug control efforts. Each Member State 
is represented in non-Member States by an immigration 
liaison officer (ILO), who facilitates the measures taken 
by the EU to combat illegal immigration and maintains 
contacts with the authorities in the host country in order 
to improve exchanges of information concerning, inter 
alia, the routes followed by flows of immigrants and 
the existence of criminal organisations involved in the 
smuggling of immigrants. The network of the ILOs pools 
the actions taken by the officers and enables them to liaise 
with one another.
A number of Member States also use multi-institutional 
approaches to combat human trafficking, whether 
for sexual or labour exploitation, as well as organised 
crime in general. Such approaches try to go beyond the 
boundaries of traditional criminal investigation by police 
and the judicial authorities, with administrative and law 
enforcement agencies working together and contributing 
their specialist knowledge and competences in combating 
and preventing crime (Bundeskriminalamt, 2012). The 
‘multi-institutional approach’ is based on the so-called 
‘barrier model’, which involves the identification of suitable 
agencies or areas where barriers can be set up to impede 
the activities of criminals. In the Netherlands, for example, 
such barriers are being established in the following areas: 
access (smuggling, border crossing); accommodation 
(prostitution precinct, illegal housing); identity (forged 
papers, forged social security documents); work (exploiters, 
violence, exploitation); and finance (money laundering, 
investments). This ‘barrier model’ aims to identify providers 
of illegal services as well as illegal activities at all five 
stages of the model. The model simultaneously relies on 
the training and on the intensive exchange of information 
between government agencies involved in the fight against 
human trafficking. Financial investigations also form an 
integral part of the model.
Another concern in many countries is the rise of gang 
violence in disadvantaged communities, which is often 
linked to drug dealings at a number of different levels. The 
European Platform for Gang Expert Virtual Community is an 
exchange platform for national experts on motorcycle gang-
related crime and current developments with relevance to 
the wider European network. A number of Member States 
have programmes that seek to prevent disadvantaged 
young people becoming involved in gangs, for example the 
‘Ending Gang and Youth Violence’ programme in the United 
Kingdom (HM Government, 2015).
The EU and its Member States are involved in many 
international actions with different organisations and 
countries. Both the EU drugs strategy (2013–20) and its 
action plan (2013–16) designate international cooperation 
as an important cross-cutting issue. The EU contributes 
to action against the production and trafficking of drugs 
through, for example, its financial support provided by the 
European Commission for the UNODC.
Alternative development in countries impacted by the 
cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit drugs is a 
core part of international cooperation. Action 32 of the 
EU drugs action plan (2013–16) calls for alternative 
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development to be integrated into EU programming 
and external assistance through projects in source and 
transit countries. The European Commission and the 
EEAS operate funding instruments that finance projects 
in different countries. For example, the EU is actively 
involved in helping Afghanistan recover from conflict 
and provides financial support through the DCI. In the 
2014–20 Multi-annual Indicative Plan for Afghanistan, 
the level of indicated EU funding for the country amounts 
to EUR 1.4 billion (European Commission and European 
External Action Service, 2014a). Similarly, the EU supports 
alternative development in the countries where most 
cocaine is produced (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru), and 
in Latin America generally, through the European Union 
and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (EU-CELAC) Action Plan (2013–15) (Council 
of the European Union, 2013b, 2015c). Under the 
DCI, indicative financing for 2014–20 in the region is 
EUR 805 million for Latin America and EUR 120 million 
for subregional cooperation with Central America. Drug 
issues are, for example, part of the programming covering 
the Security-Development Nexus, with indicative funding 
of EUR 70 million (European Commission and European 
External Action Service, 2014b).
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Abbreviations
APAAN alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile
ATS amphetamine-type stimulants
BHO butane hash/honey oil
BMK benzyl methyl ketone
CARIN Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network
CBD cannabidiol
CCP Container Control Programme
CEPOL European Police College
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMF Combined Maritime Forces
COSI Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security
DCI Development and Cooperation Instrument
DG Directorate-General
DIMS Dutch Drug Information and Monitoring System
EACN European Contact-point Network against corruption
EDF European Development Fund
EEAS European External Action Service
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EILCS Europol Illicit Laboratory Comparison System
EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats
ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
EPAC European Partners Against Corruption
ERISSP European Reporting Instrument on Sites related to Synthetic Production
EU European Union
EU-CELAC European Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
Eurosur European Border Surveillance System
EWS Early Warning System
4-FA 4-fluoroamphetamine
FATF Financial Action Task Force
Frontex
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GBL gamma-butyrolactone
GHB gamma-hyroxybutyrate
HDG Horizontal Working Party on Drugs
IcPS Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ILO immigration liaison officer
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
ION International Operations on New Psychoactive Substances
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IPA II Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
IQR interquartile range
ISF Internal Security Fund
JIT joint investigation team
LSD lysergic acid diethylamide
MAOC-N Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics
MDA methylenedioxyamphetamine
MDMA 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine
MDPV methylenedioxypyrovalerone
MSM methylsulphonylmethane
NCC National Coordination Centre
NGO non-governmental organisation
NPS new psychoactive substance(s)
OAP operational action plan
OCG organised crime group
OMCG outlaw motor cycle gang
PAA phenylacetic acid
PCU Port Control Unit
PMK piperonyl methyl ketone
PMMA para-methoxymethamphetamine
SMART Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting and Trends
SOCTA Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment
StAR Stolen asset Recovery Initiative
TEU Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty)
THC tetrahydrocannabinol
Tor the Onion Router
UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
WCO World Customs Organization
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TABLE A.1
Principal EU legislation linked to drug supply reduction
Drug precursors
Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on 
drug precursors
Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 of 22 December 2004 laying down rules for the monitoring of 
trade between the Community and third countries in drug precursors
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/1011 of 24 April 2015 supplementing Regulation (EC) 
No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on drug precursors
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1013 of 25 June 2015 laying down rules in respect of 
Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on drug precursors and of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between the Union 
and third countries in drug precursors
Risk assessment and control of new psychoactive substances
Council Decision 2005/387/JHA of 10 May 2005 on the information exchange, risk-assessment and 
control of new psychoactive substances
Council Implementing Decision of 25 September 2014 on subjecting 4-iodo-2,5-dimethoxy-N-(2-
methoxybenzyl)phenethylamine (25I-NBOMe), 3,4-dichloro-N-[[1-(dimethylamino)cyclohexyl]methyl]
benzamide (AH-7921), 3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV) and 2-(3-methoxyphenyl)–2-
(ethylamino)cyclohexanone (methoxetamine) to control measures (1)
Forensic analysis and criminal investigation
Council Decision of 28 May 2001 on the transmission of samples of controlled substances (2001/419/
JHA)
Council Recommendation of 30 March 2004 regarding guidelines for taking samples of seized drugs 
(2004/C 86/04)
Information exchange
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange 
of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the 
European Union (‘the Swedish initiative’)
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (‘Prüm Decision’)
Judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters
Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union 
the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union (2000/C 197/01)
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams (2002/465/JHA)
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA)
Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime
Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant 
for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters
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Proceeds of crime
Council Decision of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial 
intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information
Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, 
seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime (2001/500/JHA)
Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on confiscation of crime-related 
proceeds, instrumentalities and property
Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between asset recovery 
offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identification of proceeds from, or other property 
related to, crime
Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing
(1) Similar legislation exists for a number of other substances. 
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TABLE A.2
Financial instruments supporting drug supply reduction
EU internal action
The Internal Security Fund (ISF)
– ISF Borders and Visa
– ISF Police
The Justice Programme
The EU Health Programme
Horizon 2020
EU external action 
Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability (IcPS)
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
– European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
– TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange)
Development and Cooperation Instrument (DCI)
European Development Fund (EDF)
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
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TABLE A.3
EU and international supply reduction interventions — matrix of examples
Target →
Intervention 
type↓
Drug markets Facilitation of supply Conditions enabling 
supply
Coordination n  EMPACT Working Groups and 
OAPs on heroin, cocaine and 
synthetic drugs
n  Europol National Units (ENUs): 
coordination of national contacts 
and operations
n  MAOC-N and CeCLAD-M  
EU/international coordination 
of maritime anti-smuggling 
operations
n  Southeast European Law 
Enforcement Center (SELEC) 
Regional Centre for EU/
international coordination of law 
enforcement (LE) anti-drugs 
operations in the Balkan Region
n  BSTF for EU/international regional 
coordination of LE anti-drugs 
operations in the Baltic Sea 
Region
n  CARICC regional coordination of 
LE anti-drugs operations in the 
Central Asian Region
n  Joint Investigation Teams (JITs)
n  INCB projects ‘Prism’ 
and ‘Cohesion’ 
and ‘ION’: targeting 
precursors
n  Prevention of the 
diversion of drugs 
precursors in the 
Latin American and 
Caribbean region 
(PRELAC)
n  Camden Asset 
Recovery Inter-Agency 
Network (CARIN)
n  The Network of the 
Immigration Liaison 
Officers
n  West African Police 
Information System 
(WAPIS)
Capacity 
building
n  Cocaine Routes Programme  
Airport Communication 
Programme (AIRCOP), the 
Seaport Cooperation Programme 
(SEACOP)
n  Heroin Routes Programme
n  Border Management Programme 
in Central Asia (BOMCA)
n  Central Asia Drug Action 
Programme (CADAP)
n  Container Control Programme
n  Global SMART programme
n  The Paris Pact
n  Europol training on dismantling 
illicit synthetic drug laboratories
n  Heroin route I — fight against 
trafficking from and to Afghanistan
n  Heroin route II — container control 
along the heroin route
n  The Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF)
n  Supporting Anti-
Money Laundering 
and Financial Crime 
Initiatives in Latin 
America (GAFILAT-EU)
n  CEPOL training 
courses
n  Supporting Anti-
Money Laundering 
and Financial Crime 
Initiatives in West 
Africa (AML-WA)
n  Stolen asset Recovery 
Initiative (StAR)
n  EU-funded 
Alternative 
Development 
and Sustainable 
Development 
support
n  Generalised Scheme 
of Preferences (GSP) 
on exports to EU
n  World Bank 
programmes under 
Governance and 
Anti-corruption 
Strategy
Intelligence 
gathering 
and 
exchange
n  Europol Focal Points with 
contribution of LE intelligence 
from EU Member States and 
international operational partners
n  SIENA network secure 
communication of intelligence 
between EU Member States and 
international operational partners
n  MAOC–N and CeCLAD-M 
intelligence gathering on maritime 
anti-smuggling operations
n  INTERPOL’s I-24/7 secure police 
communication system
n  Heroin route II — information 
networks along the heroin route
n  The Egmont Group of 
Financial Investigation 
Units
n  Europol Platform for 
Gang Experts (EPGE) 
(virtual Community)
n  Network of 
Immigration Liaison 
Officers
n  Strengthening 
cooperation of law 
enforcement, judicial 
and prosecuting 
authorities in 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
(AMERIPOL-EU)
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About this report
The EU Drug Markets Report 2016 is the second comprehensive overview of illicit drug 
markets in the European Union by the EMCDDA and Europol. The analysis presented 
in this report spans numerous topics such as the links between drugs and other 
crimes, the licit economy and society more generally as well as the processes and 
players involved in the trade from production and trafficking to distribution. Taking an 
evidence-based approach, the report reviews the markets for heroin, cocaine, cannabis, 
amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA and new psychoactive substances. It also 
provides concrete action points to inform policy development at EU and national level.
This publication is an essential reference for law enforcement professionals, 
policymakers, the academic community and indeed for anyone seeking up-to-date 
information and analysis on drug markets in Europe.
About the EMCDDA
The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is the central 
source and confirmed authority on drug-related issues in Europe. For over 20 years, 
it has been collecting, analysing and disseminating scientifically sound information 
on drugs and drug addiction and their consequences, providing its audiences with an 
evidence-based picture of the drug phenomenon at European level. Based in Lisbon, 
the EMCDDA is one of the decentralised agencies of the European Union.
www.emcdda.europa.eu
About Europol
Europol is the European Union’s law enforcement agency whose mission is to support 
its Member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international and 
organised crime and terrorism. Europol employs almost 1 000 staff at its headquarters 
in The Hague. They provide a unique and evolving set of operational products and 
services to EU law enforcement authorities for their everyday work, including efforts 
to tackle illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, cybercrime and terrorism. Europol’s 
focus is to look further ahead for more opportunities to streamline cooperation and the 
fight against organised crime and terrorism, with the ultimate goal of achieving a safer 
Europe for the benefit of all EU citizens.
www.europol.europa.eu
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